

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION**

**THOMAS C. AND
PAMELA MCINTOSH**

PLAINTIFFS

VS.

CASE NO.: 1:06cv1080-LTS-RHW

**STATE FARM FIRE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY; and
FORENSIC ANALYSIS & ENGINEERING
CORP; and E.A. RENFROE & CO., INC.**

DEFENDANTS

DAUBERT HEARING REQUESTED

**MOTION AND MEMORANDUM BRIEF
TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF RICHARD G. HENNING**

COMES NOW, Defendant STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY (“State Farm”) and files this its Motion and Memorandum to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Richard Henning, expert witness for Plaintiffs in the above-numbered cause and would show unto the Court the following, to-wit:

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. The Loss and Insurance Claim

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Mississippi Gulf Coast and damaged Plaintiffs’ home, which was located near the Gulf Coast in Biloxi. Plaintiffs submitted a claim under their State Farm homeowners policy. State Farm’s investigation revealed that Plaintiffs’ loss was caused primarily by storm surge.¹ State Farm paid Plaintiffs \$36,228.37 for covered wind damage and denied the remainder of the claim.²

¹ Plaintiffs’ homeowners policy contains a Water Damage exclusion that excludes loss that “would
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On October 23, 2006, Plaintiffs filed their complaint against State Farm and Forensic Analysis and Engineering Corp., the engineering firm retained by State Farm to determine causation. On May 31, 2007, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint [194] against State Farm and Forensic and also added E.F. Renfroe, an independent claim adjusting firm used by State Farm to assist with Plaintiffs' claim, as a defendant. Plaintiffs contend that wind, including tornadoes, caused the damage to their home hours before peak storm surge. (FAC, ¶ 20) Accordingly, Plaintiffs contend they are entitled to coverage for the entire loss under their homeowners policy.³

B. Designation of Richard Henning

not have occurred in the absence of . . . Water Damage,” defined to include “flood” and “tidal water,” “whether or not driven by wind.” This Court has already ruled that this exclusion unambiguously excludes damage from flood waters and storm surge accompanying Hurricane Katrina. *Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.*, 2006 WL 1442489 (S.D. Miss. May 4, 2006), appeal pending, 5th Cir. Docket No. 6-61075.

² State Farm also paid plaintiffs \$6,073 for additional living expenses and \$750 for loss of rental income.

³ The Fifth Circuit has recently ruled that where a loss is caused by the combined perils of wind and water in any sequence, the loss is excluded under a homeowners policy with anti-concurrent cause lead-in language to its water damage exclusion, similar to that contained in State Farm's policy. *Nationwide v. Leonard*, ___ F.3d. ___, 2007 WL 2446794 (5th Cir. (Miss.)). State Farm acknowledges that unresolved issues exist in this Court regarding the burden of proof. For the purposes of this motion, it is unnecessary to resolve these issues.

On March 30, 2007, Plaintiffs served their designation of experts, naming five purported experts, including three in the field of meteorology.⁴ On April 4, Plaintiffs served an amended expert designation, adding a fourth meteorologist, Richard Henning, to their arsenal. Henning has written about 140 reports related to Hurricane Katrina, all but a few were written for homeowners suing their insurance companies. (Ex. B, p. 6) Henning prepares his reports generically by neighborhood (essentially by street map and zip code), without considering topological features specific to the neighborhood or the property site. (Hurricane Katrina Timeline of Events attached to Exhibit A; Ex. B, p. 45)

Although Henning's resume is impressive - he is currently a civil service meteorologist at Eglin Air Force Base, flies with a weather reconnaissance squadron as an air force reservist, and is a private consulting meteorologist - his duties in these capacities deal primarily with forecasting, as opposed to hindcasting. (Ex. B, pp. 13, 14, 16, 18)

C. Henning's Opinions and Their Bases

Plaintiffs intend to use Henning to demonstrate the timing and speed of the winds that purportedly impacted their home. Through other experts they will attempt to show the timing and height of the storm surge in an effort to demonstrate that the home was damaged by wind prior to the arrival of storm surge.

1. The Timing and Speed of Winds

⁴ The persons designated as experts in meteorology are Dr. Pat Fitzpatrick, Dr. Keith Blackwell, and Dr. Aaron (Bill) Williams. Additionally, Plaintiffs named Dr. Ralph Sinno as an engineering expert and Tim Ryles and an insurance claims practices expert.

Henning prepared a report for this litigation on March 27, 2007. The report contains a “Timeline of Events” which documents his findings. The time line provides the following information for periodic time intervals beginning on August 28, 2005 at 3:13 p.m. through August 29, 2005 at 7:00 p.m.: the sustained (one minute average) wind speed in knots, the large scale (three second average) wind gusts in knots, the wind direction, and the distance to the center of the hurricane (in miles).⁵

This time line reflects Henning’s opinion that Plaintiffs’ property was hit by hurricane force winds of 75 miles per hour or more for nine and a half hours between 6:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. on August 29. (Timeline of Events attached to Exhibit A) Henning opines that the maximum one-minute sustained winds at the location of Plaintiff’s property were 120 mph and large scale three-minute gusts, occurring at or before 10 a.m., were up to 150 mph.⁶ (*Id.*)

2. The Method for Arriving at Wind Speed

The purported “methodology” Henning employs to arrive at his wind speed estimates is convoluted to say the least. And at the end of the day, the wind speeds are nothing more than subjective guesses. For the benefit of the court and to support this motion, State Farm will explain how Henning claims to arrive at his opinions.

a. Henning manipulates a software program and then purports to rely on the output.

⁵ In other reports prepared for Katrina-related litigation, Mr. Henning also includes the storm surge height above mean sea level in this time line; however, he was specifically instructed not to do any work regarding the surge for this matter. (Ex. B, p. 46)

⁶ Henning’s time line is expressed in terms of knots. For the Court’s convenience, State Farm has converted this information to “miles per hour” using a conversion factor of 1.15.

Henning first creates a “large scale wind field estimate” using HURRTRAK, a software program.⁷ (Ex. B, p.47) This is the starting point for his ultimate creation of wind speeds at any given location. He also “considers” other weather information, most notably reconnaissance data and radar data, in an effort to reconstruct what the wind speeds were at the specific location in question, although ultimately the wind speed values he arrives at are just his own subjective assignment of speeds. He provides no explanation of how this process takes place, making it impossible to determine whether or not his results have any scientific validity.

As it turns out, Henning has total discretion in inputting data into HURRTRAK. (Ex. B, p. 111) Consequently, the results generated by HURRTRAK are completely dependent upon his discretion, and therefore only as reliable as the data he “chose” for the program.⁸ HURRTRAK is designed to use the National Hurricane Center (“NHC”) advisories as its input and the primary purpose of the HURRTRAK program is to *forecast* storms and allow decisions to be made regarding evacuations. (Ex. B, p. 118) Henning started by inputting into HURRTRAK the real-time wind speeds contained in NHC’s Advisory number 27, which was generated on the day of landfall. (Exhibit B, p. 83) A few months later, NHC published a report which downgraded the real-time wind speeds in Advisory number 27.⁹ (*Id.*) But Henning opted to use the speeds

⁷ The HURRTRAK software was devised by PC Weather Products. (See <http://www.pcwp.com/>.)

⁸ Curiously, the hurricane Henning generated using HURRTRAK is not consistent with typical hurricane behavior. As Henning explained in another matter: “the western side of it is unrealistically high in wind speeds;” Furthermore, all of the wind speeds in the eye register at “zero through the entire [. . .] area inside of the eye, which is unrealistic.” (Exhibit C, p. 61) Nonetheless, Henning maintains it provides a good model for the arrival of the most intense winds on the Mississippi shore.

⁹ Henning acknowledges that the NHC often considers a variety of sources when composing its initial hurricane advisories, including “reports of winds from the police or emergency management officials

from the *initial* real-time forecast because he disagrees with how the NHC personnel interpret their dropsonde¹⁰ and reconnaissance data. (Exhibit B, pp. 83, 84) Henning disagrees with both the sustained wind speeds calculated by the NHC and, more strongly, the 3-second wind gusts. (Exh. B, p. 85) Henning contends that these “findings of the NHC report have caused a great deal of controversy in the tropical cyclone research community,” but he does not identify which persons or institutions are included in the “tropical cyclone research community” to which he refers. (Exhibit A, p. 3)

Henning admits that if he had input the data from the *revised* NHC advisories, his wind speed results would have been lower. (Exh. B, p. 118, 119) But he claims he could not use the revised advisories, even had he been so inclined, because the NHC did not provide all of the necessary “quadrants and radii” when they downgraded the wind speeds from Advisory number 27. *Id.*

It is commonly understood that wind speed decreases closer to the ground; therefore, one would expect that Henning would reduce the wind speeds obtained from the already questionable Advisory number 27. Henning acknowledges that the biggest adjustment must be interpolation from flight level to surface level. (Exh. B, p. 91) For this reason, meteorologists

or some other kind of unofficial anemometer.” (Exhibit F, p. 29-32) He further admits that “[i]n real time, there isn’t much time to corroborate their accuracy,” and that the Hurricane Center will likely take reports into account unless they appear “totally nonsensical.” (Exhibit F, p. 29-32)

¹⁰ A dropsonde is a device designed to be measure weather data. When used to obtain data on a hurricane, the device is dropped from a plane that flies to the center of the hurricane, normally at about 10,000 feet. The dropsonde contains a GPS receiver and pressure, temperature and humidity sensors that capture atmospheric profiles and thermodynamic data which is transmitted back to the aircraft and fed into supercomputers to enable forecasters to track and predict what will happen in a hurricane. See www.wikipedia.com/dropsonde.

often apply a reduction factor—sometimes up to 50%, according to Henning—in order to estimate ground wind speeds from data obtained at high altitudes. (Exhibit F, pp. 86-88) But Henning disagrees with the reduction factor used by the NHC personnel to get the surface wind estimation from the 10,000 foot flight level and, in fact, does not apply *any* reduction factor to the data he uses from Advisory number 27.

In this case after the HURRTRAK model produced wind speeds, Henning looked at this other information - flight level data, dropsonde data, radar imagery, etc., and concluded that the wind speeds calculated by HURRTRAK did not need to be adjusted. (Exh. B, pp. 113, 114) Interestingly, Henning readily admits that the wind speeds produced by HURRTRAK for the time after the maximum wind reached the property are “considerably” overstated. (Exh. B, p. 114)

b. Henning considers unreliable reconnaissance data to establish wind speed.

In addition to Advisory 27, Henning looks at flight level wind speed information obtained by reconnaissance aircraft, both before Hurricane Katrina made landfall and in the time frame between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. on August 29, when the landfall occurred. (Ex. A, p. 5) But again, this information is of limited usefulness in predicting ground wind speed because it is measured at 10,000 feet elevation. (Ex. B, p. 22) Furthermore, meteorologists disagree on which factor to use in adjusting the flight level data to estimate surface wind speeds, making this information even less reliable. (Ex. D, p. 16)

Henning also looks at wind speed data obtained from dropsondes. (Ex. A, p. 5) Henning relates:

A dropsonde instrument released [. . .] at 9:22 AM [. . .] which [. . .] landed in Pass Christian [. . .] measured winds as high as 133 knots (153 MPH) at an altitude of only about 350 meters above the surface [i.e., the beach in Pass Christian] [. . .] The average wind measured by this instrument in the lowest 500 meters of the atmosphere was 120 knots (138 MPH). (Ex. A, p. 5)

From this, he concludes that “extreme winds were still flowing just above the surface at landfall.” (Ex. A, p. 8) But, for similar reasons, this high-altitude data is also problematic.

First, the dropsonde information is subjected to only very brief quality control: the reconnaissance crew has less than five minutes to review the dropsonde data before transmitting it to the NHC and will only reject it if there is an obvious problem with it. (Ex. B, p. 27)

Second, there is a real problem in converting the data obtained from the dropsondes into ground level wind speeds. In Henning’s own words: “[t]he question, the million dollar question, to them [the National Hurricane Center] is how much of that [high altitude winds detected by dropsondes] gets translated down to the surface?” (Ex. C, pp. 75-76) And as Henning explains, this “translation” is guesswork performed at the discretion of meteorologists:

They’re really just percentage reduction factors [as opposed to equations]. And again, they are used at the discretion of hurricane specialists in creating their advisory products, and then by researchers later on in doing reconstruction of the wind field. And again, sometimes they use 90 percent; sometimes they use 80 percent; sometimes they use 70 percent. (Ex. F, p. 86-88)

Henning acknowledges that there is an ongoing debate in the tropical cyclone community as to how to interpret dropsonde winds and how to reduce flight level winds down to surface. (Ex. B, p. 62)

Henning also testifies that there will be a tremendous amount of variability of dropsonde readings at ground surface, in the unlikely event that they take measurements at surface level.

(Ex. B, p. 64, 65) At his deposition, Henning reviewed the profile of a particular dropsonde reading that occurred 150 miles north of Biloxi. The dropsonde measured wind up to 175 miles per hour at 421 meters above the surface of the gulf. (Ex. B, p. 70) Once the dropsonde dropped to an altitude of about 400 meters, the wind velocity started to decrease significantly, an indication that the sonde was entering the boundary layer. (Ex. B, p. 71) He also reviewed a dropsonde that landed in Pass Christian and measured wind speeds of 153 miles per hour at 350 meters, or about 1,000 feet, about ground level. (Ex. B, p. 144) This dropsonde also recorded significantly decreased wind speeds once it dropped below an altitude of 350 meters. (Ex. B, p. 146) According to Henning, the wind speeds measured by this dropsonde near Pass Christian were about 103 miles per hour at 10 meters above ground, and he concedes that atmospheric scientists would expect surface winds to be weaker to the east, in the direction of Biloxi. (Ex. B, p. 147) Nonetheless, Henning intends to testify that a significant portion of the winds measured by the dropsondes were brought down to the surface in the areas of convection over Biloxi, and in particular, to Plaintiffs' property. (See, Exhibit A, p. 8; Ex. B, pp. 145, 146)

c. **Henning claims radar imagery supports his escalation of wind speeds.**

Henning looked at Doppler radar imagery from Slidell and Mobile to support his conclusion that "some very intense bands" came across the McIntosh neighborhood, although the Doppler radars can only see winds at the 10-meter level a few miles from their site. The wind in Biloxi that was detected by the Slidell and Mobile radars was between 4,000 and 6,000 feet above the ground. (Exh. B, p. 97)

Although Henning admits that wind speeds typically decrease below the so-called boundary layer because of the surface friction of the earth, Henning contends that the amount

they are reduced is greatly influenced by the stability and characteristics of the boundary layer and where, as here, there is “active convection” the wind speeds are not as influenced, i.e. reduced, by the earth’s friction. (Ex. B, p. 57, 58) Henning admits that wind speeds at 500 to 1,000 feet above ground will still be stronger than at ground level even with active convection, but the drop off in wind speed will not be as dramatic. (Ex. B, p. 59)

Henning’s theory is that these high-altitude winds detected by aircraft and dropsondes on the day of the storm were brought down to ground level by “mesoscale convective vortices” that were detected from the Doppler imagery:

There are -- there is little mechanism available to transfer those winds down to the surface. And so my -- my theory is that around 9:00 a.m. that there was a mechanism to transport it down to the surface, that being the very intense convection that was occurring in the -- in the Pass Christian, Bay St. Louis, Waveland area within the inner eyewall. And that a considerable amount of those 153-mile-per-hour winds made -- made their way down to the surface. (Ex. C, p. 76)

Henning contends that the cells were strong enough to enhance the wind speeds by somewhere between 30 and 35 miles per hour, although he admits that this is based on his “meteorological judgment” and not on any actual measurements taken on the ground. (Ex. B, pp. 155, 156) And when asked whether he would expect to see damage throughout the McIntosh’s neighborhood - and not simply confined to their residence - if these meteorological phenomena indeed caused wind damage on the ground, he backpedals, testifying that it depends

on a lot of factors, such as the construction of the building, the terrain, trees, and surrounding houses. (Ex. B, p. 158) It is all the more problematic that he did not bother to look into these factors in an effort to confirm or refute his novel theories.¹¹

In reality, neither Henning nor any other meteorologist can ever say with any certainty that a particular cell produced a tornado.¹² (Ex. B, pp. 121-123, 150; Exhibit E, pp. 55-58) As Henning admits, it is essentially impossible to tell for sure whether a tornado has occurred in a tropical cyclone situation - which includes hurricanes - because the tornados that are generated in these situations tend to be very “transient,” according to Henning. (*Id.*) In other words, they form, go through their life cycle, and dissipate in a matter of a few minutes. (*Id.*) This process is made even more difficult by the temporal resolution of the Doppler radar; the radar essentially takes snapshots every five to six minutes. Because it is suspected that the entire life of these hurricane-borne tornadoes is only a few minutes, the Doppler will oftentimes miss them altogether. (*Id.*) Moreover, tornadoes that exist within tropical cyclones are generally too small to be seen on radar, so all a meteorologist can do is look for the intense reflective cells that have

¹¹ Henning acknowledges that the earth’s friction considerably reduces wind speed, and terrain features such as elevation, changes in elevation, and obstructions such as trees and buildings are important considerations. (Ex. B, p. 42) It is remarkable then, that Henning does not consider the terrain at the McIntosh’s property, nor does he consider what is built on the property. (Ex. B, p. 45) Nor does the HURRTRAK model take into consideration particular exposure of a particular property, such as topography or location from the coast. (Ex. B, p. 117) As Henning’s deposition testimony indicates, he has never visited Plaintiffs’ property and thus has no appreciation for how the house was constructed. (Ex. B, p. 175)

¹² The Doppler radar was designed to identify classic tornadoes, such as those that occur in the Midwestern plains and often last for a half hour to an hour at a time and cover several dozen miles: “not the kind of tornadoes that we see in a hurricane,” Henning explains. (Exhibit B, pp. 123) They do so by generating a computer algorithm that can be identified as a tornado vortex signature (TVS). A tornado that exists within a tropical cyclone will not have that kind of signature, in part because the entire circulation of the storm is rotating.

the potential to generate them. (*Id.*) And even if these structures are detected, there is no way for any meteorologist to confirm whether they actually created a tornado that possibly impacted a ground-level property, since the radar beam used to detect them is unable to see below 3,000 to 8,000 feet from the earth's surface due to the curvature of the earth. (Ex. B, pp. 80-81, 121-123) Out of a thousand mesovortices identified on radar, only a very small percentage would actually produce tornadoes. (Ex. B, p. 151)

Consequently, as Henning admits, he has no objective evidence to support his tornado theory. (Ex. B, p. 152; Ex. E, p. 226) The National Weather Service did not confirm the existence of *any* tornadoes along the Mississippi Gulf Coast during Hurricane Katrina. (Ex. B, pp. 153, 154) Moreover, Henning will be unable to identify *any other meteorologists* that apply the same methodology he uses to determine the relative increase in gust velocity based upon small-scale convective events.¹³

3. The Information Henning Ignores

Equally interesting is the information that Henning chooses to ignore. For instance, he acknowledges that at least three universities have programs which have well maintained and calibrated anemometers set up on towers specifically to measure hurricane winds. An obvious way in which Henning could test his novel and completely subjective method of assigning wind speed values would be to employ his "methodology" at the sites of these towers and see if his wind speed predictions are similar to those recorded by the anemometers at those locations. At

¹³ Although Henning identifies a few individuals whom he says agree with the general notion that "there isn't enough emphasis placed on the importance of the convection within the storm" (Exh. B, p. 86), there is no published materials supporting his claims.

his deposition, Henning did not accept an invitation to explain why he did not do so. (Ex. B, pp. 37-40)

Henning also chose to ignore wind gust measurements from the Florida Coast Monitoring Program (“FCMP”), which had set up a wind tower at the Trent Lott airport in Pascagoula. (Ex. B, p. 137-139) The wind tower at that location recorded a maximum 3-second gust of 92.91 miles per hour, significantly less than the maximum gust speed created by Henning. (Ex. B, p. 138) With the information Henning input into it, the HURRTRAK model would have generated a significantly higher wind gust “estimate” than recorded by FCMP. (Ex. B, p. 139)

ARGUMENT

HENNING’S PROFFERED TESTIMONY IS NOT RELIABLE AND SHOULD BE EXCLUDED

A. The Legal Standard

In *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals*, 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,¹⁴ which governs the admissibility of expert witness testimony, requires that the trial court act as a “gatekeeper” by determining at the outset “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the [expert’s]

¹⁴ In 2000, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended consistent with *Daubert*.

