Paul Rioux has the skinny on the consent judgement filed today in the new Parish lawsuit against the landfill. Rioux describes it as a “stunning reversal” for Fred Heebe. True dat but it is also true Heebe’s balls are in a big vice as well. For Team Young and Parish Attorney Deb Foshee this represents a big win politically and we gotta give props to Foshee in particular.
Now if memory serves Mayor Mitcho didn’t renegotiate one waste contract for the City of NOLA. He may want to change that IMHO.
sop
So, please permit me to sak an obtuse question (pretermitting for the moment whether the "tea leaves" might signal indictments of River Birch's principals), namely: "Are the citizens of Jefferson Parish better served by "the contract" being fulfilled by Waste Management or IESI rather than by River Birch?" Stated another way, "Does the possibility exist that ALL of the 'players' in the waste disposal business are a bunch of crooks, with their own 'relationships' withe the 'pure as the driven snow' Jefferson Parish Council?" Just asking. Ashton O'Dwyer.
Ashton, you better believe ALL of them are crooks; and the Council of Clowns are telegraphing every move. The contract(s) with IESI stink just as bad as the River Birch deal. The original collection contract skated by during the early days of the Whitmer/Broussard unraveling. Remember the chairman of the committee that changed the grading process after the results of the bids were first graded and made public which miraculously gave the garbage collection contract to IESI was the very same d-bag that was on committees for both the River Birch deal and the JPAC theater, nearly destroyed the fire protection throughout the parish, finished-off the animal shelter and has now weaseled his way back as the personal tirlit paper for both Councilclowns-at-large – (spit) Deano Bonano (spit).
I am going to make a prediction…….IESI/Progressive Waste will buy the River Birch landfill.
RB consent J to void JP contract is an admission by Frederick R. Heebe to public corruption. CIVIL RICO before Judge Lemelle by law SHOULD HAVE AS PART OF DAMAGES ONCE A J IS GRANTED TO PLAINTIFF WASTE MGT THE FORCED FORFEITURE OF ALL RB LANDFILL MONIES AND TITLE TO WASTE MGT. AS NEW OWNER OF THE RB LANDFILL.
CIVIL RICO WASTE MGT. FRILOT LAW FIRM WOULD REQUIRE ALL LANDFILL MONIES BE FORFEITED, NOT JUST MONIES FROM JP.
CO CONSPIRATORS WHO GET ARRAIGNED TODAY FOR CRIMINAL COUNTS OF PAYROLL FRAUD AND GOING TO GO AFTER FREDDY TO SAVE PRISON TIME. THESE ARE MY PREDICTIONS.
The TP Headlines: "River Birch Pulls Out…. " .TP, is that like in a forced rape when the rapist decides he's had enough screwing his victim and doesn't want to leave any DNA evidence "behind".
Like Sop states maybe somebody's balls were put in a high pressure vice- that will usually cause sudden excruciating pain and an unintended pullout even during the rapist's passionate enjoyment of its victim.
Too bad so sad but JP is tired of being screwed and its time the rapist(s) themselves get some time and suffer the same plight at Angola.
There is a deeper issue underlying all of these Parish landfill contracts – that of privatization of government services. The justification for privatization is greater efficiency. Businesses are just more efficient that government. But the downside is what we see here — corruption on an epic scale because the dollars are so big. Let's assume that Jefferson Parish owned the landfill property and Jefferson Parish had sanitation trucks and employees delivering garbage to the landfill. Inefficient – perhaps – but no profits, no bribes, no grand juries, no indictments. Perhaps it's time to rethink this privatization issue and look to see if other places still are getting by with the traditional governmental service.
PERFECT TIMING FOR A RE-POST:
Let me preface my following rant on retaining outside counsel, only to pay fees for conflicts that only exist because our corrupt public officials here in Jefferson Parish are arrogant, greedy and incompetent…
Again I will excerpt parts of Val Bracy’s interview with then Parish Attorney Tom Wilkinson as it relates to his, Parish President Broussard, CAO Tim Whitmer and ALL seven of the Council Clowns sitting at the time, conspire to use a RFP protocol instead of a bid process for the waste disposal issue concerning JP:
“…VAL: Why was it so important to do an RFP on this instead of putting it out to bid ?
TOM: State Law allows us to RFP Time contracts for diposal.
VAL: Why is it that a better deal than putting it out for bid?
TOM: Well, propasals allow us …anyone who wants to respond can respond and then we evalute the proposal.
VAL: So why is it a benefit to the parish to do a RFP instead of putting it out for bid?
TOM: Well, the law allows us to do the RFP.
VAL: So is it a better deal for the parish?
TOM: I think so.
VAL: Why ?
TOM: Cause it gives us an opportunity to evaluate the proposals that are made and make a best of decision we can make…”
So the charade begins … we have an incompetent and corrupt Parish Attorney tell us that what is illegal is legal … this is the law in JP because I say it is a la Louis Gruntz … we have an incompetent, corrupt and unqualified RFP committee illegally constituted with Wilkinson and two political hack lackeys, David Fos and Alan Gandolfi as the only voting members who just so happened to give River Birch the highest score over runner-up Concrete Busters …
BAM … the floodgates of the illegal conspiracy in awarding RIVER BIRCH a landfill monopoly are open… and continue to be investigated by the Federal Authorities as I write … however the crony outside lawyers on sitting on the banks willing to throw out defective legal-savers to these very same Jefferson parish Politico Mafioso who are costing the taxpayers of Jefferson Parish MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF DOLLARS … money wasted on a scam for only a few to profit by …
WTF … about these outside Attorney’s fees …A SUM TOTALING $396,800 DOLLARS re River Birch paid up to 08/01/2011:
1) GAUDRY, RANSON, HIGGINS, GREMILLION (Michael Peytavin) … negotiations with River Birch $146,788.87 … litigation with Waste Management et al $226,037__ TOTAL $372,826 DOLLARS
2) PHELPS, DUNBAR from a period between 01/01/2009 to 02/01/2011 in matters only referenced Waste Management, the Parish of Jefferson paid __________________ TOTAL $130,556 DOLLARS
3) MCCRANIE, SITRUNK, ANZELMO brought in to advise JP______ TOTAL $ 23,974 DOLLARS
[* I am sure an edited billing thru Dec 31, 2011 will round it out about 1/2 A MILLION DOLLARS]
[*NOTE that these monies do not include the TENS OF THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS that have been paid to CPAs and Engineers concerning this River Birch fiasco.]
