What’s the score? 0 – 2 on tail-wagging-dog Protective Orders

Right of the bat, we’re going to find out if I cut my 7th inning stretch short.   Frankly, what I found when I later turned my attention to the docket of the day to check for any additions in cases SLABBED made me wonder if one day of reflection was going to be sufficient.

Magistrate Judge Parker pitched a Protective Order to State Farm in Lizana and Magistrate Judge Walker tossed the Company another in Montet .  Since it took Parker 2 (pages) to do what Walker did in 7, Parker is up first for examination:

State Farm has cited numerous cases within this jurisdiction, with facts and issues very similar to those involved in this matter, wherein protective orders have been entered with respect to the same types of information at issue here. As in those cases, State Farm has demonstrated good cause for the entry of a protective order and, accordingly, the motion will be GRANTED.

Walker said much the same, however:

The court, being duly advised in the premises, finds that good cause exists for the issuance of a Protective Order; therefore, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED…

Now, a good portion of my 7th inning stretch was devoted to reflecting on “good cause” for a protective order in discovery.  I’ve observed that counsel for both parties in a case and the District Court “hang their hat” with the Fifth Circuit and, since I’m neither a lawyer nor an officer of the Court, I decided that I’d follow and hang mine on the 5th’s order quoted in the most recent SLABBED update on Montet which clearly states: Continue reading “What’s the score? 0 – 2 on tail-wagging-dog Protective Orders”