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist a trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

Thus, courts must exclude expert evidence that is not “based on sufficient facts or data,” that is not “the product of reliable principles and methods,” or whose methods are not applied “reliably to the facts of the case.” *Id.*

testimony is scientifically valid and . . . whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.”¹⁵ *Id.* at 592-593. The Court set forth several factors that a trial court might consider in performing this gatekeeping function, including whether a “theory or technique . . . can be (and has been) tested”; whether it “has been subjected to peer review and publication”;¹⁶ whether the particular technique involved has a “known or potential rate of error”; whether there are “standards controlling the technique’s operation”; and whether the theory or technique enjoys “general acceptance” within a “relevant scientific community.” *Id.* at 592-594. These factors do not constitute a “definitive checklist or test” and the inquiry must be “tied to the facts” of a particular “case.” *Id.* at 591. The focus of the inquiry “must be solely on the principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” *Id.* at 595. “The proponent of expert testimony . . . has the burden of showing that the testimony is reliable.” *See Moore v. Ashland Chem. Inc.*, 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir.1998) (en banc).

The purpose of the *Daubert* inquiry is to ensure that an expert “employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.” *Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael*, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). In performing its screening function, the court must meaningfully scrutinize an expert’s testimony, or its “factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their application.” 526 U.S. at 149. Thus in *Kumho*, the district court

¹⁵ In *Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael*, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999), the Court clarified that this “gatekeeping” duty applies not only to “scientific” expert testimony, but to all expert testimony. *Id.* at 147. (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony of engineer).

¹⁶ In *Daubert*, the Court recognized that when a theory or technique is submitted to the scrutiny of other experts within the field, “it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in the methodology will be detected,” and thus enhances the reliability of the information. 509 U.S. at 593. Henning’s reports and findings have never been peer reviewed by anyone.

excluded a qualified engineer's testimony regarding the cause of a tire failure because the court "found unreliable 'the methodology employed by the expert in analyzing the data obtained in the visual inspection, and the scientific basis, if any, for such an analysis.'" *Id.* at 153. Noting that the relevant issue was whether the expert could reliably determine the cause of the failure of the *particular tire at issue*, the court questioned both the reasonableness of the expert's approach and the "method of analyzing the data thereby obtained, to draw a conclusion regarding *the particular matter to which the expert testimony was directly relevant.*" *Id.* at 154 (emphasis in original).

B. Henning's Opinions Are Based on Data of Questionable Relevance and Reliability.

As part of its role as gatekeeper, the district court must ensure that the underlying facts and/or data upon which a proffered expert's opinion are based are in and of themselves reliable. If an expert's opinion is based on unreliable facts, the opinion must be excluded. *See In re TMI Litigation*, 193 F.3d 613, 697 (3d Cir. 1999); *Montgomery county v. Microvote Corp.*, 320 F.3d 440, 448 (3d Cir. 2003).

The data used by Henning has a number of problems. As noted above, much of the information was obtained from HURRTRAK, a software program which requires that data input from the user. Henning had total discretion in inputting data into HURRTRAK, and the results generated by HURRTRAK are only as reliable as the data entered into the program.

Henning's ultimate calculation of wind speeds that came in contact with Plaintiffs' residence begins with data from a hurricane advisory that was later criticized and revised downward by its very source, the National Hurricane Center.

Henning's conclusions about wind speed are also dependent upon his unsupported conclusion that convective events such MCVs or wet microbursts occurred at the property, although he admits that the Doppler imagery he looks to in support of this does not necessarily indicate such was the case. A failure to test one's own premise results in a conclusion that is no better than a guess. *Joiner, supra*, 522 U.S. at 146, citing *Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.* 959 F.2d 1349 (C.A. 6 1992). Here, Henning could easily test his theories employing his so-called methodology to a location where accurate wind speeds were recorded, such as the site of the towers set up by the three university programs noted above. He chose not to do so.

Henning did not consider other readily available information, such as the FEMA wind maps or the information generated by the Florida Coast Monitoring Program. He also did not look at the condition of nearby homes and trees. There is no indication that Henning looked at the wind speeds generated in the area by past hurricanes, nor did he inquire how Plaintiffs' home withstood wind forces from those hurricanes.

C. Henning's Methods Are Deficient and Thus the Conclusions He Reaches Are Unreliable.

For every conclusion contained in an expert's proposed testimony, the court must determine if the methodology leading to that conclusion is sound. *Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng'g Corp.*, 102 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). A court may appropriately exclude expert testimony when it finds that an expert has extrapolated data, and there is "too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." *General Elec. Co. v. Joiner*, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997); *Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc.*, 151 F.3d 269, 279 (5th Cir. 1998). Such testimony should

also be excluded when it is speculative or not amenable to scientific verification. *Moore*, 151 F.3d at 273.

Application of the *Daubert* factors is equally warranted in cases where the expert's testimony is based solely on experience or training. *Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc.*, 121 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 1997). In fact, the Supreme Court has rejected validation based solely upon an expert's say so. *General Elec. Co. v. Joiner*, 522 U.S. at 146 (“[N]othing in either *Daubert* or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the *ipse dixit* of the expert.”).

In this case, Henning's methodology - by his own admission - is at odds with others in his field.¹⁷ For instance, he was unable to identify any meteorologists who apply the same methodology to determine the relative increase in gust velocity based upon small-scale convective events. *United States v. Downing*, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985) (Widespread acceptance is significant factor in determining whether expert opinion evidence is admissible).

¹⁷ After preparing his first report for this matter, Henning came across other research data that he believes support his findings, and amended his report to include it. One is a paper written by Mark Powell and Tim Reinhold that discusses “integrated kinetic energy” and the importance of taking into account the size of the storm. (See excerpts from Mr. Henning's deposition in *Candiotto v. State Farm*, attached hereto as Exhibit H, p. 9) There are also two papers written by Keith Blackwell that discuss the double eyewall structure of Katrina and about the cells that were embedded within the eyewall and feeder bands that may have enhanced the wind field. (Exhibit H, pp. 9-10) He also obtained a PowerPoint presentation that uses Blackwell's data. (Exhibit H, pp. 10-11) He also notes two papers written by individuals from Texas Tech University (Exhibit H, pp. 15-16), and a paper from the U.S. Department of Commerce which is a service assessment of the National Weather Service. (Exhibit H, pp. 16-17) This information did not change Henning's findings regarding wind and surge estimates, and there is no indication that these writings support Henning's novel methodology. (Exhibit H, p. 14)

Henning did not take into consideration the frictional effect of topographical features in determining the wind gust speeds at Plaintiffs' property despite common knowledge that the presence of numerous trees or elevation differences on a property will reduce gust velocity.

Not only are there apparent holes in Henning's methodology, there is no evidence that his novel theories and calculations have been (or even can be) tested. Whether an expert's theory has been tested is considered by many to be the most important factor in assessing reliability. Stewart Lee, *Evidence – Expert Witnesses – Daubert Applies to All Expert Testimony*, 69 Miss. L.J. 979, 986 (1999), citing Margaret A. Burger, *Does the Search for Truth in Our Scholarship Continue In Our Classrooms?*, 49 Hastings L.J. 1179, 1180 (1998); Michael D. Green, *Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation*, 86 NW U.L. Rev. 643, 645 (1992) (contending scientific methodology is predicated on developing and testing hypothesis).

When applying *Daubert* to meteorologists, courts have insisted that the equations upon which meteorologists rely—as well as the factors entered into those equations—be supported by peer-reviewed literature. *Holder v. Gold Fields Mining Corp.* 2007 WL 188130, *3 (N.D. Ok 1997) (excluding a meteorologist's expert testimony because a factor he chose for input into an equation had not been independently validated. In that case, the court recognized that it “would not be fulfilling its duty as gatekeeper if it permitted the introduction of novel scientific methodology [the discretionary factor] based solely on the assurances of the expert himself.”) Here, even if the weather data Henning relied upon was correct, even if the hurricane was as Henning reconstructed it, even if the necessary convective features were high above Plaintiffs' house, Henning could never show that the “100% reduction factor” he chose to apply (meaning

zero reduction in wind speeds from upper to lower atmosphere)—or any reduction factor for the air above the property on that day for that matter—is based upon anything more than his subjective belief. Under *Daubert*, any step which renders the expert’s analysis unreliable renders the expert’s testimony inadmissible. Henning’s bridge from high altitude to rooftop cannot rest on discretion alone.

D. The Deficiencies in Henning’s Methodology Go to not to the Weight, but to the Admissibility of his Testimony.

Where there is too great an analytical gap between an expert’s unreliable methodology and untested theories and the conclusions he reaches, the testimony should be excluded. *See Kass v. West Bend Co.*, 2004 WL 2475606, at * 6, *10 (E.D.N.Y.) (excluding as unreliable under *Daubert* plaintiffs' expert's testimony concerning alternative feasible designs for allegedly defective product where expert did not adequately test prototypes or subject them to peer review and his methods were generally "incomplete, cursory and undisciplined"). In such a case, the flaws do not simply go to the weight of the testimony. *Id. See also Bland v. HC Beck*, 2007 WL 748461, at * 4-5 (E.D. Mo.) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that any "gaps" in his expert's opinion about design defect caused by expert's lack of testing and lack of experience with particular product went to weight, not admissibility). Given the likelihood of confusion and the weight generally given to expert testimony by jurors, the opponent of blatantly unreliable testimony should not have to resort to vigorous cross-examination as its only recourse. *See also Werde v. Allright Holdings Inc.*, 2005 WL 2124553, at *2, * 5 (D. Colo.) (court excluded discrimination plaintiff's expert's statistical regression analysis based on pay differentials where expert's failure to include non-discriminatory variables such as skill, education and experience rendered

otherwise recognized methodology flawed, and rejected plaintiff's argument that court should "let [the jury] decide what weight, if any, should be given" to expert's conclusions).

CONCLUSION

Henning's conclusions regarding the relative time and speeds of the winds that reached Plaintiffs' property is not based on reliable scientific evidence. His conclusions rests upon unsupported premises and unreliable data. As such, his opinions and conclusions, including his report, should be excluded.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this the 9th day of November, 2007.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Roechelle M. Morgan, hereby certify that on November 9, 2007, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system which sent notification of such filing to the following:

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
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THIS, the 9th day of November, 2007.

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


By any of several measures, Hurricane Katrina was the most destructive tropical cyclone ever to hit the United States. In May of 2006, the official death toll was raised to 1836 (making it the deadliest storm since the 1926 Lake Okeechobee, FL Hurricane), including 238 lives lost on the Mississippi Coast where over 68,000 homes were destroyed and another 65,000 heavily damaged (see [Table 1](#)). In terms of property damage inflicted (over \$75 billion), as well as overall economic impact (over \$125 billion), it far exceeded Camille of 1969, the storm that had previously been considered the benchmark for natural disasters in Mississippi.

While Camille came ashore as an extraordinarily intense Category 5 storm, in terms of its diameter, it was very compact compared to Katrina. See [Figures A, B, and C](#), satellite images of Camille as it moved in August of 1969 from the northwestern tip of Cuba, across the Gulf of Mexico toward the center of the eye making landfall near Waveland, MS (sweeping the worst wind and surge underneath the northeast eyewall over coastal Mississippi).

Figure D is an image of Katrina as it approached the coast on August 28th 2005 (encompassing most of the Gulf of Mexico) and Figure E is a side-by-side comparison of the two storms at landfall, showing how much larger Katrina was in terms of the number of square miles it covered.

In a study being conducted at Colorado State University by Dr Mark DeMaria and Kate Maclay, presented in April 2006 at the 27th American Meteorological Society Conference on Hurricanes and Tropical Meteorology in Monterey, CA, of all tropical cyclones that have struck the U.S. since 1995, Katrina contained far more kinetic energy (KE) at landfall than any other storm. In fact, it contained *six times* as much kinetic energy as Hurricane Charley, a Category Four storm which devastated Charlotte County Florida, north of Fort Meyers, in August of 2004. The study calculated KE by integrating the total wind energy multiplied over the area encompassed by those winds. The study reinforces the notion that the total number of square miles covered by winds in excess of 100 knots (not just the maximum winds nearest the center) is crucial in determining the overall destructive potential of a storm. The total energy of Katrina, as compared to other landfalling storms over the past ten years, is plotted below:



Katrina was born as Tropical Depression #12 over the Bahamas on the 23rd of August. For the first 48 hours of its life cycle, it was a very ordinary tropical system, showing no indication that it would become such a historic event. On August 25th, as it approached the Miami area, it strengthened into a Category One hurricane and came ashore over south Florida with sustained winds of 80 MPH. Katrina then crossed the Everglades and entered the Gulf of Mexico on the morning of Friday the 26th.

On Saturday morning, the 27th of August, Katrina became a major (Category Three) hurricane. The first Hurricane Watch for the Gulf states was issued at 10:00 AM for the Louisiana coast from Morgan City to the mouth of the Pearl River (see Figure 1). A later 4:00 PM afternoon advisory included a Hurricane Warning was issued for the Mississippi coast later that evening at 10:00 PM CDT (see Figure 2, Advisory #19 issued 36 hours prior to the Hancock County landfall and 32 hours prior to the first landfall in the Louisiana Delta). About six hours later, a USAF Reserve reconnaissance aircraft measured a central pressure of 915 millibars in the eye of Katrina and winds of over 166 knots (191 MPH) in the eyewall, a little over 300 miles south of Biloxi. This prompted NHC to upgrade Katrina to a Category Five storm at 08:00 AM CDT on Sunday morning the 28th of August (see the forecast discussion Figure 3 approximately 22 hours prior to the initial landfall).

That reconnaissance flight by the USAF Reserve's 53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron *Hurricane Hunters*, and a subsequent flight later that morning by a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) WP-3 aircraft, found the central pressure of Katrina continued to drop to a value as low as 902 millibars. This is three millibars lower than the lowest pressure measured in Camille. Using a dropsonde (an instrument released from the aircraft that falls with a parachute and measures winds, pressure, temperature and other meteorological parameters) winds in the lowest 150 meters, just above the Gulf waters, averaged as high as 158 knots (182 MPH). At 09:21 AM CDT, a dropsonde released into the northeastern quadrant of the eyewall measured a wind gust of 234 knots (269 MPH) at approximately

600 meters above the ocean surface. These are the strongest winds ever directly measured in any tropical cyclone anywhere on Earth.

Thirteen hours later, with the eye of Katrina only 150 miles south of Biloxi, another reconnaissance flight (AF305) measured winds up to 152 knots (175 MPH) in the northeastern eyewall 421 meters above the surface of the Gulf (see [Figures F1](#), [F2](#), and [F3](#) where this maximum wind value is depicted as 78.2 meters per second) less than nine hours before this portion of the eyewall swept over Hancock and Harrison Counties.

With the storm so close to landfall at such intensity, the fate of the Mississippi Coast was already sealed. Katrina was, by that point, transferring so much energy into the ocean that there was no way that any subsequent weakening of the system would have made much difference. The meteorological term *momentum flux* is used to describe how the warm seas of the tropics contain potential energy that is absorbed by hurricanes and converted into kinetic energy in the form of winds generated around the eye. These powerful winds whip up the ocean below the eyewall into a frenzy, transferring energy back into the sea in the form of wave energy. Due to its strength and size (an exceptionally large radius of hurricane force winds that extended, at the time of landfall, up to 125 miles northeast of the eye), the momentum flux was calculated to be higher for Katrina than any other storm that has ever threatened the U.S. coastline.