So now I read that all of this money paid to the Gaudry, Ranson law firm and the Phelps Dunbar law firm has been pissed away as a result of incompetent advice given by Tom Wilkinson, Phelps Dunbar and Gaudry Ranson … is that right ? … 1/2 MILLION DOLLARS by the end of the year, with no end in sight concerning litigation as we start the new year !!!
The taxpayers/voters of Jefferson Parish have been and are continuing to be raped by outside legal fees brought on by corrupt officials and their gang of campaign contributing lawyers … and now we’re being told that the whole process of awarding River Birch an illegal landfill monopoly was fatally flawed in the first place … now that we have what appears to be a professional and competent new Parish Attorney we read this, and I quote from the T-P article:
“The parish contends that under state law, the contract should have been awarded through a competitive bidding process, not a more open-ended request for proposals, or RFP.”
“The parish's lawsuit, filed Tuesday in 24th Judicial District Court, said this would give River Birch an "exclusive franchise" to dispose of parish garbage. Such an arrangement can be made only through a competitive bidding process under a state law covering garbage collection and disposal contracts, the suit says.”
“The River Birch deal was drafted as a "time contract" under that same law, which does not require bids for garbage-disposal contracts lasting up to 25 years. But the parish's suit said the requirement that the parish close its rival dump and the inclusion of penalties if the parish takes its trash elsewhere amount to an "exclusive franchise," triggering the competitive bid requirement.”
“The suit also contends that because the contract does not include a clause that voids the deal if the Parish Council does not approve funding, the contract could force the parish to incur debt without approval from the State Bond Commission in violation of state law.”
River Birch landfill contract challenged with fresh strategy
Published: Thursday, December 01, 2011, 10:55 PM
By Paul Rioux, The Times-Picayune http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/12/ri…
Hopefully River Birch will be dammed by this lawsuit.
I mean really … no one from the law firm of Phelps Dunbar and/or the Gaudry law firm had enough sense to suspect that Wilkinson is not only incompetent, but corrupt to the core … it’s not like they had never been around this troglodyte; or was it collusion with these thug Jefferson Parish Politico Mafioso that drove this ludicrous billing of HUNDREDS AND HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS of unwarranted legal fees … where was the due diligence ?
Mr. Young, I know you voted 7-0 with your former Council Clown colleagues to award River Birch this criminal illegal monopoly that now also appears to be an illegal contract without that stigma attached. You can redeem yourself. I suggest it is high time that you instruct your Parish Attorney, along with Fortenberry at Risk Management, to explore the real possibility of suing these people for recovery of tax monies unnecessarily expended as a result of their negligence, gross or otherwise. The law firms can be sued under their E&O policy; Wilkinson also can be sued, and upon obtaining a Judgement against him, his retirement can be garnished ! Hell you might as well sue Broussard, Whitmer, Gruntz, Barton Fos, and Gandolfi, they all have big retirements to garnish as well !!!
NOW DO YOU GET IT MR. YOUNG ???
OH … and by the way Mr. Young …now would be a good time to suck it up and do the right thing as it relates to Ms. Vandenweghe … instead of paying a billion dollars in attorney’s fee to Phelps, Dunbar, the law firm which failed to do due diligence in the handling of this case in the first instance and lose as in the PRR lawsuit … settle up and then sue Phelps, Dunbar under their E&O to help recoup some of the dollars incurred in damages, costs and attorney’s fees owed to AMV.
REALLY … STOP … NOW … DEFENDING THE INDEFENSIBLE !!!
You only have to take the first step Mr. Young …
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sz2rYVFRIR4&fe…
Thanks for this information, Whitmergate. I want "the Public", and particularly victims of "the Broussard Flood", who have not seen a "sou" in over 6 years, to focus on one detail: Attorney Michael Peytavin of the law firm of Gaudry, Ranson, Higgins and Gremillion, who is the BLOOD RELATIVE SON and OFFSPRING of the Judge who is presiding over "the Broussard Flood" litigation, namely the "Honorable" – but IS he? -John Peytavin, has been paid at least $372,826 in legal fees by the Parish of Jefferson (the primary defendant in "the Broussard Flood" litigation) DURING THE PENDENCY OF "THE BROUSSARD FLOOD LITIGATION". And what has "Sonnyboy" Michael Peytavin (and his law firm) been paid by the Parish over and above what they were paid in the River Birch negotiations and in the Waste Management litigation? What were they paid by the Parish pre-KATRINA? What might they yet expect to be paid by the Parish in the pending matter or future matters? Do these quite large sums of money flowing from the parish to "Sonnyboy" taint "Daddy", much like the sibling relationship between former Parish Attorney Tom Wilkinson, who is the brother of U.S. Magistrate Jay Wilkinson, and CAUSED THE ENTIRE EASTERN DISTRICT BENCH TO RECUSE ITSELF IN THE BROUSSARD, PARKER AND WILKINSON CRIMINAL CASES SUA SPONTE, also warrant the sua sponte recusal of "Daddy" Judge John Peytavin in "the Broussard Flood" litigation? To borrow a line from Whitmergate: "Hey, Darleen Jacobs, Carol Rogers, and any other Members of the Plaintiffs' Liason Committee in "the Broussard Flood" litigation, ARE YOU LISTENING? Ashton O'Dwyer.