According to NOAA, the center of Hurricane Katrina first made landfall at 06:10 AM CDT on August 29th in the marshy Mississippi River Delta of Plaquemines Parish, LA, 90 miles southwest of Biloxi (see [Figure 4](#)). At landfall, the National Hurricane Center Public Advisory #26A (issued at 06:00AM CDT) listed Katrina as a Category Four hurricane with 145 MPH maximum sustained winds and a central pressure of 918 millibars. Over the next four hours, the center of Katrina moved NNE at 15 MPH across the Delta then back over Lake Borgne, southeast of New Orleans.

At 8:00 AM, NHC Advisory #26B placed the storm over Plaquemines Parish, 40 miles southeast of New Orleans with 135 MPH winds and a central pressure of 923 millibars. Katrina came ashore for a final time just east of the Mississippi-Louisiana state line (near Buccaneer State Park) into Hancock County (see a satellite loop of this in [Figure 5](#)).

Advisory #27, issued at 10:00 AM as the center of the eye was making its final landfall between Ansley and Pearlington, MS, 39 miles southwest of South Shore Drive, listed sustained winds of 125 MPH, with gusts to 155 MPH and a central pressure of 927 millibars. The McIntosh property never experienced the eye itself, with the calm center eventually passing 36 miles to the west just before 11:00 AM. Instead, Biloxi once again (as in Camille) saw some of the worst the storm had to offer as sustained winds of 100 knots or more blew for at least a 90 minute period.

The track of Katrina from birth in the Bahamas to its dissipation as a depression over Clarksville, Tennessee, along with its intensity at each point, is seen as [Figure 6](#) (or an animated version can be seen as [Figure 7](#)). A listing of all the advisories issued by NHC on Katrina is shown as [Figure 8](#). An animation of all the advisory graphics is at [Figure 9](#).

On December 20th, 2005, The National Hurricane Center published its official tropical cyclone report on Katrina (which can be viewed as [NHC Katrina Report](#)). The NHC report went back and re-defined the intensity of Katrina at both the Louisiana and the Mississippi landfalls, with lower wind estimates than what they had used in their operational bulletins listed above (issued in real-time as the storm came ashore). The findings of the NHC report have caused a great deal of controversy in the tropical cyclone research community. Many scientists disagree with the revised wind assessments made, especially since they are contrary to considerable evidence that Category Four winds impacted the Louisiana coast and that these extreme winds may even have persisted as far north as the second landfall in Hancock County.

Automated Surface Observing Station (ASOS) stations all across southeastern Louisiana and southern Mississippi were either rendered inoperative due to power failures, or destroyed by winds before they could capture anything close to the strongest winds. [Animation A](#) is a loop of several hours of station plots prior to, during, and after landfall, showing more and more wind sensors on the coast and at offshore buoys dropping offline (disappearing from the plot) as Katrina struck.

The wind values in this report are based on a combination of all available data (including both the original NHC advisories and their revised December estimates) but are weighted heavily toward aircraft reconnaissance and ground based radar data sets since these continued to be recorded after conventional anemometers at nearly all weather stations along the coast were destroyed.

WIND SUMMARY

At the McIntosh property in the Ancient Oaks neighborhood of Lopez Point (see [Figure 9a](#), [Figure 9b](#), and [Figure 9c](#)) tropical storm force winds (in excess of 34 knots or 39 MPH) began at 8:00 PM CDT on Sunday August 28th and ended just before 7:00 PM on Monday August 29th, a duration of 23 hours. Winds exceeding 50 knots (or 58 MPH) began at 4:00 AM early Monday morning and ended just after 4:00 PM Monday afternoon, a duration of 12 hours. Sustained hurricane force winds of 64 knots (75 MPH) or more lasted for 8.5 hours, beginning at 6:00 AM Monday morning and lasting until 2:30 PM Monday afternoon.

The maximum one minute sustained winds estimated for the Ancient Oaks neighborhood, just west of the Sunkist Golf Course, about two miles south of Interstate 10 near the confluence of the Biloxi and Tchoutacabouffa Rivers and the Big Lake (the western end of the Back Bay of Biloxi, were approximately 105 knots or 121 MPH around 10:00 AM on Monday August 29th. The strongest large-scale three second gusts associated with the hurricane wind field here in this westernmost portion of Biloxi were 131 knots (151 MPH) (not including localized phenomena, that will be discussed shortly, that may have momentarily produced even higher gusts). These values are based on interpolation of the best available wind measurements using the Hurtrak RM Pro 2005 software.

[Figure 10](#) shows the distribution of maximum wind gusts across Mississippi and surrounding states as compiled by Clark Love of Forest One Inc., an information technology company specializing in Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Remote Sensing (RS) solutions that is performing post-Katrina analysis of the damage. This chart clearly shows the "buzz saw" of extreme winds that raked the state of Mississippi from the southwest to the northeast corners as the storm continued to move inland (with 100 MPH gusts reaching almost all the way up to Starkville and Columbus).

The National Weather Service Office in Jackson, MS (the forecasters responsible for most of inland Mississippi) posted their report on September 7th, 2005 that described results of a field study (including aerial surveys) of the swath from Purvis to Collins to Newton to Meridian, MS. They reported seeing widespread damage equivalent to that caused by Fujita Scale F-2 tornadoes (winds of 110-135 MPH) as much as 100 miles inland with isolated areas approaching F-3 damage (as is seen with tornadoes containing winds of 136 to 165 MPH). They described F-1 type damage (winds of 86 to 110 MPH) as far inland as between 150 and 200 miles from the coast. The Jackson office measured their all-time lowest barometric pressure with 28.74 inches of mercury (breaking the old record that had been established in 1969 during Camille).

Another plot of winds at landfall can be seen as [Figure 11](#) (showing maximum sustained winds in knots around 10:30 AM). An animated .gif file shows several hourly plots prior to, and immediately following, landfall (see [Figure 12](#)).

[Figure 13](#) (a .jpg image) and [Figure 14](#) (an HTML file) show tables of hour-by-hour winds for Eagle Point. A graphical plot of winds for the two days in this area is shown as [Figure 15](#). A look at the overall distribution of maximum winds recorded during Katrina's landfall, and how the western end of North Biloxi fared in relation to the rest of the Gulf Coast, is shown as [Figure 15a](#), [Figure 15b](#) (a breakdown of how Harrison County's winds compared to other counties on the coast), and [Figure 15c](#) (a breakdown of how Zip Code 39532 winds compared to other zip codes on the coast).

The closest official wind measurement sites all failed prior to landfall, therefore, there were no official National Weather Service reporting stations operating nearby during what would have been the maximum wind event. The Automated Surface Observing Station (ASOS) located at Gulfport Airport, failed early Monday morning at 5:25 AM and transmitted no data that would be useful in reconstructing actual observed maximum winds. At Keesler AFB, (four miles southeast of South Shore Drive) the maximum winds measured prior to the instrument failing before landfall were 85 knots (98 MPH).

The highest wind speeds recorded by an anemometer prior to failure anywhere to the west of Biloxi along the Mississippi Coast was 117 knots (135 MPH) at the Pearl River City Emergency Operations Center in Poplarville (40 miles inland). This sort of instrument failure is common during severe landfalling hurricanes, creating a data void and making efforts at reconstructing the exact intensity of winds at a particular location more of a challenge. Unofficial reports from emergency management personnel observing the readouts of remote wind instruments at NASA's Stennis Space Center, north of Bay St Louis, quote several workers seeing gusts well in excess of 140 MPH.

To the east, the ASOS station at the Jackson County Airport, east of downtown Pascagoula, failed at 4:53 AM. The Jackson County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at 600 Convent Avenue in Pascagoula recorded what was reported by the National Weather Service as a 108 knot (124 MPH) wind gust prior to the winds tearing the roof off the facility. Later the Director of the EOC, Butch Loper, testified in court that the maximum winds had actually reached 137 MPH (119 knots) during a gust as the roof began to peel off between 8:00 and 8:30 AM. An anemometer at the Ingalls Shipyard recorded gusts to 117 knots (135 MPH) on two occasions, first, between 7:40 and 7:50 AM and a second time between 9:10 and 9:20 AM.

This sort of instrument failure is common during severe landfalling hurricanes, creating a data void and making efforts at reconstructing the exact intensity of winds at a particular location more of a challenge. If there are aircraft flying reconnaissance missions as a storm is coming ashore, this provides an excellent source of continuous information and fortunately, that morning, there were not only one but three such missions. Aircraft reconnaissance data measured from AF300 and AF306, two Air Force Reserve WC-130J aircraft, and NOAA 43, a WP-3 (all three flying simultaneous missions into Katrina as it was making landfall) supports the assertion that hurricane force winds extended up to 125 miles northeast of the center of the eye with major hurricane force winds (in excess of 100 knots or 115 MPH) spreading over an extensive area of the shoreline up to and immediately after landfall.

A dropsonde instrument released from USAF aircraft 300 (Katrina mission # 2212A) at 9:22 AM at 30.31N 89.27W, (which was then carried northward in the eyewall and actually landed on land in Pass Christian northeast of Henderson Point in the Timber Ridge neighborhood) measured winds as high as 133 knots (153 MPH) at an altitude of only 350 meters above the surface. The average wind measured by this instrument in the lowest 500 meters of the atmosphere was 120 knots (138 MPH). This dropsonde data is included in [Figure 16](#) and a plot of this wind profile over Pass Christian is shown as [Figure 16a](#).

Overall, winds continuously measured at flight level during the AF300 WC-130J mission (see [Figure 17](#)) were consistently over 115 knots and as high as 127 knots (146 MPH) at 10:06 AM. [Figure 17b](#) shows a plot of the aircraft track and wind speed measured as it flew across the Mississippi Sound toward marking the center of the eye just southwest of the Pearl River at 9:29 AM (where you see the wind value drop down to two knots). As AF300 flew through the eastern eyewall you can see wind values of 117 knots southeast of Biloxi, upwind from the McIntosh neighborhood.

A second aircraft, the other USAF Reserve WC-130J from the 53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron (AF306), measured peak flight level winds of 130 knots (149 MPH) from an altitude of 2000 meters over the beach, at 10:46AM (about 45 minutes after landfall) from an altitude of 2000 meters over portions of Hancock and Harrison County well inland (see [Figure 17c](#) and [Figure 17d](#)).

The eyewall of a hurricane is also prone to spawning large numbers of small, short-lived, tornadoes. The National Hurricane Center, working with the Storm Prediction Center in Oklahoma City, is examining evidence of between 33 and 39 such tornadoes that were spawned by Katrina. These tornadoes, commonly seen in the front-right quadrant of landfalling tropical cyclones, are highly transient in nature but often are responsible for locally worsening the wind damage underneath the eyewall. The Biloxi area was under a Tornado Watch for 26 consecutive hours from 4:40 PM on August 28th, until 6:40 PM on the 29th (see [Figures G, H, and I](#)). The NWS Office in Jackson published tracks of tornadoes spawned by Katrina farther inland in central Mississippi (see [Figure 12](#) and [Figure 13](#)). The convective bands associated with these tornadoes act to mix some of the strongest winds, seen in aircraft reconnaissance data above, down to the surface for brief intervals.

Western Biloxi experienced multiple feeder bands rotating around and into the storm center which were likely to be tornadic. Since few of these isolated tornadoes happen to occur at exact locations where winds are measured with instrumentation, usually their intensity can only be estimated based on the resulting damage and the assumption (based on studies of other landfalling tropical cyclones) that these funnels, and the mesoscale convective vortices (MCVs) that create them, can locally increase wind speeds at a given spot well above the ambient, larger scale, prevailing hurricane wind field.

Damage along the Mississippi coast was not a continuum that steadily increased in severity from east to west (as you drew closer to the eye). Instead, it occurred in bands, similar to what was seen in Alabama and Northwest Florida from Hurricane Ivan. As with Ivan, much of the banded damage strips attributable to winds corresponds to where feeder bands moved onshore with embedded MCVs.

Three second wind gusts may approach values twice that of the one-minute sustained wind (Mark Powell et al., "Reduced drag coefficient for high wind speeds in tropical cyclones" 2003). The University of Chicago's noted tornado researcher, Dr Theodore Fujita, suggested in several papers written in the 1980s and 1990s that many of the most extreme convective winds in hurricanes are associated with thunderstorm downdrafts. Also, Powell and Sam Houston ("Hurricane Andrew's Landfall in South Florida. Part II: Surface Wind Fields and Potential Real-time Applications". *Weather and Forecasting*, American Meteorological Society, 1996) indicate that strong horizontal shear along the lateral edge of these thunderstorm downdrafts as they spread along the ground may develop small vortices and extreme winds.

Research into what happens when dry air from the continental U.S. is ingested into the circulation of a landfalling hurricane along the northern Gulf Coast has been conducted by Dr. Keith Blackwell and others at the University of South Alabama. Their work supports the notion that while dry air ingestion weakens the overall intensity of a storm, and contributes to weakening of a hurricane prior to landfall on a large scale (as was the case with Katrina), pockets of this dry air (which is heavier than moist air and tends to cool more quickly, making it more dense and likely to descend more rapidly (therefore, with more kinetic energy)), when entrained into individual thunderstorms embedded within feeder bands and fragments of inner and outer eyewall structures, greatly enhances the potential for stronger downdrafts that, upon reaching the ground, spread out as very strong wind gusts. The enhancement of gusts by this episode of dry air entrainment into Katrina's convective bands over localized areas for brief intervals was clearly evident on the eastern semicircle of the storm as it came ashore.

Therefore, the superimposition of a feeder band, onto Katrina's sustained wind field, would have resulted in winds being locally increased from prevailing larger-scale values of around 120 MPH, with gusts over 150 MPH. Any MCVs and their accompanying funnel clouds, embedded within a feeder band, or within the main eyewall, would have produced momentary wind gusts significantly exceeding these values.

Computer model simulations of Katrina performed by Canadian hurricane researcher Chris Fogarty (see [Movie File A](#) , [Movie File B](#), and [Movie File C](#)) show evidence of these vortices swirling around the eyewall

National Weather Service (NWS) Doppler radar, operating from Slidell, Louisiana, can identify the time when the strongest feeder bands and the eyewall came over Sunkist and Ancient Oaks during the morning of August 29th (until the radar was destroyed by high winds at 9:01 AM). It can used to identify some of the MCVs that may have produced tornadoes embedded within the convective bands. These are chronicled in the following radar animation loop: [Movie File 1](#) (8 megabytes) and [Movie File Two](#) (22 megabytes). Several very strong feeder bands moved onshore from the Gulf prior to the eyewall (containing potentially tornadic MCVs).

The first thunderstorms associated with the periphery of Katrina's circulation developed along the Biloxi beachfront at 3:13 PM on the afternoon prior to landfall. By 4:19 PM, the first of several outlying feeder bands, rotating around the edge of the storm, moved across the coast with wind gusts to tropical storm force (over 35 knots or 40 MPH). More moved overhead at 4:52 PM and 6:25 PM that evening. Then at 11:15 PM that night, the main rain shield associated with the storm moved in as it then rained continuously over Biloxi for the next 14 hours until well after Katrina made landfall.

From midnight of August 29th until after 4:00 AM, Lopez Point was pounded by several rounds of powerful thunderstorms (with particularly intense cells coming over at 2:09, 2:31, and 3:26 AM) associated with outer feeder bands and winds began to gust to hurricane force (in excess of 64 knots or 75 MPH). While these large scale winds are not generally recognized to have been sufficiently strong to have caused significant damage, the cumulative toll of this wind stress for four hours undoubtedly weakened structures in the area. The force pressing upon each square foot of a structure exposed to the wind increases by the square of the wind velocity. Therefore, instead of the pressure being doubled as winds increase from 50 MPH to 100 MPH, the force increases by a factor of more than five, from 5.5 pounds per square foot to over 30 pounds per square foot. Also of note is that these early feeder bands began to generate MCVs and several tornado warnings were issued for the three coastal Mississippi counties during the night.

The first intense feeder bands associated with the core of Katrina moved onshore at 5:28 AM, with a second round hitting at 5:49 AM. It was during this second period when large scale gusts over 100 MPH first occurred and several more tornadic MCVs may have produced significant localized damage. Another intense band with a tornadic MCV moved over the McIntosh neighborhood at 6:21 AM.

Then at 7:11 AM, a fragment of the outer eyewall of Katrina reached Lopez Point with another eyewall fragment moving overhead at 7:27 AM. The eyewall itself came overhead at 8:05 with the strongest cells embedded within this portion of the eyewall, likely containing tornadic MCVs, moving overhead at 8:21 and 8:49 AM. In the final radar image available prior to the Slidell radar being destroyed, at 8:59 AM (see [Figure J](#)), the main inner eyewall of Katrina had rotated onshore and covered the southern end of Hancock County and the southwest corner of Harrison County.

[Figure J4A](#) and [Figure J4B](#) (from a report published by Pat Fitzpatrick and Yee Lau at Mississippi State University) are plots of 123 potentially tornadic MCVs tracked by both the Mobile (from 3:30 AM through 12:45 PM) and Slidell (from 3:30 AM through 9:00 AM) Doppler radars that rotated onto the Mississippi coast from the Gulf of Mexico as the feeder bands and outer/inner eyewalls of Katrina came ashore.

After 9:00 AM, there is radar imagery available from the NWS Doppler radar in Mobile, Alabama. [Figure J2](#) (from 09:31AM) shows the eyewall working its way into central Hancock County and the southern portion of the county emerging into the eye. A distinctive hook echo, the signature of a potentially large tornado embedded within the inner edge of the eyewall, appears to be moving northwestward out of the area around western St Louis Bay and across Interstate 10 towards the Stennis Space Center and the town of Picayune. This would be just after the maximum wind event over southern Hancock County and extreme western Harrison County.

Doppler radar can also track the velocities of rain droplets (measuring how fast they are moving either toward the radar or away from it). This provides yet another method of estimating maximum winds. These velocities, coming from the Mobile site (rather than the more optimal location at Slidell), are distorted to appear displaced further away from the site and somewhat degraded. However, they do show maximum Doppler-derived wind velocities measured in Katrina just prior to landfall were at least 127-132 MPH (see [Figure J3](#) and [Movie File J4](#) (6.5 megabytes)).

Advanced MIMIC microwave satellite imagery of Katrina from The University of Wisconsin CIMSS (Morphed Integrated Microwave Imagery from CIMSS) reveals details of the storm's structure that is hidden using ordinary satellite imagery underneath the overlying cloud shield canopy capping the top of the storm. Evident in a movie animation (see [Movie File D](#)) of microwave data from Katrina over a three day period is the evolution of a very warm, well-defined eye (the classic signature of an intense tropical cyclone shown as the very dark blue color in the center) along with very cold cloud tops of the surrounding thunderstorms that comprise the eyewall (shown as bright red bands of convection). As Katrina approached landfall on the morning of 29 August, the western semicircle of convection was clearly eroded by the intrusion of dry air mentioned above. However, it is to be noted that the eye continued to be clearly evident as seen in the dark blue color at the center that persisted, and actually became slightly *better defined* upon landfall briefly while inland over Hancock County. [Figure J3](#) shows a burst of convection in the eastern eyewall (the spot of red that appears) at landfall that was likely accompanied by a very strong surge in wind gusts along the shoreline as it passed overhead. It also helps support the notion that Katrina was in the process of an eyewall replacement cycle when it made landfall (trying to rebuild a new inner core eyewall structure).

Lightning data also supports the assertion that the inner core of Katrina was experiencing a burst of convection immediately subsequent to landfall in Hancock County. The core of a mature hurricane typically contains little lightning because lightning is caused by the interaction of supercooled water droplets and ice particles above the freezing level within the storm clouds that form the eyewall. However, hurricanes contain so much warm air within their core, that the freezing level is elevated to great heights, limiting the opportunity for these water droplets to interact with ice crystals to create a build-up of static charge. Only in the most vigorous and violent updrafts in an eyewall, is the supercooled water carried high enough to rub against the ice particles and create enough charge to generate significant lightning. [Figure JA](#) shows a burst of lightning strikes immediately after landfall around 10:00 AM in what appears to be the innermost eyewall that moved across Hancock and western Harrison County. [Figure JB](#) is from 11:00 AM, showing the lightning continuing inland into southern Mississippi. These two images are in sharp contrast to [Figure JC](#), from 7:00 AM, that shows no lightning in the core region of Katrina (with all the lightning confined instead to the outlying feeder bands). An animation of several hours of lightning data (from 5:00 AM to 11:00AM) is shown in [Movie File JD](#) depicting the sudden appearance of lightning near the center of the storm as it passed over the Mississippi Coast.

Video shot from the Hancock Bank Parking Garage on 14th Avenue in downtown Gulfport (see [Figures J5](#) and [Figure J6](#)), by amateur storm chasers Scott McPartland and David Lewison, provide further evidence of the fury of the winds in the eyewall (see [Movie File J7](#) and [Movie File J8](#)).

Applied Research Associates (ARA) developed a wind model for FEMA to estimate the maximum 3 second wind gusts associated with the landfall of Katrina. The Hazards U.S. – Multi-Hazard (HAZUS-MH) plot is shown below. It is a conservative, large-scale estimate that does not include the localized mesoscale features embedded within feeder bands and the eyewall that produced briefly higher gusts.




Figure 2-11.
Wind swath contour plot of
3-second gust wind speeds in
mph at a height of 10 meters
above ground (open exposure)
based on HAZUS-MH wind field
methodology
SOURCE: ARA

SUMMARY OF EVENTS

The Mississippi Gulf coast was overwhelmed by an unprecedented weather event that turned out to be even worse than what had been encountered with Camille 36 years earlier. Figure 22 is an aerial photograph taken by NOAA three days after Katrina struck showing extensive damage in the Sunkist, Ancient Oaks and Beau Chene Estates neighborhoods of Lopez Point. The combination of wind and surge created by Katrina produced an even higher degree of devastation this time around (destroying many structures that had survived Camille).

Extraordinarily high winds, both within feeder bands and underneath the outer eyewall make it is a meteorological certainty that devastating winds along the waterfront of Big Lake and the Back Bay of Biloxi (with 120 MPH sustained winds and gusts over 150 MPH) pounded South Shore Drive for several hours. Feeder bands and elements of outer eyewalls included at least a half-dozen cells containing tomadic MCVs.

The Sunkist Country Club Road area sits immediately adjacent to the expanse of the Back Bay of Biloxi and Big Lake. This allowed winds to flow with reduced friction across the water and directly onto waterfront structures, adding greatly to the wind's destructive potential. In many landfalling hurricanes there exists a sharp gradient of wind velocity both horizontally and vertically along the immediate shoreline. Dropsondes show extreme winds were still flowing just above the surface at landfall. The intense convection occurring within the re-developing inner eyewall of Katrina at landfall provided a conduit for these winds to reach the surface in the form of localized gusts much stronger than the prevailing large scale sustained wind field of the main hurricane circulation.

Richard G. Henning

Richard G. Henning
Consulting Meteorologist
Report prepared March 27th, 2007

Hurricane KATRINA: Timeline of Events for 30.43N 88.99W 2558 South Shore Drive Biloxi, MS 39532

Sunday: 08/28/2005 20:00 CDT - Monday: 08/29/2005 19:00 CDT

Date / Time	Sustained (One minute average) Wind Speed (knots)	Large Scale (Three second average) Wind Gusts (knots)	Wind Direction (degrees)	Distance to center (miles)
Sunday 08/28/2006: 3:13 PM First thunderstorms associated with Katrina develop along beachfront of Biloxi with gusts to tropical storm force				
4:19 PM First outlying feeder bands from Katrina reach the coast				
4:52 PM Second outlying feeder band moves overhead				
6:25 PM Third outer feeder band moves overhead with tropical storm force wind gusts				
Sunday: 08/28/2005 20:00 CDT Sustained Winds Reach Tropical Storm Force	035	044	070	0214
Sunday: 08/28/2005 20:30 CDT	036	045	070	0210
Sunday: 08/28/2005 21:00 CDT	037	046	070	0205
Sunday: 08/28/2005 21:30 CDT	037	046	070	0202
Sunday: 08/28/2005 22:00 CDT	038	048	070	0197
Sunday: 08/28/2005 22:30 CDT	039	049	075	0192
Sunday: 08/28/2005 23:00 CDT	040	050	075	0188
Sunday: 08/28/2005 23:30 CDT	040	050	075	0182
Monday: 08/29/2005 Midnight CDT Strong feeder bands begin rotating off the Gulf, across the beach and onto Lopez Point for the next four hours. Isolated wind gusts associated with strongest cells (at 2:09, 2:31, and 3:26 AM) briefly reach hurricane force	041	051	075	0177
Monday: 08/29/2005 00:30 CDT	042	052	075	0173
Monday: 08/29/2005 01:00 CDT	043	054	075	0168
Monday: 08/29/2005 01:30 CDT	043	054	075	0164
Monday: 08/29/2005 02:00 CDT	044	055	080	0158
Monday: 08/29/2005 02:30 CDT	046	058	080	0149
Monday: 08/29/2005 03:00 CDT	048	060	080	0138
Monday: 08/29/2005 03:30 CDT	049	061	080	0128
Monday: 08/29/2005 04:00 CDT Sustained Winds Reach 50 knots (58 MPH)	054	068	085	0119
Monday: 08/29/2005 04:30 CDT	056	070	085	0114
Monday: 08/29/2005 05:00 CDT	059	074	085	0108
5:28 AM: First intense feeder band associated with the core of Katrina moves inland over the McIntosh neighborhood				
Monday: 08/29/2005 05:30 CDT	062	078	085	0104

5:49 AM: Second Intense feeder band with localized gusts to 100 MPH									
Monday: 08/29/2005 06:00 CDT Sustained Winds Reach Hurricane Force	064	080	085	0099					
8:21 AM: Potentially tornadic MCV moves overhead embedded within another Intense core feeder band									
Monday: 08/29/2005 06:30 CDT	066	082	090	0090					
Monday: 08/29/2005 07:00 CDT	070	088	090	0079					
7:11: Fragment of outer eyewall moves across Lopez Point									
7:27: Another fragment of outer eyewall moves overhead									
Monday: 08/29/2005 07:30 CDT	075	094	095	0071					
Monday: 08/29/2005 08:00 CDT	082	102	100	0062					
8:05: Outer eyewall moves overhead with localized gusts over 130 MPH									
8:21: Tornadic MCV moves overhead embedded within eyewall									
Monday: 08/29/2005 08:30 CDT	090	112	105	0048					
Monday: 08/29/2005 08:45 CDT	097	121	113	0060					
Monday: 08/29/2005 10:00 CDT MAXIMUM LARGE SCALE WINDS AND GUSTS	105	131							
Monday: 08/29/2005 12:00 CDT	085	106	190	0045					
Monday: 08/29/2005 12:30 CDT	080	100	200	0051					
Monday: 08/29/2005 13:00 CDT	075	094	205	0059					
Monday: 08/29/2005 13:30 CDT	071	089	210	0067					
Monday: 08/29/2005 14:00 CDT	068	085	215	0076					
Monday: 08/29/2005 14:30 CDT	065	081	220	0084					
Monday: 08/29/2005 15:00 CDT Sustained winds drop below hurricane force	061	076	220	0092					
Monday: 08/29/2005 15:30 CDT	055	069	225	0100					
Monday: 08/29/2005 16:00 CDT	050	062	225	0108					
Monday: 08/29/2005 16:30 CDT Sustained winds drop below 50 knots	048	060	230	0116					
Monday: 08/29/2005 17:00 CDT Surge event ends as water levels on the Back Bay of Biloxi and Big Lake return to normal	045	056	235	0127					
Monday: 08/29/2005 17:30 CDT	042	052	240	0137					
Monday: 08/29/2005 18:00 CDT	039	049	240	0147					
Monday: 08/29/2005 18:30 CDT	035	044	245	0159					
Monday: 08/29/2005 19:00 CDT Sustained winds drop below tropical storm force	031	039	245						

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[Handwritten Signature] 27 March 2007

Richard G. Henning, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF Reserve

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Email: richard.henning@cox.net

Education

M.S. Meteorology, Florida State University, 1997

Thesis: *Mesoscale Convective Processes and their Link to Enhanced Tropical Cyclogenesis* Master's course work specializing in atmospheric numerical modeling, tropical meteorology, oceanography, time series data analysis, remote sensing. Thesis dealt with forecasting the development of rapidly intensifying hurricanes.

B.S. Meteorology, Florida State University, 1994

Minor in Physics, Mathematics

M.S. Management, Troy State University (NW Florida satellite campus), 1991

B.S. Geology, Southern Illinois University, 1983

Experience

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE WEATHER OFFICER: 53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, *The Hurricane Hunters*, Keesler AFB, MS. March 1995 - present. Mission Director responsible for all meteorological data collection during hurricane and winter storm penetration flights. Liaison with National Hurricane Center for all aspects of mission planning, execution, and data transmission via satellite communications link. Over 145 eyewall penetrations flown into hurricanes including Opal, Fran, Bonnie, Georges, Erin (including landfalling mission over Pensacola Beach in August, 1995), Category Five Hurricane Isabel in 2003, the major 2004 Florida storms: Charley, Frances and Ivan, as well as Hurricanes Emily, Katrina, Ophelia, and Wilma in 2005.

Directed four missions into Ivan, including three as a Category Five system. Directed historic mission on the early morning of 28 August 2005 into Hurricane Katrina, transmitting data that prompted the National Hurricane Center to upgrade Katrina to Category Five status. Flew 20 October 2005 mission into Category Five Hurricane Wilma as the storm approached landfall along the Yucatan Peninsula of Mexico.

Authored and presented papers at the American Meteorological Society (AMS) Conference on Hurricanes and Tropical Meteorology in 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002, and 2004. Chairman of the 2004 AMS conference session dealing with landfalling storms. Chairman of the 1999 Interdepartmental Hurricane Conference held in Biloxi, MS. Awarded seven Aerial Achievement Medals and the USAF Meritorious Service Medal. Over 1650 hours flown in the WC-130H & WC-130J aircraft with the *Hurricane Hunters*; over 2600 total hours of military flight time. Top Secret security clearance based on Special Background Investigation conducted in 1987, updated 1997.

PRIVATE CONSULTING METEOROLOGIST: Consultant to Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell, Echsner & Proctor P.A., Pensacola, FL. February 2005 through present. Clark, Partington and Hart, Pensacola FL; McDonald, Fleming and Moorehead, Pensacola, FL; Merlin Law Group, Tampa, FL; Balch and Bingham LLP, Gulfport, MS. October 2005 through Present.; Maples and Kirwan, New Orleans, LA. June 2006 through Present. Several private individuals and consulting engineering firms; Researched and authored over 85 meteorological reports regarding wind and storm surge conditions for residential and commercial properties damaged by Hurricanes Ivan, Frances, Jeanne, Wilma and Katrina on behalf of individual clients involved in litigation including experience providing sworn testimony as an expert witness at depositions.

METEOROLOGIST: Civilian employee of the Department of Defense (GS-12 Step 5), 46th Test Wing, Eglin

AFB, FL. July 1998 through present. Staff meteorologist to the Air Armament Center and the Air Force Research Lab Munitions Directorate. Responsible for ensuring that all advances in the field of atmospheric science are applied to weapons research and development of precision guided munitions and missile targeting systems. Squadron climatologist and web master, created and maintains one of the most extensive web sites in the USAF for the collection and archiving of weather data at: <http://www.eglin.af.mil/weather/> Hurricane expert for Eglin AFB. Responsible for daily briefings to the base leadership during hurricane season. Primary advisor to the 96th Air Base Wing Commander responsible for the decision to evacuate a base covering 724 square miles and employing over 22,000 military and civilian workers and their dependents. Researched and drafted reports to the commander detailing the impact of Hurricanes Ivan, Dennis and Katrina on various locations across the Eglin AFB Reservation.

METEOROLOGIST INSTRUCTOR: Civilian employee of the Department of Defense (GS-11), Joint Weather Training Complex, Forecaster Course, Keesler AFB, MS. January 1997 through July 1998. Instructed coursework including atmospheric dynamics, physics, satellite analysis and synoptic laboratory. Responsible for curriculum development and quality assurance in 12 courses.

RADAR OFFICER / COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER - AIR CONTROL OFFICER: E-2C Hawkeye, US Navy active duty Naval Flight Officer, Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron 116, Miramar Naval Air Station, San Diego, CA. April 1986 through September 1992. 204 carrier landings and 831 flight hours aboard the *USS Ranger*. Mission Commander responsible for all aspects of mission success (planning, coordination with carrier Combat Information Center, and execution leading a crew of 5 officers). Participated in three extended deployments to the western Pacific, and Middle East, including Operation Nimble Archer in 1987, combat operations in the Persian Gulf / Straits of Hormuz. Served final assignment on active duty as an Aerodynamics Instructor at Naval Aviation Schools Command, NAS Pensacola, FL.

Flight Training, T-34C, T-2B, T-47A aircraft, Training Squadron Ten (VT-10), Naval Air Station Pensacola, FL. February 1985 through April 1986. Graduated number 1 of 19 in academics from Aviation Officer Candidate School (AOCS) Class 19-85, and 4 of 16 from basic and intermediate Naval Flight Officer training at VT-10.

MCINTOSH-000710

Expert Witness Rate Schedule
Richard Henning

\$100 per hour for research and writing of reports

\$120 per hour for depositions

\$140.00 per hour for trial testimony

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION

THOMAS C. and PAMELA MCINTOSH,

Plaintiffs,


vs.

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-1080-LTS-RHW

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY;
and FORENSIC ANALYSIS & ENGINEERING CORP;
and E.A. RENFROE & CO, INC.

Defendants.

The Deposition of RICHARD G. HENNING, taken by
the attorney for the Defendants, pursuant to Notice,
before Lisa D. Jeter, Registered Professional
Reporter and Notary Public, State of Florida on the
8th day of October 2007, commencing at 9:37 a.m., at
Destin Reporting & Technology Group,
910 Airport Road, Suite 3A, Destin, Florida.



1 you'd probably win it.

2 Let me start off by asking a little bit
3 about your background. And when we start doing
4 that, let's introduce Exhibit 1, which I would ask
5 you to tell us whether that is a -- let's let the
6 reporter mark it first. Then I will ask you to tell
7 me if that's a copy of your CV.

8 (Defendant's Exhibit 1 marked for identification.)

9 THE WITNESS: It's a copy of a CV that --
10 a CV that was produced last year. It's about a
11 year old, at least a year old. The only
12 significant difference is, is that the number
13 of different firms that I've worked for in the
14 section Private Consulting Meteorologist has
15 grown considerably since then. And the number
16 of reports that I've written regarding all the
17 different hurricanes that are listed has grown
18 now to in excess of 200.

19 So it says, Researched and authored over
20 85 meteorological reports, and then it lists a
21 bunch of storms, I've done approximately 140
22 reports on Hurricane Katrina and about 220
23 total.

24 BY MR. BONDS:

25 Q. Rather than my asking you to update that,

1 listed on this list of publications that would be
2 pertinent.

3 And then depositions, the number has grown
4 pretty dramatically. What you see are three
5 depositions listed. I've done about 22 now up to
6 this point. So that number has gone up quite a bit,
7 along with the sworn affidavits. I've probably done
8 about a dozen of those now instead of the two that
9 are listed.

10 So I would be able to provide, as we did
11 earlier with the CV, an updated version of the list
12 of depositions, publications and affidavits.

13 Q. That would be good, if you would do that.

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. Okay. Let's go back to your resume. And
16 let me just ask you to tell us now, what is your
17 employment at the present time?