Correction to the post above: Landrieu did indeed renegotiate the River Birch contract earlier in 2011:
"Owners of the River Birch Landfill, where the city dumps its refuse under a 20-year agreement signed in 2000 by then-Mayor Marc Morial, agreed to a 15 percent reduction in the rate the city has been paying, bringing the cost down from $34.25 per ton to $29.11 per ton, starting July 1.
The company also agreed to return to the city control of the Florida Avenue Transfer Station, where private haulers can dump construction or commercial waste."
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/06/ne…
(T-P, 6/18/11)
Thanks for the correction and link Matt, mucho appreciated. Something about that whole deal stuck in my mind. I'm going to have to dig back into my notes.
sop
Do I understand correctly that the Judge in the Parish of Jefferson Broussard Flood Litigation ( John Peytavin) is the father of one of the attorneys ( Michael Peytavin) whose firm is defending the Parish of Jefferson against the Jefferson Parish Broussard Flood Litigation? If this is correct it would appear to be a HUGE CONFLICT OF INTEREST and JOHN PEYTAVIN would do well to immediately recuse himself and hope to high heaven no Federal Agencies want to look into his rulings to date. OMGosh. The entire judiciary in Louisiana appears to have an inability to recognize potentially fatal conflicts…aaaagh.
And Whitmergate: Is that the same Michael Peytavin who assisted indicted former Parish Attorney Tom Wilkinson ( for whom he, Michael Peytavin, worked as an Assistant Parish Attorney prior to joining the Gaudry, Hansen, Higgins, Gremillion firm) in drafting the RFP on River Birch? Aaaagh again. ( Note to self: check 'Metadata' on original RFP drafts floating back and forth between Wilkinson, Whitmer, Baby Butler, Peytavin, Heebe and Marnie Winter).
Oh and Whitmergate: on the subject of AMV's lawsuit(s); who are the players there? Have any lawyers shown up for the two defendants? Who is representing TheRiot? Presumably the Sistas of Satan are representing the Parish, correct? After the way Debbie Foshee socked it to River Birch the Parish may want to reconsider using outside counsel and just let Parish Attorney Foshee do her job…she obviously knows exactly what that job is and does it better than the past couple of jacklegs in the job.
Inquiring minds want to know…or maybe just curious minds want to know.
To SHARKPUPPET and SOP and NOWDY: This is not a personal attack, BUT WHERE THE FUCK HAVE YOU BEEN? I've been screaming about this CONFLICT for months, but got NO TRACTION WHATSOEVER. It sure would be nice if SLABBED elucidated on the concerns most recently expressed by "sharkpuppet". I'll stay in my hole, under the rock. Ashton O'Dwyer.
No offense taken Ashton. Sometimes it feels like we are all playing that game where you try to hit the pop-up head on the board as other heads keep popping up all around.
The amount of information out there about corruption, nepotism, conflicts, etc is a neverending story of its own and keeping up is overwhelming … thank God there is Slabbed to blog on and get all the great minds hitting on all cylinders.
Sometimes just getting the information out there in the Blogosphere is all we can do , that and pray that someone else will pick up the banner and march forward.
CORRECTION: The firm which is representing "da Pawish" in "the Broussard Flood" litigation is "Burglass and Tankersly", not "Gaudry, Ranson, et al". But that's "no never mind". The Judge's son has continued to profit handsomely from his representation of "da Pawish" during the pendency of "the Broussatd Flood" litigation. Why has this issue gotten NO TRACTION, even on SLABBED? Ashton O'Dwyer (and not "going away", unless I'm earmarked as a TERRORIST, again, for the second time, post-KATRINA).
The City of New Orleans had four trash/sanitation contracts: Richards, Metro, SDT and RB. The city renegotiated Richards, Metro, and SDT up front and there was a good amount of reporting on it, largely with teh angle as to teh controversy of minority contracting. However teh RB contract, though larger than the SDT contract, was rarely mentioned. There was no mention of the RB contract being under review until the TP directly questioned the city about it and even then there was little mention of it. Later of course as above in June 2011 a new deal was signed with little fanfare. However at a reduction of $34 to $29.11 that still seemed fairly low compared to what others have received, Kenner was paying around $25 and JP whether via WM or RB wa paying around $19-20.
The Gambit recently had a good report about the failures in the city's online and internal contract systems. In particular the ECRS (electronic contract routing system) has some failures. They mention the RB contract and point out that the original contract is not available online but teh amendment is.
http://www.bestofneworleans.com/gambit/broken-rec…
You can find what contracts are available here:
http://www.purchasing.cityofno.com/bso/
Go to Active Contracts; and then go to the last of 21 pages / 513 or so items and you will see the RB amendment. It's short, and shows the revised pricing. It's signed by AJ Ward (Jim?), the mayor, and Nanette Jolivette Brown the city attorney.
Note that the contract is shown as the "fourth" amended version, so the Gambit actually failed to mention that three other versions are not available online. Also on the .gov site Fazzio is shown as the vendor contact while Ward is teh one who signed the contract.
Here are a couple things the TP fails to mention: how much in actual contributions from all the RB and Ward related companies has Mitch Landrieu received between his first and second runs for mayor? Is it it over $30,000? Over $50,000? Whatever their prior reporting they may not realize the full extent of all these shell companies, heck the mayor may not.
The main article Gordon Russell (great writer, has done much for the city, nothing but thanks here especially post Katrina for his work) wrote for the TP was: 11/21/05.
Here is what the TP reported on his own visit with Heebe: "Russell also visited Heebe's home to pick up documents, and when Heebe asked him to stay for lunch, he accepted." Plus of course the chopper ride.
http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/2011/09/ww…
Who knows what the timing was of that visit, but if it was before the 11/21/05 report it might be interesting to ask where did he get the names an sources for his story.
Here are the people interviewed in that story:
Chuch Brown, DEQ – supported and approved the Old Gentill landfill
Nannette Jolivette (now Brown) – opposed and criticized the new landfill; she was also sanitation director under Marc Morial 1994-96 and next question is when was the first RB contract completed? At the time of the article she was described as "a lawyer"
A professor at Tulane – opposed to the new landfill
These are just questions asking for facts and pure speculation and questioning from the curious but very little information about the original formulation of the original contract and amendments and the connections between those doing the negotiations has really been discussed by the TP. Basically it's renegotiated and that's a done deal.
Turns out Russell's article is actually available online here:
http://www.watercenter.org/blog/WCorgarchives/200…
Have to scroll down though to "Landfill's Reopening Is Raising New Stink" (talk about foreshadowing…).
Ah, the TP (11/13/99):
"WARD: LANDFILL AD PURE GARBAGE – BUT GUIDRY PLANNING MAILER TO PROVE CLAIMS
Some say the commercial reeks of impropriety: A picture of New Orleans Mayor Marc Morial appears against a star-lit, cartoon sky as tiny clip-art garbage trucks crawl secretly across the screen to a landfill apparently in Jefferson Parish.
The images are a series of pictures including a smiling Jefferson Parish Councilman T.J. "Butch" Ward, a cascade of $20 bills and a puzzled Parish President Tim Coulon and old tin cans.
Candidate Shane Guidry's latest commercial, which infers Ward and Coulon profited from permitting a landfill owned by Ward's brother, has struck a nerve among those featured in it. Their resounding comment: Absolutely false.
Morial , Coulon and Jim Ward, who owns River Birch landfill along with businessman Fred Heebe, say they were unfairly dragged into a mud-slinging race. Coulon and Jim Ward swiftly issued statements denouncing the advertisement.
"It's such a bald-faced lie on every issue that it brought up," Jim Ward said.
The commercial claims that "Marc Morial 's New Orleans garbage" is being dumped in Jefferson Parish.
Not true, Jefferson and New Orleans officials said.
"It's blatantly false," Morial said, calling the portrayal "not even a stretch of the facts, it's just false."
New Orleans' residential garbage is taken to Livingston Parish, city spokeswoman Rhonda Spears said.
Guidry's campaign manager, Bill Allerton, said they stand behind the commercial.
"There's more than just residential garbage that goes into a landfill," Allerton said. "There's commercial garbage going into a landfill."
Morial 's image was used to imply "that this is coming from the City of New Orleans," Allerton said. Instead of developing a landfill on its own vacant property, New Orleans is building a theme park and trying to lure a racetrack, Allerton said, and "Jefferson is becoming the trash dump of southeast Louisiana."
Though the River Birch landfill bid on the city's residential garbage contract , that contract has not been awarded, officials said.
Jim Ward said he doesn't know how much garbage the landfill would receive if River Birch wins the contract .
"From what we have been told by other people … about 800 tons of garbage a day," he said, adding that the city hasn't made any garbage estimates clear.
The commercial also alleges that "the Parish Council gave the valuable landfill contract to Butch Ward's brother and nephew behind closed doors."
Others said the "closed door" meetings were executive sessions in which a council is allowed by state law to talk privately about legal issues.
And Councilman Ward said he has never voted on measures pertaining to the landfill.
Jefferson officials said River Birch has no contract with Jefferson Parish and never has.
Jim Ward called the commercial a direct affront.
"I'm a 72-year-old man who has worked hard all of my life to earn what I have," Ward said in a statement. "Now, at the end of my career, I find myself being slandered by a young man that got what he has from his daddy who openly admits to corruption and bribery involving Edwin Edwards and the Treasure Chest Casino case."
Another target of the commercial, Parish President Tim Coulon, said he did not profit personally from the licensing of River Birch .
*****His son, lobbyist Chris Coulon, was hired for about a year at "market salary" and "on a contractual basis" by the landfill company to secure contracts with several river parishes, Ward said. Chris Coulon was contracted for up to $50,000.
"He was specifically restricted from doing business with Jefferson Parish or anyone who did business with Jefferson Parish," Ward said.
Tim Coulon said his son was hired by a private company and worked for River Birch just like he legally could work for any private company.
"The issue is Butch's record against Shane's ridiculous promises," Coulon said. "It's not Tim Coulon and his family or anything relating to River Birch landfill, which is a privately owned landfill."
Guidry issued a statement saying he would mail out information to residents next week to back up his commercial. "I stand by the claims of my TV advertising," he said in the statement.
Morial , who said he received many angry calls from his constituents, said he found the commercial's message disconcerting. "All I can gather is that the guy is probably losing," he said.
"It's a sophisticated form of playing politics of dividing Orleans and Jefferson," Morial said. "Unfortunately, there may be hints of race in it." "
And don't forget that Nanette Jolivette Brown now has a Federal "job for life" as a Federal Judge in the Eastern District of Louisiana. I was too pre-occupied with opposing the nomination of Stephen Higginson to his Federal "job for life" on the Fifth Circus to be able to focus on Jolivette Brown. Neither she nor Higginson WERE ASKED ONE HARD QUESTION UNDER OATH DURING THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS (G. T. Ortous and "the Federal Bureau of Constipation" WHERE ARE YOU?). I'd reanny like to knoe "after the fact" how many cases Nanette Jolivette Brown has handled in her entire professional career in Federal Court. And how many cases has she tried to conclusion in Federal Court? My prediction is that "the numbers" will surprise all of us, and not favorably. The Congressional Judicial Confirmation Process is WOESE than when the "unqualified" Thomas G. Porteous was confirmed. Way to go, Guys! Ashton O'Dwyer.