18 A. Well, basically, I have three jobs as a
19 meteorologist. Right now, I -- my regular
20 Monday-through-Friday full-time job is as a
21 meteorologist at Eglin Air Force Base. I'm a
22 civilian GS-12 civil service employee of the
23 Department of the Air Force. I work for the
24 46th Test Wing at Eglin.

25 In addition to my job there at Eglin Air

1 Force Base, I also fly in the reserves part time.
2 I'm a lieutenant colonel with the 53rd Weather
3 Reconnaissance Squadron based at Keesler Air Force
4 Base in Mississippi. I've been doing that for
5 12 years now, since the spring of 1995.

6 And in addition to those two jobs, since
7 2005, I've been working as a private consulting
8 meteorologist dealing with these type of cases,
9 hurricane litigation primarily, where in the fall
10 of -- I'm sorry. In the spring of 2005, I was
11 contacted by Levin Papantonio, which is a law firm
12 in Pensacola, Florida, and asked if I would be
13 interested in writing reports for Hurricane Ivan.
14 And I began doing that.

15 And since then, what at first was a
16 relatively small portion of my time, has gotten
17 larger, and now it's -- it takes up a considerable
18 amount of my time, the consulting aspect. It's
19 grown quite a bit over the last couple of years.

20 Q. Is that primarily as a result of Hurricane
21 Katrina cases?

22 A. That's correct. I've done, in total,
23 probably about 60 to 80 reports on storms that were
24 not Katrina. Again, originally I worked on strictly
25 Hurricane Ivan cases. And then I began working on

1 And then I've been recently retained to
2 help with Dole and Chiquita in the same regard,
3 where a lot of their containers ended up after
4 Katrina in the front lawns of property owners.

5 So that's -- that has been a -- that,
6 along with Hurricane Rita, I've done a report for
7 Locke, Liddell & Sapp, a rig that was located out in
8 the Gulf of Mexico that was destroyed by Hurricane
9 Rita, the rig was submerged, and subsequently an oil
10 tanker collided with it, and there was an oil spill
11 that resulted. And Targa Corporation, which is the
12 corporation that was retained by Locke, Liddell &
13 Sapp, the company that I'm working with, was the
14 defendant in that case.

15 Q. In the container cases, what was the
16 issue?

17 A. The issue is that there was damage caused
18 to the properties by these containers. And the case
19 is, on the defendants' side, that these homes would
20 have been destroyed anyway, even if the -- whether
21 or not the container was there or not, because of
22 the extreme nature of the storm.

23 Q. Was there any issue in those cases about
24 whether it was wind that blew the containers or
25 water that carried the containers to those

1 landfall situations. I'm the primary adviser to the
2 squadron commander who makes the recommendation
3 whether or not to evacuate the base, based on the
4 arrival of 50-knot winds and whether or not the
5 personnel -- there's about 22,000 people that work
6 at Eglin Air Force Base, whether or not to evacuate
7 those personnel, that sort of thing. And then after
8 the storm, I write reports regarding the impact to
9 the reservation.

10 Eglin Air Force Base is a large complex.
11 It's about 724 square miles. It covers a big
12 portion of Walton and Okaloosa County and Santa Rosa
13 County, Florida. I write reports dealing with the
14 impact of the wind and the surge at different
15 facilities across the base.

16 Q. The first part of your duties that you
17 described, would it be fair to say, deal with
18 forecasting as opposed to hindcasting; is that
19 correct?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to form.

22 BY MR. BONDS:

23 Q. All right. Any other duties at the
24 46th Test Wing that involve estimating hurricane
25 winds at particular locations?

1 the ocean and falls to the bottom of the sea.

2 They're disposable.

3 Q. Are these GPS sondes?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. Thank you for showing that to us.

6 Do you have like a button that you press
7 when you release the sonde?

8 A. I work with the load master on board our
9 aircraft, who is the one who actually releases the
10 sonde. He is the one who loads it in the tube. And
11 then at my command, he presses a button. And it's
12 spring-loaded. And the spring and the suction of
13 the winds, we're flying at about 180 knots, sucks
14 the sonde out of the tube into the air.

15 Q. At what altitude do you normally fly these
16 missions?

17 A. It all depends on what the Hurricane
18 Center is looking for as far as data. They can be
19 anywhere from 500 feet above the water, up to
20 somewhere between 8 and 10 thousand feet in the
21 stronger storms.

22 Normally, for a storm like Katrina, we're
23 flying between 8 and 10 thousand feet above the
24 water.

25 Q. I've seen some references in publications

1 interpretation of that?

2 A. What we do there is, we make sure that
3 there aren't any obviously garbled lines of data.
4 The dropsondes tend to be quite reliable, in that if
5 they are getting a good GPS signal from four or more
6 satellites, the wind information tends to be very
7 reliable. We're making sure that the -- nothing
8 that looks obviously erroneous gets through. But
9 that's a relatively rare situation most of the time.
10 If we're getting good wind data, the winds all look
11 scientifically reasonable.

12 We look to make sure that the temperature
13 data looks reasonable because that's going to have
14 an impact on the pressure data. Basically what we
15 do, we do a quick quality check of the data. We
16 only have a few minutes in which to do that because
17 the Hurricane Center is eager to get the data. So,
18 generally, we only have about less than five minutes
19 to quality control the dropsonde message before we
20 transmit it to the Hurricane Center.

21 Q. Could you give us an example of a wind
22 reading from a dropsonde that might cause you to
23 question its reliability?

24 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

25 THE WITNESS: For example, if the wind

1 BY MR. BONDS:

2 Q. But back to the National Hurricane Center.
3 Among the data that the center would have available
4 to consider, in addition to the dropsonde
5 information, the ASOS information that we talked
6 about, would be information from anemometers on the
7 towers that university programs have specifically
8 set up to measure the hurricane winds, correct?

9 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

10 THE WITNESS: Yes.

11 BY MR. BONDS:

12 Q. And those would include the program known
13 as FCMP and a Texas Tech program.

14 Do you know whether or not that also
15 includes a University of South Alabama program?

16 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

17 THE WITNESS: The -- all three of those
18 organizations set up towers in an effort to
19 sample the winds of Katrina at landfall. The
20 FCMP, Texas Tech and University of South
21 Alabama all set up towers to that end.

22 BY MR. BONDS:

23 Q. Okay. Do you know whether or not the wind
24 instruments that are maintained on those towers are
25 specifically tested and calibrated to measure severe

1 weather, including hurricane winds?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And they are?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Okay. Would you agree that one way of
6 testing the accuracy of an estimated wind or
7 specifically an estimated hurricane wind would be to
8 compare an estimate made at a location occupied, for
9 example, by one of those towers so that you could
10 compare the estimated wind velocity with the actual
11 measured wind velocity?

12 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

13 THE WITNESS: Well, part of the problem
14 with that is it sometimes turns into an apples
15 and oranges type of proposition, because I've
16 actually personally been involved in an effort
17 by FCMP prior to Hurricane Dennis to place one
18 of those towers at Eglin Air Force Base, and
19 it's -- the people who try to conduct these
20 field experiments, the FCMP, Texas Tech people,
21 run up against some obstacles. Not the
22 smallest of which being that they're trying to
23 set up their instruments on somebody else's
24 property.

25 And when it -- whether it's a government

1 organization where there's a lot of red tape
2 involved or it's a private organization and
3 there are liability concerns, sometimes there
4 are factors that have nothing to do with
5 meteorology that go into the placement of these
6 towers.

7 The example that I know firsthand is that
8 they wanted to set one up at what would have
9 been an optimal location near the beach front
10 at Eglin Air Force Base. But because of all of
11 the rules and regulations, we couldn't, over
12 about a 36-hour period, get all the approval
13 that was necessary. So as a result, their plan
14 was to take that station and move it about four
15 miles inland to the -- what we refer to in
16 Niceville as the Mullet Festival grounds.
17 There's an area of civic property owned by the
18 City of Niceville. It's a large field. But
19 it's an area ringed with trees and several
20 miles inland, and that turned out to be the
21 location for their tower in landfall of
22 Katrina.

23 I suspect that they may have had similar
24 problems, in that their -- the locations that
25 they chose to place their towers, both the FCMP

1 and Texas Tech, were all far inland. And part
2 of that consideration, I know they must have
3 been thinking of was surge, the fact that
4 Katrina was going to bring a tremendous amount
5 of surge with it, and that they didn't want to
6 have their towers inundated by surge.

7 But by making that decision to bring them
8 from the immediate beach front or from areas
9 immediately adjacent to inland waterways such
10 as the back bay of Biloxi or St. Louis Bay,
11 that instead of sampling the winds right along
12 those waterfront properties, they're going to
13 sample winds that are considerably inland.

14 And that -- there are lots of studies that
15 are out there, some authored by individuals at
16 Texas Tech, that show that there are quite a
17 few dynamics that occur that are important in
18 that difference between the immediate shoreline
19 and further inland that the earth's -- the
20 friction of the earth's surface that plays a
21 considerable role in the reduction of the winds
22 as you go inland.

23 BY MR. BONDS:

24 Q. Do you happen to recall any of those
25 studies specifically?

1 BY MR. BONDS:

2 Q. And the terrain would be one of the
3 constraints that you were talking about?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. Any others that come to mind?

6 A. Well, the -- again, the differences in
7 the -- the distribution of terrain features in terms
8 of elevation, changes in elevation with horizontal
9 distance would be important. And, again, the type
10 of obstructions that were present around the tower
11 would be important; trees, buildings, anything like
12 that, that would impede the wind.

13 Again, this tends to create a large
14 difference between sustained winds and gusts, in
15 that the air is still going to reach the instrument,
16 but it tends to reach the instrument in a more
17 pulsating fashion. So the result is a lowering of
18 the sustained wind speed, which is winds measured
19 across a 1-minute interval, a lowering of the
20 sustained winds and an increase in the gust factor.
21 That is the difference between the sustained winds
22 and the maximum gusts.

23 Q. So would it be true that the anemometer on
24 the tower would automatically take those constraints
25 into consideration by measuring the wind as it has

1 BY MR. BONDS:

2 Q. All right. Let me switch gears a little
3 bit. I didn't see anything in your report, I'd just
4 represent to you, that I took to be opinions about
5 damage on the ground from Hurricane Katrina. But I
6 want to make sure that I ask you. Do you consider,
7 as part of your report and your opinions in this
8 case, to be opinions about damage on the ground from
9 Hurricane Katrina?

10 A. No. In fact, I specifically point out --
11 or I would specifically point out that this -- at
12 this time, that that is not part of my effort, is a
13 forensic reconstruction of what happened based on
14 damage. I typically do not go out to the location
15 of these homes where I write reports for. I treat
16 them as a latitude and a longitude, and that
17 whatever is built on the -- at that location is not
18 necessarily relevant to what I'm trying to do, which
19 is to report the -- in this case, what the wind
20 conditions were at that location during the landfall
21 of the storm.

22 I leave it up to engineers to try to
23 determine what happened as a result of the winds
24 that I report and how a particular structure was
25 taken apart by winds or water or any combination of

1 the two.

2 So I specifically stay away from
3 references to the damage at a particular house.

4 Q. Okay. I know you said that you typically
5 don't go to the individual property. Was this a
6 typical case?

7 A. Yes, sir, it was. I was not -- every once
8 in a while, the attorney that I'm working for asks
9 me to go out and visit a property. And sometimes I
10 will go out with that attorney to a property. I'll
11 be provided pictures and things like that. And I --
12 in this case, I was not asked to go out and make an
13 examination of the property.

14 Q. Okay. Same kind of question. I did -- I
15 will represent to you I didn't see in your report
16 anything I interpreted as an opinion about storm
17 surge conditions at this property. I just want to
18 make sure. Do you consider that your report and
19 your opinions in this case include opinions about
20 the storm surge?

21 A. No, I was not instructed to do any work
22 regarding the surge. I -- most of my reports do
23 contain a discussion of both wind and surge, and
24 I've done many of such reports in the back bay of
25 Biloxi area. But this particular report I was not

1 asked to do that. I was specifically asked to focus
2 on the wind conditions, and that other members of
3 their team would take a look at the surge.

4 Q. We will get to this area in more detail.
5 But when you said you treat the property location
6 for purposes of your report as a latitude and a
7 longitude, do I correctly understand that you do
8 that because you have the capability of creating a
9 wind field that will show your estimate of wind
10 conditions at that point?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. Would it be the case that you have
13 constructed a wind field for Hurricane Katrina that
14 you're able to use in all of these cases?

15 A. I have a large scale wind field estimate
16 that I build using a Hurrtrak, which is a piece of
17 commercial software. It's H-U-R-R-T-R-A-K. But
18 primarily what I do with that is I just use it as a
19 starting point. When I create timelines for a
20 specific location, I look at the reconnaissance data
21 and the radar data to try to reconstruct on a more
22 small scale at a specific location what the winds
23 were as they were affected by these smaller scale
24 what I refer to as convective scale episodes, as
25 each band of thunderstorms pass through the area and

1 falling at a rate of about 10 to 12 meters a second?

2 A. It works out to -- I have to do the math
3 in my head, but it works out to about 3,000 feet per
4 minute. In other words, from 10,000 feet we're
5 going to expect the sonde to hit the water in a
6 little over 3 minutes, between 3 and 3 and a half
7 minutes.

8 Q. I think I will have to have a calculator
9 to make that calculation.

10 Okay. As the dropsondes are falling, at
11 some point they enter what is called the boundary
12 layer, correct?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. Would I be correct in understanding that's
15 an area of the atmosphere above the ground in which
16 the speed of the winds is influenced by the surface
17 friction or the drag force exerted by the surface on
18 the winds?

19 A. Yes, that is correct.

20 Q. Would it be fair to say that as the
21 dropsonde falls through the boundary layer, one
22 would expect the winds to be increasingly slowed by
23 the surface friction of the earth?

24 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

25 THE WITNESS: The -- the bottom of the

1 boundary layer is how much that friction is
2 able to reduce wind speeds. For the most part,
3 statistically, if you were to drop a thousand
4 sondes at a given location, the majority of
5 them would be -- would show a reduction in
6 winds just above the surface due to this
7 friction that you just spoke of. The amount to
8 which the winds are reduced is greatly
9 dependent upon the stability of the boundary
10 layer. That is the characteristics of the
11 boundary layer, including, especially,
12 essentially what type of weather you're
13 dropping the sonde into, whether or not there's
14 an active convection going on with strong
15 thunderstorm activity or if it's what we refer
16 to as stratiform rain.

17 If you drop a sonde into stratiform rain,
18 what you're going to get is -- the boundary
19 layer just above the earth's surface tends to
20 be rather stable and highly prone to friction
21 from the earth's surface, and you're going to
22 see a -- something close to a logarithmic drop
23 in winds as they approach -- as the sonde
24 approaches the earth's surface.

25 If you drop it into an area of strong

1 convection in a highly unstable boundary layer,
2 much less of the -- there is much less of a
3 reduction in winds from a few hundred feet
4 above the surface down to the surface. The
5 winds at 1,000 to 500 feet above the surface
6 tend to be somewhat stronger than the winds
7 that you record all the way down to the
8 surface, but not dramatically so.

9 So it's very dependent upon the
10 characteristics of the boundary layer. The
11 stability characteristics of the boundary
12 layer.

13 BY MR. BONDS:

14 Q. Would it be fair to say that depending on
15 the stability characteristics of the boundary layer,
16 it would nonetheless be required in order to make an
17 accurate estimate from a dropsonde reading at some
18 distance above the surface of the earth to take the
19 retarding effect into consideration in some way?

20 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

21 Incomplete hypothetical.

22 THE WITNESS: Well, we're basically just
23 passing along the data that is measured. I
24 mean, we don't make any -- now, later on --
25 when I say "we," I'm talking about a crew

1 Mischaracterizes his prior testimony.

2 THE WITNESS: You have to use as a -- for
3 example, a forecaster at the Hurricane Center
4 has to use whatever they have available to
5 them. And for many years, we've -- in the
6 tropical cyclone community, have used flight
7 level winds. Until the advent of GPS
8 dropsondes in 1997, that is all that the
9 National Hurricane Center had to use was flight
10 level winds. And so there were different
11 strategies employed for decades as to how to
12 interpolate those winds down to the surface,
13 using different reduction values.

14 Now, the advent of GPS sondes has sort of
15 thrown that argument kind of on its ear.
16 There's been a lot of -- there's been a lot of
17 debate in the tropical cyclone community as to
18 how to interpret dropsonde winds and whether or
19 not the kind of conventions that had been
20 accepted for many decades, how appropriate they
21 are in terms of how to reduce flight level
22 winds down to the surface. So it's become an
23 issue of ongoing debate now in the community.

24 MR. BONDS: Okay. Let me have marked what
25 I believe will be Exhibit 4 to your deposition.

1 the surface wind speed to the 700 -- whatever that
2 is, hPa pressure altitude wind speed from any
3 individual sounding is of little value.

4 Do you agree with that?

5 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to form. Lack of
6 foundation.

7 THE WITNESS: Again, what Mr. Franklin is
8 doing here is a scientifically prudent way of
9 characterizing hundreds of sondes and drawing
10 conclusions based on multiple sondes, and
11 because of the variability in the wind profile,
12 the point that he's trying to make is that it's
13 difficult to reach scientific conclusions for
14 something like a paper that you're going to
15 publish in a peer-reviewed environment based on
16 individual sondes. What he's looking at here
17 are, again, hundreds of sondes and trying to
18 draw conclusions.

19 So I carry on to what he says after that,
20 that the surface wind report from a dropsonde
21 in a turbulent environment should not be
22 considered necessarily to be representative of
23 a sustained wind, and that the -- again,
24 there's going to be a tremendous amount of
25 variability in the readings that a sonde makes

1 for the actual surface, if it reaches the
2 surface. A lot of times these sondes do not
3 pick up enough satellites to make measurements
4 all the way down to the earth's surface. They
5 terminate at 10 meters or 50 meters or
6 200 meters. There's some level below which
7 there are no reliable wind measurements made,
8 and that the -- a lot of the variability that
9 Mr. Franklin talks about in here has to do with
10 the stability of the boundary layer into which
11 you're dropping the sonde, and whether or not
12 you're dropping it into an active thunderstorm
13 band with intense convection or a few miles
14 away from that.

15 So I agree with what he's saying, in that
16 you can't take the wind measurements made right
17 near the ground level and use them without
18 reference to any other -- without reference to
19 any other tool.

20 In other words, you have to know what kind
21 of atmosphere you're dropping it into and make
22 conclusions from that. Using just the sonde
23 itself, it's difficult to make definitive
24 statements regarding the characteristics of the
25 wind structure, of the wind field at the

1 station, but it won't be as smooth as balloon data
2 that's staying at the same pressure altitude either.

3 Q. Now, you note on -- going back to your
4 report. You might want to just keep an eye on that
5 because we will be coming back to it, your report
6 that is. You note on page 3 up at the top a
7 dropsonde reading 150 miles south of Biloxi, where
8 flight 305 measured winds up to 152 knots or
9 175 miles an hour, 421 meters above the surface of
10 the gulf.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Do you see that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Okay. Just to try and incorporate some of
15 the things that we've just been talking about. Am I
16 correct in understanding that was basically a .5
17 second average wind speed at about 1,300 feet or
18 thereabouts above the water?

19 A. Yes, sir.

20 Q. Okay. And if we look at Exhibit -- what
21 we will mark as Exhibit 5, which I think we will
22 find is a profile of that dropsonde.

23 (Defendant's Exhibit 5 marked for identification.)

24 BY MR. BONDS:

25 Q. Would I be correct in interpreting the

1 profile shown by Exhibit 5 as saying that at about
2 an altitude of 400 meters, the dropsonde wind
3 velocity started to decrease significantly, correct?

4 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

5 THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes.

6 BY MR. BONDS:

7 Q. And would you interpret that, as a
8 meteorologist, as an indication it was entering the
9 boundary layer and slowing because of the surface
10 friction of the earth?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And at least as this individual dropsonde
13 readout would indicate when it stopped transmitting,
14 it was somewhere in the vicinity of the surface and
15 reading of about 59 or thereabouts feet per second?

16 A. No. That's actually meters, meters per
17 second. So it's somewhere in the neighborhood of
18 60 meters per second, which is about 120 knots or
19 140 miles per hour, would be the speed.

20 Q. Okay. If I represented to you that I
21 attempted to calculate that and came up with 132,
22 would that be -- miles an hour, would that be about
23 accurate?

24 A. It depends on the number that you were
25 using. But 60 is the -- 60 is -- meters per second

1 find that on the 315-degree radial, if that's the
2 right --

3 A. Yes, that's correct.

4 Q. -- that the radius to max winds would be
5 closer and the max winds might be lower?

6 A. That's correct. The max winds -- I can't
7 remember what they were in that quadrant, but they
8 were -- in the advisory, they were lower. And they
9 were lower still in the southwest quadrant, which
10 was the weakest quadrant of the storm.

11 Q. Again, in the southwest quadrant, you
12 would expect then that the radius to the maximum
13 winds would be shorter and the max wind itself would
14 be lower?

15 A. Yes, sir.

16 Q. Okay. And in the forecaster advisory, the
17 next piece of information that would appear would be
18 a radius to hurricane speed winds?

19 A. Yes. Hurricane -- the envelope of
20 hurricane force winds.

21 Q. Okay. And then there would be another
22 radius in each quadrant to tropical storm wind?

23 A. Well, first to 50-knot winds, which is
24 used by emergency management people and the military
25 for evacuation decisions.

1 For example, our decision whether or not
2 to evacuate aircraft from Eglin is based on the
3 onset of 50-knot sustained winds, not on the onset
4 of hurricane force winds.

5 So the Hurricane Center, knowing that,
6 provides a radius of 50-knot winds; and after that,
7 they provide a radius of tropical storm force winds,
8 which are 34 knots or about 40 miles per hour winds.

9 Q. And that is the information that you
10 entered into the Hurrtrak model that --

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. -- that you used. Okay.

13 Does the public -- I'm sorry. Does the
14 forecaster advisory reflect any winds other than
15 sustained winds?

16 A. Yeah, they -- I'm sorry. Yes, sir. They
17 refer to -- they refer to gusts just as the -- just
18 as the public advisory does. There should be a
19 gust -- I know that the forecast advisory shows
20 maximum sustained winds and then gusts as well. I'm
21 not finding it in the public advisory.

22 Q. I can represent to you I didn't find it
23 either.

24 A. But it is in the forecast advisory gust.

25 Q. And did you enter that gust information in

1 winds in Hurricane Katrina as it made landfall on
2 the Gulf Coast for the second time near the
3 Louisiana/Mississippi border?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Okay. And am I also correct in
6 understanding that that is a downward revision from
7 the wind speed that the National Hurricane Center
8 estimated at the time it issued the advisory that we
9 were talking about?

10 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

11 THE WITNESS: It represents a 5-knot
12 change from the advisory number 27, which used
13 110 knots to using 105 knots for the
14 Mississippi landfall.

15 BY MR. BONDS:

16 Q. Okay. You point out, I believe, in your
17 report -- I can find it if you give me a second.
18 But you disagree with the downward revision that the
19 NHC made?

20 A. I disagree with it as a -- as something of
21 a mischaracterization of what was going on in terms
22 of the destructive potential of the storm. I
23 believe that the convective scale features that I
24 emphasize in my report create wind gusts that are
25 the kind of wind gusts that you would see associated

1 with a category four storm, which is the intensity
2 that they carried originally and the advisories back
3 on August 29th as it was making landfall in
4 Mississippi -- I'm sorry. As it was making landfall
5 in Louisiana down around Buras, Louisiana.

6 So I have disagreed and I -- the Hurricane
7 Center personnel understands my disagreement with
8 them. I voiced it, as have others, as to the
9 decision to recategorize the storm in this Hurricane
10 Katrina report that they issued in December of 2005
11 and that they updated in 2006.

12 I -- we agree -- I agree with a lot of the
13 science that went into it. These are excellent
14 meteorologists. We just come to a disagreement when
15 it comes to the emphasis that I place on the
16 convective scale features that are -- excuse me,
17 that are superimposed on the larger hurricane wind
18 field, which I think were responsible for winds at
19 localized settings being stronger than what this
20 report indicates.

21 Q. To make sure that I understand what you're
22 saying, would I be correct that your disagreement
23 with the National Hurricane Center is not so much
24 with their estimate of the 1-minute sustained winds
25 of Hurricane Katrina, but rather with the

1 implications that might be drawn from that in terms
2 of the gustiness of the winds?

3 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

4 THE WITNESS: I think that there is a
5 small disagreement still between myself and the
6 Hurricane Center report in terms of the
7 sustained winds, but I think the most important
8 aspect is the -- is the gusts, the 3-second
9 gusts and the capacity to generate very high
10 3-second gusts in the convection that occurred
11 over the Mississippi coast.

12 So I don't believe that that was
13 emphasized enough in the report and that it
14 paints a somewhat misleading picture of a
15 weakening storm at landfall that isn't
16 necessarily true when it comes to its capacity
17 to generate wind damage.

18 BY MR. BONDS:

19 Q. Okay. And you note on page 3 of your
20 report that many scientists disagree, which I take
21 to mean you're sharing your feelings about that?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. Do you know of any studies or at least
24 articles in refereed journals that reflect that --
25 those scientific differences?

1 A. Well, I have read lots of the work that
2 Dr. Blackwell at the University of South Alabama has
3 done, and this is -- this was prior to me joining
4 the team in which Dr. Blackwell is also now a part
5 of. This was -- for years he's worked on
6 identifying these convective scale features that
7 cause wind damage potential at specified locations
8 in storms. I know he disagrees with it. The -- a
9 lot of people that look at the convection within a
10 storm would tend to disagree with it.

11 In particular, individuals that work at
12 the NASA-Marshall Spaceflight Center in Huntsville,
13 Alabama that I've had personal conversations with
14 agree with me that there isn't enough emphasis
15 placed on the importance of the convection within
16 the storm.

17 Dr. Chris Veldon up at the University of
18 Wisconsin, I understand that he's also a consultant
19 in this matter. But his group has produced a lot of
20 products that would tend to cast some doubt on
21 the -- this being a weakening storm in terms of its
22 destructive potential, its wind destructive
23 potential.

24 There are -- as I said, there's lots of
25 others that I could point to that share this

1 Center in a paper that he published several years
2 ago, where the forecasters at the Hurricane Center
3 use our 10-second winds as a sustained wind. They
4 would consider our 1-second winds to be analogous to
5 3-second gusts on the ground and our 10-second winds
6 to be analogous to 1-minute ground-based winds.

7 Q. And does that analysis take into account
8 that the wind measurement at flight level is at
9 least in part a Lagrangian measurement?

10 A. To some degree. The biggest adjustment
11 has to be for the fact that it's not at the ground
12 level, that it -- that it would require some
13 interpretation and interpolation from the flight
14 level down to the surface.

15 Q. Okay. And would the same be true for
16 3-second gusts, even if -- if a 1-minute segment of
17 flight level information would be considered
18 equivalent to a 3-second gust, you would still need
19 to make a translation of that to the surface?

20 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

21 Incomplete hypothetical.

22 THE WITNESS: Well, the -- actually, the
23 winds that we measure at flight level over any
24 interval greater than one second are not
25 analogous to 3-second gusts. They're more

1 Slidell, in both cases, you're somewhere between
2 4,000 and 6,000 feet, limited by curvature of the
3 earth.

4 Q. So what the radar is seeing is the wind
5 somewhere between 4,000 and 6,000 feet above Biloxi?

6 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

7 THE WITNESS: Yes.

8 BY MR. BONDS:

9 Q. Okay. And in fact, what the radar is
10 seeing, is it not, is returns based on the speed of
11 water droplets moving towards or away from the
12 antenna?

13 A. That is the radar velocity -- the radial
14 velocity component of the radar data. There are two
15 different types of data that people look at.
16 There's reflectivity, which simply shows how much of
17 the energy is being reflected back to the radar
18 site; and then there's radial velocity which does
19 what you just described, try to measure the rate at
20 which particles are moving either towards the radar
21 site or away from the radar site.

22 Q. So if what you're measuring or seeking to
23 measure is wind velocity in a horizontal direction,
24 you would be looking at the radial velocity product
25 as opposed to the intensity product?

1 BY MR. BONDS:

2 Q. Another wind map and the same question.

3 Is this generated by Hurrtrak based on the

4 information you input from advisory 27?

5 A. Yes, sir. It's broken down by ZIP code as
6 opposed to county.

7 Q. Okay. And that's all according to
8 algorithms that are built into the Hurrtrak program?

9 A. Yes, sir.

10 Q. Okay. Let's look at another exhibit.

11 We're moving right along.

12 MR. SCRUGGS: I think that was Exhibit 13.

13 MR. BONDS: It was figure 14, but

14 Exhibit 13.

15 (Defendant's Exhibit 14 marked for identification.)

16 BY MR. BONDS:

17 Q. Let me ask you if Exhibit 14 is a display

18 of the timeline of wind velocities that you

19 generated using the Hurrtrak program for the

20 location of the McIntosh residence?

21 A. That's correct. Basically, I just plug in
22 the latitude and the longitude of the McIntosh
23 residence, which was 30.43 north, 88.99 west, and
24 Hurrtrak objectively generates this chart for me.

25 Q. Okay. Now, let's talk a little bit about

1 as you move further to the northeast and scale --
2 well, scale down in increments in either direction?

3 A. That's exactly what they do. They start
4 out with maximum value, which was 110 knots in the
5 northeast eye wall. And then based on the radius of
6 maximum winds and the radius of hurricane force wind
7 information in the Hurricane Center forecaster
8 advisory, it will create a number. In this case, it
9 was 105 knots. So it decreased the intensity
10 5 knots, moving from southwest to northeast, from
11 Hancock County into this portion of Central Harrison
12 County.

13 Q. And am I correct in understanding that's
14 simply a mathematical interpretation that doesn't
15 depend upon meteorological conditions along the way?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. Now, do I correctly recall from your
18 original description of what you did that when the
19 model produced these numbers, you then looked at all
20 the other information that was available to you and
21 made a judgment about whether those numbers produced
22 by the model using that methodology were
23 sufficiently accurate for your purposes?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And in this case, your decision was that

1 the numbers produced by the model using these
2 algorithms were numbers that you would incorporate
3 into your opinion?

4 A. Yes. There was no reason for me to
5 deviate significantly from 105 knots for a maximum
6 sustained wind and approximately 130 knots for a
7 maximum gust. Based on the reconnaissance data and
8 the radar data, those are very representative
9 numbers.

10 Now, what I have done in the months after
11 I wrote this report is that my time lines -- I never
12 thought it was very important to make too much of an
13 effort to show what the winds were after the maximum
14 event, but I have realized in the months since then
15 that that -- you know, in my efforts to make the
16 most complete and accurate statement that I can,
17 I've gone back and after the most intense convection
18 in the Northeast eye wall, I have gone back and
19 reduced my numbers considerably below what the
20 Hurrtrak numbers are for winds after the maximum
21 wind event in my timelines after -- after this
22 spring.

23 I believe at this point in March, I was
24 still depicting winds in my timeline that were very
25 similar to what these winds are. And it's my

1 or another.

2 BY MR. BONDS:

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. Again, I have made an effort to more
5 realistically decrease the winds after the maximum
6 wind event to more -- to match the lack of
7 convection.

8 So in my reports that I've written since
9 March, you'll see that there isn't nearly the
10 gradual decrease in winds that we have reflected
11 here, that it's more of a sharp decrease after the
12 maximum wind event.

13 Q. Okay. I think you probably answered this
14 question. But am I correct in understanding that
15 the Hurrtrak model does not purport to make
16 adjustments to wind velocities to reflect the
17 particular exposure of an individual property?

18 A. Not at all.

19 Q. And the same thing would be true, to the
20 extent that it is a meteorological phenomenon for
21 what's sometime called inland decay? There would be
22 no attempt to account for this particular
23 hurricane's winds slowing down as the hurricane
24 moved inland in any way other than these
25 mathematical relationships that you've just

1 described?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Just as a mechanical matter, is the
4 Hurrtrak software set up to use the information that
5 comes from these forecaster hurricane advisories or
6 would it accept a variety of different kinds of
7 input?

8 A. No. It's designed to use the NHC
9 advisories as its input. Its primary purpose is for
10 emergency management officials to plot out the wind
11 fields in preparation for a storm and to provide
12 graphics to warn decisionmakers as to the danger and
13 whether or not they should evacuate a particular
14 part of the coastline, that sort of thing.

15 Q. Am I correct in understanding that if you
16 had input information analogous to that of the
17 hurricane advisories, taken from the
18 December 2005/updated August 2006 NHC report, you
19 would have gotten at least slightly different
20 results?

21 A. Yes. One of the problems with that
22 report, though, is that they didn't go back and
23 recreate a new set of forecast advisory numbers.
24 There was the -- there was a reduction in the
25 maximum sustained winds at the second landfall in

1 Mississippi from 110 knots to 105 knots. But there
2 was no reissuance or editing of the forecast
3 advisory number 27 product field with all the
4 different quadrants and radii. There was no --
5 there was nothing like that included with the
6 report.

7 Q. Now --

8 A. So there wouldn't have been enough -- in
9 other words, there wasn't enough information for me
10 to take the December report and plug it into
11 Hurrtrak instead of the advisory 27.

12 Q. There is a table attached to the report
13 called BestTrack?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Was that updated; do you know?

16 A. Yes. The BestTrack data is as its name
17 would suggest. It's the best effort by the
18 Hurricane Center to characterize the intensity of
19 the storm at each of those times and longitudes and
20 latitudes. So the BestTrack data was changed from
21 110 knots to 105 knots.

22 Q. Okay. Do I correctly understand that
23 you're telling me that information such as this
24 quadrant by quadrant maximum wind and radius to
25 maximum wind was not part of the revision?

1 BY MR. BONDS:

2 Q. Okay. Let me -- let's look at -- let's
3 mark as Exhibit 15 what I will represent to you is a
4 satellite photograph showing the relationship
5 between Keesler Air Force base and the area that
6 includes the McIntosh property. Let me ask you if
7 you can verify that that's indeed what it shows?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Do you know from your experience with
10 Hurricane Hunters where the ASOS station is located
11 on the Keesler reservation?

12 A. Well, the FMQ19 system that was in place
13 the morning of landfall at Keesler Air Force base
14 has sensors that are located at several places on
15 the air field. There are sensors that are located
16 near the runway, sensors that are located near the
17 base operations building, which is about
18 approximately midway through the runway.

19 And I'm not sure. I'd have to go back and
20 look at the detailed logs of the FMQ19 output to see
21 what combination of sensors were being used at that
22 time. But that's typical of what we see with FMQ19.
23 It has more than one anemometer associated with it.

24 Q. Okay. Now, if we look back at Exhibit 14,
25 which is your estimates, and look at 9:00 local

1 THE WITNESS: It's a considerable
2 difference between 52 knots and 97 knots. Yes.
3 It's a meteorologically significant amount.

4 BY MR. BONDS:

5 Q. Okay. And the 97 knot amount is an
6 estimate made by you based on information from -- at
7 least based initially on information from the
8 advisory -- forecast advisory number 47, right?

9 A. Yes.

10 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

11 BY MR. BONDS:

12 Q. And the 52 knots comes from actual
13 measurement by an official weather station, correct?

14 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

15 THE WITNESS: It is -- as it's referred to
16 on the national Hurricane Center report and the
17 table that you site, there's a -- there's a
18 denotation "I" next to the value of 52, along
19 with the value of 85 knots indicating that it's
20 an incomplete data set.

21 BY MR. BONDS:

22 Q. And am I correct in understanding that
23 means that at some point after 09:00 local, the ASOS
24 station at Keesler went off the air, so to speak?