Who needs notes when we got Finisterre 😉
Thanks for spelling out in detail what stuck in my mind. That rate still seems a bit high huh?
sop
Well Ms. Foshee … it seems that the ball is back in your court again … and with your background in E&O law I would think it time to discuss with Mr. Young the obvious:
That the CONSENT JUDGEMENT entered into by and with River Birch is evidence and proof positive of the lack of due diligence …
1) by not only the buffoon, former Parish Attorney Tom Wilkinson, including his lackeys David Fos and Alan Gandolfi, also voting members of the illegal RFP Committee that scored River Birch over Concrete Busters, all three whose salaries equaled to about $400,000 thousand dollars a year;
2) but gross negligence upon the part of Michael Peytavin (Gaudry, Ranson) who negotiated this illegal contract and is defending in litigation against Waste Management and has billed the sum of some $325,000 thousand dollars;
3) and the law firm of Phelps, Dunbar who billed $130,000 for what? … counsel Wilkinson to file the ill-advised lawsuit to pre-maturely breach the Parish’s contract with Waste Management !
A suit for malpractice against all of the parties cited above is mandated by the Charter to recover any and all damages and/or ill gotten gains received by anyone doing business with Jefferson Parish to it's detriment.
REALLY … NEED I SAY MORE !!!
A legal ethics weblog and e-book of Prof. Dane S. Ciolino, Loyola New Orleans College of Law
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Rule 1.1. Competence
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(a) A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
(b) A lawyer is required to comply with the minimum requirements of continuing legal education as prescribed by Louisiana Supreme Court rule.
(c) A lawyer is required to comply with all of the requirements of the Supreme Court’s rules regarding annual registration, including payment of Bar dues, payment of the disciplinary assessment, timely notification of changes of address, and proper disclosure of trust account information or any changes therein.
Background
The Louisiana Supreme Court amended this rule on March 29, 2006. It became effective, as amended, on April 15, 2006.
Model Rule Comparison
This rule is substantially similar to ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 (2002). Paragraph (a) is identical to the Model Rule. Paragraph (b) is not included in the ABA Model Rule, but is included in the Louisiana rule so that members of the Louisiana bar who fail to comply with mandatory continuing legal education requirements can be subjected to professional discipline under this rule and Rule 8.4(a). Paragraph (c) is not included in the ABA Model Rule, but was added to the Louisiana rule effective April 15, 2006 to subject lawyers to discipline who fail to comply with annual registration requirements.
Comments to ABA Model Rule 1.1
Legal Knowledge and Skill
[1] In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer’s general experience, the lawyer’s training and experience in the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. In many instances, the required proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of law may be required in some circumstances.
[2] A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study. Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.
[3] In an emergency a lawyer may give advice or assistance in a matter in which the lawyer does not have the skill ordinarily required where referral to or consultation or association with another lawyer would be impractical. Even in an emergency, however, assistance should be limited to that reasonably necessary in the circumstances, for ill-considered action under emergency conditions can jeopardize the client’s interest.
[4] A lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level of competence can be achieved by reasonable preparation. This applies as well to a lawyer who is appointed as counsel for an unrepresented person. See also Rule 6.2.
Thoroughness and Preparation
[5] Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation. The required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require more extensive treatment than matters of lesser complexity and consequence. An agreement between the lawyer and the client regarding the scope of the representation may limit the matters for which the lawyer is responsible. See Rule 1.2(c).
Maintaining Competence
[6] To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, engage in continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.
Annotations
Generally
The most fundamental obligation that a lawyer owes to a client is the duty to handle the client’s matter competently. See generally Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 16(2) (2000). Incompetent lawyering can lead not only to discipline[*1. In most cases, discipline imposed for violations of Rule 1.1 stems from the lawyer's failure to thoroughly prepare and prosecute a matter rather than from the lawyer's lack of "knowledge" or "skill." For this reason, disciplinary actions brought under this rule are often accompanied with alleged violations of Rule 1.3 (diligence). See, e.g., In re Andrus, 814 So. 2d 1283 (La. 2002); In re Landry, 728 So. 2d 833 (La. 1999); In re Grady, 731 So. 2d 878 (La. 1999).*] for violating Rule 1.1, see, e.g., In re Young, 849 So. 2d 25, 30 (La. 2003) (disciplining a lawyer for failure to prepare for criminal trial), but also to delictual liability for professional malpractice. In 2007, the Louisiana Supreme Court disciplined a lawyer under Rule 1.1(a) for incompetently investing a client’s funds. In re Pharr, 950 So. 2d 636, 640-641 (2007) (holding that although the lawyer did not intentionally harm the client’s financial interests,the lawyer’s fiscal mismanagement was “the product of incompetence”).
Delictual Liability for Malpractice
Elements
A plaintiff establishes legal malpractice under Louisiana law through proof (1) that there was a lawyer-client relationship, (2) that the lawyer was negligent, and (3) that the plaintiff suffered a loss caused by that negligence. See, e.g., Costello v. Hardy, 864 So. 2d 129 (La. 2004); Whittington v. Kelly, 917 So. 2d 688, 692 (La. Ct. App. 2nd Cir. 2005), Broadscape.com, Inc. v. Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevant, Carrere & Denegre, L.L.P., 866 So. 2d 1085, 1088 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2004); Kosak v. Trestman, 864 So. 2d 214, 218 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2003); Spicer v. Gambel, 789 So. 2d 741, 744 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2001); Spellman v. Bizal, 755 So. 2d 1013, 1017 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2000); Johnson v. Tschirn, 746 So. 2d 629, 631-32 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1999); Francois v. Reed, 714 So. 2d 228, 229-30 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1998); Butler v. Chuzi, 687 So. 2d 605, 606-07 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1997); Finkelstein v. Collier, 636 So. 2d 1053, 1058 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1994); Dier v. Hamilton, 501 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987). See generally Warren L. Mengis, Professional Responsibility, 46 La. L. Rev. 637, 642 (1986).