25 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

1 digital or an analog readout. I don't know.

2 Q. Okay. You are aware, we know, I think,
3 that the Florida Coast Monitoring Program had an
4 instrumented wind tower at the Trent Lott airport in
5 Pascagoula, right?

6 A. Yes, sir.

7 Q. About the same distance from the McIntosh
8 property as the Jackson County EOC and the Ingalls
9 Shipyard?

10 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to form.

11 THE WITNESS: Slightly -- the Trent Lott
12 airport is slightly farther to the east than
13 the downtown EOC location or Ingalls.

14 (Defendant's Exhibit 16 marked for identification.)

15 BY MR. BONDS:

16 Q. Okay. Let's look at Exhibit 16, which I
17 will represent to you is a graph downloaded from the
18 FCMP website of gust measurements at that wind
19 tower.

20 A. I'm familiar with this diagram. I include
21 it in all of my reports now. I didn't back in
22 March, but I include it now in my reports. I
23 address the FCMP measurements.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. So I am familiar with it.

1 Q. And the FCMP website indicates that the
2 maximum 3-second gust measured at that wind tower
3 was 92.91 miles an hour recorded at about 1641 UTC,
4 correct?

5 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form of the
6 question and this exhibit, given that it's
7 incomplete and there are several malfunctions
8 on it as noted on Exhibit 16. So subject to
9 those objections to the accuracy of anything on
10 this piece of paper, if you're familiar with it
11 and can answer his questions, you're welcome to
12 do so.

13 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

14 BY MR. BONDS:

15 Q. The first question is: It says that the
16 maximum 3-second gust recorded at that time was
17 92.91 miles an hour, correct?

18 MR. SCRUGGS: Same objection and assumes
19 facts not in evidence.

20 THE WITNESS: Yes.

21 BY MR. BONDS:

22 Q. Okay. Let me ask you this and then we
23 will get to what you think about that. If we looked
24 back at your estimates, this would be a considerably
25 lower gust speed than the maximum that you estimated

1 for the McIntosh property, correct?

2 MR. SCRUGGS: Same objection.

3 THE WITNESS: Yes.

4 BY MR. BONDS:

5 Q. And would I be -- would it be accurate for
6 me to conclude that if you had programmed into the
7 Hurrtrak model the latitude and longitude of the
8 tower location at the Trent Lott airport, the
9 estimated maximum wind gust that that program would
10 have produced would have been significantly higher
11 than the wind gust information shown on Exhibit 16?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And do you have, I ask, any reason to
14 believe that the instrumentation on this tower was
15 not capable of lively recording the wind that the
16 tower experienced during Hurricane Katrina?

17 MR. SCRUGGS: Objection to form. Asked
18 and answered.

19 BY MR. BONDS:

20 Q. Wind velocity.

21 A. Two things I want to point out. We can
22 talk a lot about this data. One is that I do plan
23 on including in my disk to Mr. Scruggs to pass along
24 to you a listing of all of the dropsonde data, which
25 includes a dropsonde which was made just south of

1 THE WITNESS: The -- well, first of all,
2 Hurrtrak is only the beginning of what I do.
3 Later on, I look at all of my reports and look
4 at the reconnaissance and radar data. So I
5 have not -- I haven't done that for this
6 particular location. I have done reports in
7 Pascagoula. Several of them for Mr. Scruggs'
8 group and for other plaintiffs in Jackson
9 County. The winds that I've reported in those
10 reports are significantly higher than what I
11 see at this particular location.

12 Again, I've not done any reports for
13 property that are directly adjacent to this
14 airport. But based on what I've seen for other
15 reports in Jackson County, my numbers are
16 considerably higher than these numbers.

17 BY MR. BONDS:

18 Q. Okay. In the third paragraph on page 5 of
19 your report, you address a dropsonde instrument
20 released from USAF aircraft 300 over the gulf that
21 landed in Pass Christian and measured wind speeds of
22 153 miles an hour of what you characterize is only
23 350 meters above the surface, right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Am I correct in understanding that that

1 153-mile-per-hour figure is basically an
2 instantaneous wind measured about within the
3 neighborhood of 1,100 feet over the ocean?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And that would be somewhere in the
6 neighborhood of 20 miles from the McIntosh
7 residence?

8 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

9 THE WITNESS: It's approximately a little
10 less than 20 miles west/southwest of the
11 McIntosh home.

12 BY MR. BONDS:

13 Q. Okay.

14 A. Probably closer to 15 miles.

15 Q. Okay. Would you agree with me that winds
16 at that altitude were considerably stronger than the
17 winds immediately below the dropsonde at that
18 altitude at the surface?

19 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form. Asked
20 and answered.

21 THE WITNESS: In areas of stratiform
22 precipitation, I would agree with that
23 statement. In areas of intense convective
24 precipitation with a highly unstable boundary
25 layer, I believe that a significant portion of

1 the 133-knot winds shown in that dropsonde are
2 translated down to the surface, especially in
3 the form of 3-second gusts.

4 (Defendant's Exhibit 17 marked for identification.)

5 BY MR. BONDS:

6 Q. Let's look at the next exhibit,
7 Exhibit 17.

8 First let me ask you. Does Exhibit 17
9 reflect a profile of the winds measured by that
10 particular dropsonde?

11 A. Yes, sir.

12 Q. And am I correct in seeing this that after
13 an altitude of about 350 meters, the dropsonde
14 recorded significantly decreased wind speeds,
15 correct?

16 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

17 THE WITNESS: Yes.

18 BY MR. BONDS:

19 Q. And the last information reported by the
20 dropsonde here as it approached, it appears to me to
21 be about 100 meters, would have been about 47 meters
22 per second?

23 A. Yes. Again, I can give you the exact
24 number of meters above the surface. It will only
25 take me a moment to do.

1 But, yes, the basic of what you're saying
2 is true, that the -- approximately -- I believe the
3 number is something closer to 10 meters above the
4 surface. The winds were 47 meters per second, which
5 is approximately 90 knots, about 103, 104 miles per
6 hour.

7 Q. Okay. Now, that was in the vicinity of
8 Pass Christian, right?

9 A. Yes. That was in the Timber Ridge
10 neighborhood of Pass Christian. These are one of
11 the sondes that actually floated over the beach and
12 landed inland.

13 Q. Okay. And would I be correct in
14 understanding that atmospheric scientists generally
15 would expect the winds -- surface winds to decrease
16 as one moved eastward from that location?

17 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form. Asked
18 and answered.

19 THE WITNESS: Yes. I just found -- the
20 last winds measured by that sonde was at
21 77 meters above the surface.

22 BY MR. BONDS:

23 Q. Okay. And that was, again, a -- as we've
24 talked about it before, that was basically an
25 instantaneous reading, correct?

1 locally increased wind speeds, correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Let me see if I can ask a question that
4 will short-circuit this. These are meteorological
5 conditions that, in your view, are consistent with
6 the development of either tornados in the one
7 instance or with extreme convection in the other,
8 correct?

9 A. I'm not sure I understand the question.

10 Q. Okay. What you're talking about, when you
11 look at radar images for example, or satellite
12 images of these meteorological phenomena, you're
13 talking about identifying conditions that are
14 consistent with the existence of tornados in one
15 case or, B, if not a tornado, an intense convective
16 activity at the surface, correct?

17 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

18 THE WITNESS: What I'm doing is, I'm
19 identifying very intense convective cells that
20 were embedded with the feeder bands and the eye
21 wall of Katrina that certainly increased the
22 local wind field above the larger scale --
23 ambient wind field of the larger scale
24 hurricane feature. And that they may or may
25 not have created funnel clouds. They may or

1 may not have generated funnel clouds. But the
2 generation of funnel clouds and tornados wasn't
3 necessary to increase the wind field. Just
4 having these mesovortices created was enough to
5 enhance the wind field by a certain amount.

6 BY MR. BONDS:

7 Q. Okay. Now, on the tornado side, am I
8 correct in believing that studies mesovorti-- of
9 radar images of mesovortices says in the Midwest
10 have established that the observation of a radar I
11 am page like this would be associated with the
12 actual confirmation of a tornado on the ground and
13 only a small portion of the cases, correct?

14 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

15 THE WITNESS: There's -- again, that's a
16 statistical inference that if you take a
17 thousand mesovortices identified on radar and
18 then go back and try to confirm how many of
19 them actually produced tornadoes, it would be a
20 small percentage.

21 BY MR. BONDS:

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. But, again, a lot of that depends upon the
24 atmospheric conditions in which the mesovortex
25 formed as to how likely it's going to be to produce

1 a tornado. There's a quantity in the atmosphere
2 that metrologists refer to helicity, which is very
3 important in determining whether or not one of these
4 supercells is going to actually produce a tornado or
5 not.

6 Q. But am I right in understanding that you
7 can't look at any of the radar images that are
8 included in the data on which you based your report
9 and say this radar image shows the existence of a
10 tornado at the McIntosh residence, correct?

11 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

12 THE WITNESS: It's not possible to
13 definitively tell that by radar one way or the
14 other. Either to positively confirm or to
15 positively rule out the existence of that
16 feature at the McIntosh place.

17 BY MR. BONDS:

18 Q. Okay. And is it also true that you cannot
19 point to any specific radar image and say this image
20 shows severe convective activity at the McIntosh
21 residence, correct?

22 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

23 THE WITNESS: Actually, that is not true.
24 We did have several cells that moved over the
25 McIntosh neighborhood that contained very

1 intense convection.

2 MR. SCRUGGS: Can we take a five-minute
3 break?

4 (A recess was taken.)

5 BY MR. BONDS:

6 Q. Before we broke, I was asking you some
7 questions about radar and satellite images of
8 meteorological phenomena and how they might relate
9 to what took place on the ground.

10 Let me ask you with respect to tornados.
11 Am I correct in understanding that the National
12 Weather Service did not confirm the existence of any
13 tornados along the Mississippi Gulf Coast during
14 Hurricane Katrina, correct?

15 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form. Assumes
16 facts not in evidence.

17 THE WITNESS: The typical protocol for a
18 National Weather Service office -- and in this
19 case the office in Slidell is responsible for
20 the Mississippi coast -- is to go out and do a
21 survey afterwards and look for the kind of
22 damage that would be expected from a tornado.
23 And that kind of forensic analysis was really
24 not practical or possible after Katrina because
25 of the subsequent surge event.

1 So a lot of the Mississippi coast in my
2 opinion -- again, this is strictly my opinion,
3 but it's consistent with meteorological
4 reasoning -- is that there may or may not have
5 been the kind of tornados that you typically
6 see spawned by landfalling tropical cyclones
7 along the Mississippi coast. But any evidence
8 of them was later washed away by the extreme
9 surge event that followed.

10 So such an effort by the National Weather
11 Service office wasn't possible after Katrina.

12 BY MR. BONDS:

13 Q. Now, regarding convective activity, I
14 understood your testimony before we broke to be that
15 you can see supercell paths that crossed in the
16 vicinity of the McIntosh residence, right?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. I guess my question to you is: As a
19 scientist, can you say that such images prove that
20 there was any severe wind damage on the ground
21 beneath that meteorological radar or satellite
22 picture?

23 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

24 THE WITNESS: Again, I typically don't get
25 involved in the forensic aspect of it where I

1 talk about damage to a property because part of
2 the -- part of what I'm dealing with then is
3 how the property is constructed. But what I
4 can say is that there were -- there were
5 thunderstorms that were imbedded within feeder
6 bands and the outer eye wall that moved over
7 the McIntosh property that certainly, with
8 100 percent certainty increased the wind speeds
9 at the surface above the large scale ambient
10 hurricane wind field in north Biloxi at that
11 time. In other words, these cells were strong
12 enough to have locally increased the winds.

13 Typically what I estimate is that these
14 kind of cells to the intensity that I saw, the
15 ones greater than 50 decibels of radar
16 reflectivity enhanced the wind field by
17 somewhere between 30 and 35 miles per hour
18 above the ambient hurricane wind field. That's
19 primarily in the form of 3-second gusts. But
20 if you have enough 3-second gusts strung
21 together, they can increase the sustained winds
22 by some also.

23 But what I contend is that I believe that
24 the cells were strong enough to have enhanced
25 the winds by somewhere between 30 and 35 miles

1 per hour in the form of gusts.

2 BY MR. BONDS:

3 Q. Okay. And am I right in understanding
4 that that 35 -- 30, 35 percent estimate on your part
5 is based on your meteorological judgment, as opposed
6 to being based upon any actual measurements that
7 were taken on the ground?

8 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

9 THE WITNESS: That's correct. There were
10 no measurements taken on the ground in that
11 neighborhood.

12 BY MR. BONDS:

13 Q. Now, you say on page 5 -- page 6 of
14 your -- I'm looking at my notes to make sure. In
15 the next to the last paragraph on page 6, you note
16 that large scale winds that you were describing in
17 the first part of that paragraph, while not
18 generally recognized to have been sufficiently
19 stronger to cause significant damage, the cumulative
20 toll of this wind stress for four hours undoubtedly
21 weakened the structures in the area.

22 Do you see that?

23 A. Yes, sir.

24 Q. My question to you is: First of all,
25 you're not an engineer, correct?

1 the meteorological phenomena that you observed that
2 formed the basis -- let's withdraw that question and
3 start again.

4 The radar returns or other images of
5 meteorological phenomena that you observed as part
6 of expressing the opinions about tornados and
7 convective activity that we've talked about are
8 meteorological conditions that would not be
9 confined, in all likelihood, to the McIntosh
10 property itself, correct?

11 A. That's correct. You would expect them
12 elsewhere.

13 Q. And if those meteorological phenomena
14 caused wind damage on the ground, you would expect
15 to see that damage through the neighborhood
16 generally as opposed to confined to the McIntosh
17 residence itself, correct?

18 MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form.

19 THE WITNESS: Again, I -- that's not what
20 I specialize in and I would be speculating at
21 this point. Different properties respond
22 differently to the same winds. A lot of it
23 depends upon the construction of the building
24 and the microscale factors involved regarding
25 the terrain, trees, the surrounding houses,

CROSS-EXAMINATION

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BY MS. PLATT:

Q. Mr. Henning, my name is Kathryn Breard Platt. I'm one of the attorneys who represents Forensic Analysis and Engineering Corporation. I apologize if I ask something that has been already asked to you. I could hear most of what was being said, but I didn't necessarily catch every single question and answer set forth today.

Did you actually visit the McIntosh property?

A. No.

MR. SCRUGGS: Object to the form. Asked and answered.

THE WITNESS: No, I did not.

BY MS. PLATT:

Q. Can you say whether or not their home did in fact receive storm surge?

MR. SCRUGGS: Same objection.

THE WITNESS: I have not visited the location. But based on -- based on the elevation and its location, scientifically, I would argue that even though I was not asked to make any statements regarding the surge, that the answer is yes, that it did receive surge.

1 CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

2 STATE OF FLORIDA)

3 COUNTY OF BAY)

4 I, Lisa Jeter, Registered Professional
5 Reporter, certify that I was authorized to and did
6 stenographically report the foregoing deposition;
7 and that the transcript is a true record of the
8 testimony given by the witness; that the witness did
9 not waive reading and signing.

10 I further certify that I am not a relative,
11 employee, attorney, or counsel of any of the
12 parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any of
13 the parties' attorney or counsel connected with the
14 action, nor am I financially interested in this
15 action.

16
17
18 _____
LISA JETER, RPR
Registered Professional Reporter

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20
21
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23
24
25

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LYDIA D. SCHULTZ PLAINTIFF

VS. CAUSE NO. 1:06CV449-LTS-RHW

STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY DEFENDANT

DEPOSITION OF RICHARD HENNING

Taken at the instance of the Defendant at the
offices of Merlin Law Group, 368 Courthouse Road,
Suite C, Gulfport, Mississippi, on May 4, 2007,
beginning at 10:40 a.m.

APPEARANCES:

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1 And then the -- the increase in surge depth was not as
2 gradual as what's depicted in the -- the ADCIRC charts
3 from both Mississippi State and from Stennis Space
4 Center.

5 Q. And what you're gesturing at again is Figure
6 23?

7 A. Yes. What I'm showing is the -- I'm trying to
8 represent the -- the gradual nature of the -- of the rise
9 in surge as depicted by -- by most of the ADCIRC model
10 outputs --

11 Q. And when --

12 A. -- which --

13 Q. -- was -- I'm sorry.

14 A. -- I'm sorry -- which I consider to be
15 somewhat unrealistic as to how -- how they compare to
16 what actually happened in nature. What we had was a --
17 was a -- a much quicker rise in water than what's
18 depicted in these outputs.

19 Q. Could the Flick Scripps Oceanographic
20 Institute's ADCIRC version that provides higher
21 resolution have the potential for altering your opinions
22 concerning the timing of the max surge and max wind at
23 the schultz residence?

24 A. Not significantly, because even before I had
25 looked at Dr. Flick's work, I adjusted these values in
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1 the surge column to reflect what I believe was the more
2 sudden rise in water. These values do not adhere
3 strictly to the ADCIRC model. I follow what I believe is
4 a more realistic depiction of -- of a very gradual rise
5 in surge through approximately 8:00 o'clock in the
6 morning, and then a more rapid increase in surge from
7 approximately 8:00 o'clock in the morning to 9:30 in the
8 morning, and then an extremely rapid rise in surge at
9 approximately 10:00 o'clock.

10 Q. And, again, you're referring -- I'm sorry to
11 interrupt -- to the Hurricane Katrina wind and surge
12 profile --

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. -- for the Schultz residence? Okay. Well,
15 are you saying now that you didn't get that data, which
16 you've manually inputted into that column styled "Storm
17 Surge Above MSL," from the ADCIRC?

18 A. The -- I -- I used the ADCIRC for -- to help
19 reinforce my confidence in the final surge height, and
20 in -- somewhat in the -- the characterization of -- of
21 the -- the rate at which the surge increased. But -- but
22 I adjusted the numbers to -- to flatten out the rise in
23 surge early and to accelerate the rise in surge late to
24 take away some of the smoothness in the ADCIRC
25 representation of the surge rise. I did that manually.