To prove the existence of a lawyer-client relationship (prong one), the plaintiff must establish that he or she sought and received advice and assistance from the defendant-lawyer in matters pertinent to the lawyer’s profession. See State v. Green, 493 So. 2d 1178, 1180-81 (La. 1986). “What is critical . . . is [that] a person must seek legal advice from [a lawyer] acting in his capacity as such.” Id.; see also LaNasa v. Fortier, 553 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1989). The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14 provides some guidance in determining when a lawyer-client relationship arises. In re Austin, 943 So. 2d 341, 347 (La. 2006). The Restatement provides:
A relationship of client and lawyer arises when:
(1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person’s intent that the lawyer provide legal services for the person; and either
(a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or
(b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services; or
(2) a tribunal with power to do so appoints the lawyer to provide the services.
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14 (2000). Importantly, privity of contract is not necessary in establishing the existence of a lawyer-client relationship. Smith v. Patout, 956 So. 2d 689, 691 (La. Ct. App. 3rd Cir. 2007) (holding that an attorney who signed several documents for a client had “clearly” agreed to represent the client’s interests and thus, owed a fiduciary duty to him).
To prove negligence (prong two), the plaintiff must establish both the applicable duty of care and a breach of that duty. See, e.g., Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 793 (5th Cir. 1990); Ault v. Bradley, 564 So. 2d 374, 379 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1990), writ denied, 569 So. 2d 967 (La. 1990). A Louisiana lawyer owes a client the duty “to exercise at least that degree of care, skill, and diligence which is exercised by prudent practicing attorneys in his locality.” Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 239, 244 (La. 1972); see also Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 422 So. 2d 1109 (La. 1982); Sherwin-Williams Co. v. First La. Constr., Inc, 915 So. 2d 841, 845 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2005) (noting that the lawyer’s duty to the client “may depend in part on the client’s particular circumstances”); Burris v. Vinet, 664 So. 2d 1225, 1229 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1995); Leonard v. Stephens, 588 So. 2d 1300, 1304 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1991); Nelson v. Waldrup, 565 So. 2d 1078, 1079 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1990); Reed v. Verwoerdt, 490 So. 2d 421, 427 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1986). However, a lawyer is “not required to exercise perfect judgment in every instance.” See Spellman v. Bizal, 755 So. 2d 1013, 1017 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2000). A plaintiff typically establishes the applicable standard of care through expert testimony from a lawyer familiar with law practice in the relevant locale. See Geiserman, 893 F.2d at 791 (quoting 2 R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 27.15, at 667, 668-69 (4th ed. 1995)); Dixon v. Perlman, 528 So. 2d 637, 642 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1988) (noting that expert testimony will usually, but not always be required); see also Reed, 490 So. 2d at 427 (requiring expert testimony); Leonard, 588 So. 2d at 1304; Morgan v. Campbell, Campbell & Johnson, 561 So. 2d 926, 929 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1990); Houillon v. Powers & Nass, 530 So. 2d 680, 681-82 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1988). Similarly, whether the defendant-lawyer breached the applicable standard is “a fact specific question and must ordinarily be established through expert . . . testimony.”[*2. For a case finding that a lawyer did not breach any applicable standard of care, see Spellman v. Bizal, 755 So. 2d 1013 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2000) (no breach for withdrawing as counsel of record when no motions pending and no trial date set).*] Dickey v. Baptist Mem. Hosp. N. Miss., 146 F.3d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1998) (medical malpractice case). However, in cases of “obvious negligence, the court may, without expert testimony, take judicial notice of a legal duty which was breached by an attorney.” Nelson, 565 So. 2d at 1079 (citing Ramp, 269 So. 2d at 239); see also Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 793-94 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that expert testimony may not be required in cases of “egregious negligence”); Morgan, 561 So. 2d at 929 (finding that expert testimony is not required in cases involving an obvious breach of the duty of care); Dixon, 528 So. 2d at 642 (concluding that expert testimony may not be required when the trail court is “Familiar with the standards of practice in its community”).
Once the plaintiff-client has proven the existence of a lawyer-client relationship (prong one), and that the lawyer’s conduct was negligent (prong two), the client has established a prima facie case that the lawyer’s conduct caused the client to suffer some loss (prong three). Thereafter, the burden “shifts to the defendant attorney to prove that the client could not have succeeded on the original claim.” See, e.g., Johnson v. Tschirn, 746 So. 2d 629, 632 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation omitted) (citing Nelson v. Waldrup, 565 So. 2d 1078 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1990); Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 422 So. 2d 1109 (La. 1982)). The law shifts the burden in this manner because it presumes that the defendant-lawyer would not have handled the client’s claim if it were completely devoid of merit.[*3. The Fourth Circuit has held that "[t]he inference of causation of damages can easily be made in cases where the attorney enters into a ‘relationship’ with a client on the premise that the client has a valid cause of action, or on a contingency fee basis.” Broadscape.com, 866 So. 2d 1085, 1089 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2004) at *3.*] For this reason, the client is not required to prove that the negligence caused him to lose his underlying case by trying a “case within a case.” See Jenkins, 422 So. 2d at 1110; Dier v. Hamilton, 501 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987). On the contrary, the defendant-lawyer must go forward with evidence that the client would have lost[*4. Put another way, a lawyer's malpractice is a cause in fact of damage to his client when proper performance by the lawyer would have prevented the harm. See Schwehm v. Jones, 872 So. 2d 1140 (2004) (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2004); see also Ault v. Bradley, 564 So. 2d 374, 379 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1990).*] notwithstanding the lawyer’s impropriety or negligence. See Jenkins, 422 So. 2d at 1110.
Relevance of Violation of a Rule of Professional Conduct
Whether a lawyer’s violation of a rule of professional conduct is relevant to a claim for malpractice is a controversial issue. The “Scope” section of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that “[t]he Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability.” Model Rules of Professional Conduct Scope ¶ [20] (2002). Notwithstanding this statement, most jurisdictions permit experts to consider a disciplinary rule in “understanding and applying” the applicable standard of care if the rule is designed to protect the plaintiff and is relevant to the claim. See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 52(2) (2000); Note, The Evidentiary Use of the Ethics Codes in Legal Malpractice: Erasing a Double Standard, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1102, 1119 (1996) (arguing that the “logic, feasibility, [and] functional value” warrant applying the Model Rules to the malpractice context); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Scope ¶ [20] (2002) (conceding that “since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer’s violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct”).
Unconstrained by the limiting language in the “Scope” section of the ABA Model Rules, Louisiana courts consider the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct to have the full force and effect of substantive law. See e.g., In re Huddleston, 655 So. 2d 416, 422 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1995); Soderquist v. Kramer, 595 So. 2d 825, 829 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1992). Thus, the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct create legal duties that are enforceable against Louisiana lawyers in malpractice actions. See Schlesinger v. Herzog, 672 So. 2d 701, 707 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Rules of Professional Conduct “have the force and effect of substantive law” and transform ethical issues into legal duties); Dier v. Hamilton, 501 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987) (holding that alleged violation of Louisiana ethics rules on conflicts of interest established prima facie case of professional impropriety for purposes of legal malpractice action). However, liability based on such a rule-based duty turns on whether the rule in question exists to protect the plaintiff from the particular harm suffered. See, e.g., Smith v. Haynsworth, Marion, McKay & Geurard, 472 S.E.2d 612, 613-15 (S.C. 1996); see also Gresham v. Davenport, 537 So. 2d 1144 (La. 1989); Tassin v. State Farm Ins. Co., 692 So. 2d 604, 608 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1997). The duty of competence prescribed by Rule 1.1 clearly is intended to protect clients.
Prescription and Preemption of Lawyer-Malpractice Claims
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5605[*5. "[T]he prescriptive and peremptive period” for all legal malpractice claims against Louisiana lawyers “shall be governed exclusively by this section.” See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:5605(C) (emphasis added).*] sets forth a prescriptive[*6. There is caselaw in Louisiana holding that the one-year period set forth in section 9:5605 is actually a peremptive period rather than a prescriptive period. For an exhaustive discussion of this issue, see Dauterive Contractors, Inc. v. Landy & Watkins, 811 So. 2d 1242 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2002) ("We hold that both the one-year and three-year periods are peremptive and are subject to all rules governing peremption.").*] period of one year for all legal malpractice claims against Louisiana lawyers: “No action for damages against any attorney at law duly admitted to practice in this state . . . whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise . . . shall be brought unless filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and proper venue within one year from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect, or within one year from the date that the alleged act, omission, or neglect is discovered or should have been discovered . . . .” La. Rev. Stat. § 9:5605(A). Actions for malpractice are also subject to a three-year peremptive[*7. Note that the peremptive period does not apply "in cases of fraud, as defined in Civil Code Article 1953." Id. § 9:5605(E). For this exception to apply, however, the plaintiff must "state a cause of action for fraud" in his petition by alleging "both a misrepresentation, suppression, or omission of true information and the intent to obtian an unjust advantage or to cause damage or inconvenience to another." Fenner v. DeSalvo, 826 So. 2d 39, 44 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2002). Thus, this exception does not apply if the plaintiff simply recites the word "fraud" in his petition without more particular allegations. See id. As to whether subsection E applies to the statute's one-year period, three-year period, or both, see Dauterive, 811 So. 2d at 1252-53 & supra note 66.*] period: “[E]ven as to actions filed within one year from the date of such discovery, in all events such actions shall be filed at the latest within three years from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect.” Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that:
The ‘date of discovery’ from which prescription or peremption begins to run is the date on which a reasonable man in the position of the plaintiff has, or should have, either actual or constructive knowledge of the damage, the delict, and the relationship between them sufficient to indicate to a reasonable person he is the victim of a tort and to state a cause of action against the defendant. Put more simply, the date of discovery is the date the negligence was discovered or should have been discovered by a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.
Teague v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 974 So. 2d 1266, 1275 (La. 2008).
Although the law on point is not well-settled, the doctrine of contra non valentem and the continuous-representation rule may suspend any prescriptive period set forth in section 9:5605. In Hendrick v. ABC Ins. Co., 787 So. 2d 283 (La. 2001), the Louisiana Supreme Court held as follows:
The attorney-client relationship is built on trust and the continuous representation rule as encompassed by contra non valentem seeks to protect clients who rely on that trust and fail to file legal malpractice suits against their attorneys within the appropriate prescriptive period. Contra non valentem does not suspend prescription when a litigant is perfectly able to bring his claim, but fails to do so. When a client does not innocently trust and rely upon his attorney, but rather actively questions his attorney’s performance, the client may be denied the safe harbor of contra non valentem if equity and justice do not demand its application.
Id. at 293. However, this opinion did not specifically address whether the continuous-representation rule applies to the periods set forth in section 9:5605. See id. at 289-93. Moreover, as to any peremptive period, the continuous-representation rule should have no effect given that Louisiana courts have consistently held that contra non valentem does not suspend a peremptive period. See, e.g., Reeder v. North, 701 So. 2d 1291 (La. 1997); Pena v. Williams, 867 So. 2d 801 (2004) (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2004); Atkinson v. LeBlanc, 860 So. 2d 60 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2003).
Limitation of Malpractice Liability and Structured Settlements
Under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 37:222(A), “[a]n attorney who ‘acts in good faith’ shall not be liable for any loss or damages as a result of any act or omission in negotiating or recommending a structured settlement of a claim or the particular mechanism or entity for the funding thereof or in depositing or investing settlement funds in a particular entity, unless the loss or damage was caused by his willful or wanton misconduct….” Under this provision, “‘[g]ood faith’ is presumed to exist when the attorney recommends or negotiates, invests, or deposits funds with an entity which is funded, guaranteed, or bonded by an insurance company which, at the time of such act, had a minimum rating of ‘A+9′ or ‘Double A,’ or an equivalent thereof, according to standard rating practices in the insurance industry.” Id. § 37:222(B)(2).
Malpractice in Criminal Defense Practice
A cause of action for legal malpractice against a criminal defense lawyer exists even prior to final disposition of the underlying criminal case. Therefore, a potential plaintiff need not–and should not–delay filing such a claim until all writ applications and post-conviction proceedings have been exhausted. See Augman v. Colwart, 874 So. 2d 191 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2004) (“[T]he date of the negligent act itself, not the judgment giving definitive effect to that act, triggers the one-year and three-year periods.”).
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Louisiana lawyers must attend a total of twelve and one-half hours of qualified continuing legal education classes each year, unless a specific exception or exemption applies. Of these twelve and one-half hours, one hour must concern ethics and one must concern professionalism. See La. Sup. Ct. R. XXX(3)(a) & 3(c). The Louisiana Supreme Court in In re McCarthy suspended the attorney for six months for failing to complete mandatory continuing legal education, failing to timely pay his annual bar dues and prior disciplinary assessment, and subsequently practicing law during these periods of ineligibility. In re McCarthy, 972 So.2d 1143 (La. 2008).
Criminal Defense Practice
The caseload of criminal defense counsel should not, “by reason of its excessive size,” interfere with the “rendering of quality representation,” or otherwise “lead to the breach of professional obligations.” See ABA Stds. Relating to the Admin. of Crim. Justice–The Def. Function std. 4–1.3(e). Defense counsel should “at the earliest opportunity take all necessary action” to vindicate the accused’s rights, including considering “motions seeking pretrial release of the accused, obtaining psychiatric examination of the accused when a need appears, moving for change of venue or continuance, moving to suppress illegally obtained evidence, moving for severance from jointly charged defendants, and seeking dismissal of the charges.” See id. std. 4–3.6. Defense counsel “should conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case,” regardless of the accused’s statements regarding guilt or regarding a desire to plead guilty. See id. std. 4–4.1. Finally, defense counsel should “be or become familiar with all of the sentencing alternatives available to the court” and other pertinent matters relating to sentencing. See id. std. 4–8.1; see also, e.g., In re Martin, 982 So. 2d 765, 769 (La. 2008) (disciplining a lawyer for failing to provide the information necessary to complete his client’s pre-sentence report, which could have resulted in his client receiving a significantly longer prison sentence).
In providing reasonably adequate death-penalty representation, capital defense counsel should consult and consider the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of De-fense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases. The United States Supreme Court, however, has made clear that these standards are “guides” as to “what reasonableness means, not its definition.” See, e.g., Bobby v. Van Hook, No. No. 09–144 (Nov. 9, 2009).
Discipline
When a lawyer’s incompetence causes injury or potential injury to a client, the following sanctions are generally appropriate: disbarment, when the lawyer does not understand “the most fundamental legal doctrines or procedures”; suspension, when the lawyer engages in an area of practice in which the lawyer knows he is not competent; and, reprimand, when the lawyer either fails to understand relevant legal doctrines or procedures, or is negligent in determining whether he is competent to handle a legal matter. See ABA Stds. for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions stds. 4.51-4.53 (1992). When a lawyer’s incompetence causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client, admonition is generally the appropriate sanction when the lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in determining whether he or she is competent to handle a legal matter. See id. Std. 4.54. The Louisiana Supreme Court has noted that “a short suspension is the appropriate discipline for failure to render competent representation.” See In re Downing, 930 So. 2d 897, 904 (La. 2006) (citing In re Young, 849 So. 2d 25 (La. 2003)). The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that although a lawyer’s state of mind is not a defense to incompetence, it is a relevant factor in determining an appropriate sanction. In re Pharr, 950 So. 2d 636, 641 (2007) (holding disbarment would be unduly punitive where the lawyer did not intend to harm a client’s financial interests and where the lawyer entered into a consent judgment to compensate the client’s losses).
Notes
*This page was updated on June 22, 2010.
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WHOSE PHELPS, DUNBAR GOING TO RUN TO NOW … OH I BET I KNOW … THE SAME ONE THEY HAD THE PARISH PAY FOR TO BULL SHIT THE COUNCIL THAT THEY KNEW WHAT THEY WERE DOING … GOOD LUCK ON THAT ONE KIM AND NAN
Seriously …
I am writing a proposal to several reputable Law Schools who have previously expressed an interest in my standing for a PHD of Law within the nomenclature of Legal Social Sciences; and with their support, an exhaustive dissertation discussing the overall unethical reactionary behavior of lawyers and the legal community as a whole, and in particular, Phelps, Dunbar, as it relates to the status of a Whistleblower(s); and in this instance Ms. Anne Marie Vandenweghe and her fight against the forces of evil in Jefferson Parish Government …
This could be revelatory for all of us …
Wish me luck,
Whitmergate
Gate' I'm disappointed you used some of the Great Dane's reference material but anyway when you get your Doctorate in Legal Social Sciences and get appointed Dean of Loyola Law School would you please flush the Great Dane as he's been stinking up the place for too many years with his huge dumps.
Since Ms Forshee is on a legal roll how about her using her legal specialty of legal malpractice and file a suit against Phelonious Dumbar for their incompetence against RIVERBIRCH in their representation of JP in landfill suit which Ms.Forshee had to win herself with her own legal filings and briefs.
Or maybe go after the E & O policies of the attorneys who recommended / drafted the RFPs, contracts, bogus lawsuit against Waste Management etc etc etc; either they were incompetent or they failed to do due diligence to determine the validity of any of those actions. If attorneys can be sued for incompetence, or negligence, or outright thievery then this is the perfect time for Ms. Foshee to utilize her knowledge and experience with E & O ( learned at Lemle Kelleher I believe?) to recoup the costs of filings, fights and other legaleze stuff…IMHO