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1 the storm in Breeden Place and to have experienced the
2 eye and to have identified that period of time as being
3 dead calm?

4 A. I -- yes. That -- that would -- that would
5 change some of my opinions. The -- the problem I have
6 sometimes with eyewitness accounts -- the biggest problem
7 I've noted -- and I've -- I've read many of them from
8 Hurricane Ivan in particular -- is that the timing is
9 often wrong -- is that they -- sometimes people's --
10 either don't have a watch or their power is out, and
11 their -- their descriptions are -- are estimates. And
12 the time estimates can be deceiving a lot of times
13 especially since people -- sometimes if a storm strikes
14 late at night, they haven't slept for over 24 hours as
15 they've been preparing for their -- for the storm event.
16 They're tired. And later on their recollection of the
17 facts is -- is blurry in terms of the timing.

18 As far as what they're observing, I -- I -- I
19 can't question that because they -- they were there,
20 obviously, and they saw what they -- what they saw. The
21 biggest problem I have, again, is in the -- the timing,
22 some of their recollections of the -- the chronology.

23 Q. With regard to the HURRTRAK program, would you
24 agree with me that the H*Wind product would produce both
25 sustained as well as gust values lower than what you

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1 is just a schematic --

2 Q. Is it --

3 A. --really.

4 Q. -- proportionate to scale?

5 A. It's -- it's proportionate to scale, and the
6 wind directions on it, I think, are very useful because
7 the wind directions are -- are -- are accurate. They're
8 a good depiction of the -- the wind field swirling into
9 the storm. I don't want to -- people to focus too much
10 on this big doughnut red ring in that everything on the
11 western side of it is unrealistically high in wind
12 speeds.

13 Q. And you've discussed that?

14 A. Yeah. So it really should be a -- a half
15 circle --

16 Q. Oh, sure.

17 A. -- or -- or -- or the southwestern quadrant of
18 it should be removed. But other than that, it -- it
19 provides a good reference for the arrival of the most
20 intense winds, the arrival of the eye itself. And,
21 again, inside the eye, HURRTRAK just has all the winds as
22 zero through the entire -- all of the area inside the
23 eye, which is unrealistic. That does -- that's not what
24 occurs.

25 Q. Why would HURRTRAK not take into account the
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1 Q. And you're not saying that's not defensible?
2 That's just not how you approached it.

3 A. That's right.

4 Q. And we talked, I think, on another occasion
5 about how specifically with regard to the Timber Ridge
6 dropsonde -- how the dropsonde itself leaving the
7 aircraft and on its five to eight minute track --

8 A. Actually it's about three minutes.

9 Q. Three?

10 A. It --

11 Q. Minutes?

12 A. -- takes about three minutes to fall from
13 10,000 feet down to the surface.

14 Q. Down from flight level winds to the surface
15 it's passing through features or structures or weather
16 conditions which should be accounted for in terms of
17 arriving at a final velocity?

18 A. It's -- I -- I am aware of the -- the type of
19 conditions that it fell into. It fell into what I refer
20 to as stratiform rain, which are the -- for example, if
21 we look at this 9:31 Mobile radar site, the -- the most
22 intense precipitation had already moved through. And
23 this was the -- what's supposedly represented on the
24 screen as -- as greens that you can see on my computer.
25 It has areas -- areas of green and blue. That's the type

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1 of -- of rainfall that it fell into, not an area of
2 yellow, orange and red.

3 So taking that into account, what I -- what I
4 interpret that to mean is that the -- the large scale
5 hurricane wind field had winds as much as 150 miles per
6 hour at 350 meters above the surface. It's -- it's very
7 common for intense hurricanes to retain a lot of those
8 winds in those layers above the surface between 300
9 meters and 1,000 meters for a long period of time after
10 the storm begins to weaken. They -- the winds take a
11 long time to spin down at that level because there's no
12 friction. There's very little friction.

13 What's -- what is the case is that the winds
14 at the actual surface spin down much more rapidly. That
15 those -- that those 150 mile per hour winds still
16 existed. I don't think anybody at the Hurricane Center
17 would doubt that those winds still existed as they see it
18 in the dropsonde data, not only in -- at -- in the 9:22
19 Pass Christian dropsonde, but dropsondes off of the coast
20 of Pascagoula and -- and Stennis Space Center and all the
21 other dropsondes that we've looked at. They see that
22 stronger wind field that -- that is persistent with
23 the -- with the storm.

24 The question, the million dollar question, to
25 them is how much of that gets translated down to the

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1 surface? And you can see in that dropsonde that the
2 winds had already dropped off considerably in Pass
3 Christian because the -- the maximum winds at that point
4 were -- were less than 100 knots at the surface. And,
5 again, I believe that with stratiform light rain without
6 the convection, there's -- there's little mechanism to
7 transfer those winds down to the surface.

8 Q. There's what?

9 A. There are -- there is little mechanism
10 available to transfer those winds down to the surface.
11 And so my -- my theory is that around 9:00 a.m. that
12 there was a mechanism to transport it down to the
13 surface, that being the very intense convection that was
14 occurring in the -- in the Pass Christian, Bay St. Louis,
15 Waveland area within the inner eyewall. And that a
16 considerable amount of those 153-mile-per-hour winds
17 made -- made their way down to the surface.

18 Q. Why do they have to adjust anyway? Why do
19 they have to extrapolate? Is it a matter of technology
20 that they're not getting the readings consistently all
21 the way down?

22 A. That's correct. The -- the -- the winds in
23 the sonde are -- are -- are -- we're going to stop
24 receiving the data at a certain point above the surface.
25 We never have data go all the way down to the surface.

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Richard Henning - 05/04/2007 (Schultz)

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1 It -- sometimes we're lucky enough to get it down to
2 10 meters or to 15 or 20 meters. But typically if -- if
3 you get winds down to 30 or 40 meters above the surface,
4 you're doing -- you're doing really well with the
5 dropsonde.

6 Q. If you've got that convective structure that
7 it's passing through, that in turn, I take it, would tend
8 to maintain the higher velocities that you see at flight
9 level; is that fair to say?

10 A. Well, not necessarily at flight level, but in
11 that -- that boundary just above the surface, that 300
12 meters to 1,000 meters. That's well below our flight
13 level.

14 Q. Sure. Absolutely. And I didn't mean to
15 misrepresent that. But isn't there another contravening
16 factor that could reduce the winds, such as blockage from
17 buildings or --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- terrain?

20 A. Absolutely. That's why -- that's why
21 typically surface winds are -- there -- there is a --
22 if -- if you don't have -- if you don't have anemometer
23 readings, you have to assume that there is a -- a certain
24 amount of reduction in the surface winds because of that,
25 because of the terrain and -- and things blocking it,

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Richard Henning - 05/04/2007 (Schultz)

Page 78

1 and -- and mainly friction from the earth's surface.

2 Q. So in a sense, that's why there is an
3 adjustment factor?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. All right. I'm just about done. I don't
6 think we asked it in this deposition. So just for
7 purposes of completeness, we've got Figures J4A, J4B --
8 we don't need to go to those, Colonel -- which consist of
9 the plots of the 123 potentially tornadic MCVs -- unless
10 to answer this question you need to -- did any of those
11 that are represented in those files pass over or in
12 reasonable proximity to impact the Schultz residence,
13 pass over close enough to impact, in your opinion, the
14 Schultz residence?

15 A. Actually -- actually the answer is, yes,
16 because we -- we discussed yesterday a pattern of -- of
17 points that was south of Pass Christian that moves right
18 over Bay St. Louis, so the southern end of Bay St. Louis
19 and the northern end of Waveland in the -- in the -- in
20 the area around Breeden Place.

21 Q. Okay. And apart from that, do you have any
22 other meteorological evidence to indicate that these are
23 indeed MCVs?

24 A. Well, we looked at the -- the radar
25 reflectivity products, and I described the -- the fact

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1 that some of the radial velocities associated with those
2 products contained some rotation in a couple of them.

3 Q. And however that may be, you're not here to
4 testify that any of them created a tornado that impacted
5 the Schultz residence?

6 A. That's right. There's no way to tell that.

7 MR. SHANLEY: All right. I thank you so much,
8 Colonel Henning. I tender the witness.

9 MS. TROTTER: I have no follow-up questions.

10 (Off the record.)

11 THE WITNESS: I burned that disk, so this
12 the -- the double eye -- this is the double -- what I'm
13 presenting is the double eyewall paper by Blackwell,
14 Fitzpatrick and Velden at the interdepartmental hurricane
15 conference in New Orleans in March of 2007. This is a
16 copy I'm providing to the Merlin group.

17 MS. TROTTER: That's the double eyewall
18 presentation?

19 THE WITNESS: Yes.

20 (Time Noted: 1:46 p.m.)

21 (Exhibits 4-5 marked for identification.)

22

23

24

25

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION

HELEN DAVIS

PLAINTIFF

VS.

CAUSE NO. 1:06CV574-LTS-RHW

STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY

DEFENDANT

DEPOSITION OF RICHARD HENNING
VOLUME II OF II

Taken at the instance of the Defendant at
the offices of Merlin Law Group, 368 Courthouse Road,
Suite C, Gulfport, Mississippi, on May 4, 2007,
beginning at 8:47 a.m.

APPEARANCES:

DEBORAH R. TROTTER, ESQ.
Merlin Law Group
718 Dunbar Avenue, Suite 1A
Bay St. Louis, Mississippi 39520
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF

DION J. SHANLEY, ESQ.
Hickman, Goza & Spragins, PLLC
115 Homestead Drive
Madison, Mississippi 39110
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT

REPORTED BY: Sherry L. Purvis, CSR #1566
Certified Court Reporter
134 Mallard Pointe Drive
Madison, Mississippi 39110
(601) 605-0229

Exhibit 'D'

1 exhibit to the Carbine deposition -- was that the same
2 conference? Oh, that was a 2006 conference?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. Okay. All right. And I know we had talked
5 about it in a previous deposition. For purposes of this
6 record, it's true that you have authored approximately
7 170 reports since 2005?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. And approximately 100 specific to
10 Katrina?

11 A. Yeah, something over 100, and I don't know the
12 exact number.

13 Q. Okay. And all of those, is it safe to say,
14 we're prepared on behalf of a homeowner?

15 A. No. There are a few outliers that aren't
16 the -- what I would consider the -- the vast majority of
17 them are in cases where homeowners were acting as
18 plaintiffs versus an insurance company, and where I was
19 contacted by a -- a law firm representing those
20 plaintiffs. Those are the vast majority. There are a
21 few outliers. One of them is for Balch & Bingham, their
22 Crowley container case. They are acting -- Crowley,
23 Chiquita and Dole are acting as defendants in a suit
24 brought by homeowners in the Gulfport, Long Beach, Pass
25 Christian areas where approximately 150 containers washed

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1 aircraft this year. It'll be the first season that we
2 fly them into -- into hurricanes. The NOAA P-3 aircraft
3 that are flown by the -- the NOAA hurricane research
4 division have been flying with the SFMR for the three
5 years on their aircraft.

6 Q. And understanding that there is some
7 disagreement within the field concerning the proper
8 adjustment from flight level wind to surface wind in
9 interpreting or in extrapolating what the surface winds
10 would be, that's a disagreement among and between
11 meteorologists, would you agree?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. I mean you're not contending that the
14 Hurricane Research Center had any agenda?

15 A. Oh, absolutely not. I -- I know most of the
16 folks that work at the hurricane center and the hurricane
17 research division, and I've known them since I began
18 going to conferences in 1997, and had a lot of -- a lot
19 of discussions with them both officially and
20 unofficially, and I -- they're -- they're outstanding
21 scientists. Ultimately what they're -- they're doing
22 what -- what every scientists should do, and that's just
23 search for the truth. And -- and I don't -- I don't
24 think they have any -- any sort of reason to -- to fudge
25 their data one way or another.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION

REBA J. ECHEZABAL,

PLAINTIFF,

vs. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:06-CV-005220-LTS-RHW

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,

DEFENDANTS.

DEPOSITION OF RICHARD G. HENNING

JUNE 27TH, 2007

VOLUME 1 of 2

(Pages 1-198)

The deposition of RICHARD G. HENNING was taken in the above-styled cause by the attorney for DEFENDANT, on Wednesday, June 27th, 2007, commencing at 3:00 p.m., at the offices of Destin Reporting, 910 Airport Road, Suite 3A, Destin, Florida, pursuant to Notice.

REPORTED BY: TRACY LEFEBVRE, COURT REPORTER
& NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF FLORIDA

1 particular location. Is it my understanding that
2 your methodology would be to first look at the
3 reflectivity reflected on these radar screens, but
4 then also as a separate method also look at radial
5 velocity, which we haven't gotten into yet?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. Okay. So you use those two things and
8 combine them to determine in your mind or
9 formulate an opinion in your mind as to whether or
10 not a tornado occurred at a certain location?

11 A. Actually, that's not -- that's not -- I
12 can't take it that far. What I'm looking for are
13 cells that are candidates to potentially have been
14 tornadic. There's no way to tell for sure in most
15 land-falling tropical cyclone situations that a
16 tornado occurred because the tornados that are
17 generated by land-falling hurricanes and tropical
18 storms and depressions, which I lump together as
19 tropical cyclones --

20 Q. Uh-huh (indicating affirmatively).

21 A. -- those types of funnel clouds and tornados
22 tend to be very transient features. They tend to
23 form, go through their life cycle and dissipate
24 within a period of just a few minutes. And the
25 temporal resolution of the radar, that is the time

1 step of the radar, is every five to six minutes.
2 What we're looking at are snapshots. Each of
3 these radar frames that we're looking at are
4 somewhere either five or six minutes apart.

5 There are tornados that go through their
6 whole life cycle in between a couple of these
7 frames that are never seen. They're also
8 generally, in a land-falling tropical cyclone, too
9 small to be actually seen on radar. So what
10 you're looking for is the parent cells that could
11 potentially generate them.

12 Q. Okay. So as a meteorologist, when you are
13 looking at this reflectivity and the radial
14 velocity, which we haven't gotten into yet, and
15 you're looking at those things and you're
16 combining them to formulate opinions, you're
17 saying that it's never going to be your opinion to
18 a reasonable degree of meteorological certainty
19 that a tornado actually touched down without some
20 additional information; is that right?

21 A. That's correct. Using radar for, again, for
22 the types of tornados that occur within feeder
23 bands and the eye walls of a land-falling tropical
24 cyclone, it's difficult to tell in most cases --
25 in the vast majority of cases, you cannot

1 definitively say whether a cell either did produce
2 a tornado or did not produce a tornado based
3 strictly on radar data. You can say that this is
4 a candidate. This is, you know, a good candidate
5 to have been a tornadic MCV, but you can't say for
6 certain that it produced a tornado unless you have
7 some sort of other way to determine that, either
8 by looking at the damage or eye witness testimony
9 or something like that.

10 Q. Okay. So to elaborate on that, when you're
11 talking about you can't ever say to a reasonable
12 degree of meteorological certainty that a tornado
13 touched down at a specific location just by
14 looking at radar data -- that's what you said,
15 right?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay. By radar data, you mean the
18 reflectivity information and the radial velocity
19 information?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. Okay. I'm sorry. Go ahead.

22 A. Yeah. If you want to talk more about the
23 radial velocity product, part of the problem with
24 the, what people refer to as Doppler radar, which
25 is the NEXRAD WSR-88D radar system, is that it was

1 designed in the 1970's and the early 1980's to
2 look for classic Midwestern tornados, the ones
3 that occur in Oklahoma and Kansas that are the
4 most deadly that occur for a half hour or 45
5 minutes, an hour at a time, that sometimes cover
6 several dozen miles in a long track similar to
7 what was seen in Enterprise, Alabama and places
8 like that. That is what the WSR-88D was designed
9 to detect.

10 You will not have that kind of a signature,
11 that kind of a definitive signature with either
12 reflectivity or with radial velocity products with
13 a land-falling tropical cyclone. There's lots of
14 reasons why that is the case, but one of the
15 primary reasons is that the entire circulation of
16 the storm is rotating.

17 Q. That's right.

18 A. And what that tends to do is it tends to
19 confuse the computer algorithm that is built into
20 the WSR-88 that tries to pick out what we call
21 TVS's, tornado vortex signatures. Most people
22 that are trained in looking at Doppler radar
23 outputs looked for those TVS signatures that are
24 automatically generated by the WSR-88 system.
25 And, typically, you will not get those in a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION

REBA J. ECHEZABAL,

PLAINTIFF,

vs. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:06-CV-005220-LTS-RHW

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY,

DEFENDANTS.

DEPOSITION OF RICHARD G. HENNING

JUNE 27TH, 2007

VOLUME 2 of 2

(Pages 199-248)

The deposition of RICHARD G. HENNING was taken in the above-styled cause by the attorney for DEFENDANT, on Wednesday, June 27th, 2007, commencing at 3:00 p.m., at the offices of Destin Reporting, 910 Airport Road, Suite 3A, Destin, Florida, pursuant to Notice.

REPORTED BY: TRACY LEFEBVRE, COURT REPORTER
& NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF FLORIDA

1 to the storm surge part summary, which is the last
2 three pages?

3 A. Uh-huh (indicating affirmatively).

4 Q. On the -- let me look here. On the second
5 paragraph you state: "As it is often seen with
6 extremely high surge events, the water rose very
7 rapidly and then receded back into the gulf
8 quickly." And then you go into some calculations
9 about the time frames by which the storm surge
10 came upon the Pass Christian, Henderson Point area
11 and then receded. Where did you get those times
12 from?

13 A. What I rely on quite a bit is the ADCIRC
14 model runs that were done after the storm. ADCIRC
15 stands for Advanced Circulation Models and the
16 SLOSH models. SLOSH is an acronym, S-L-O-S-H,
17 which is -- I have both the standalone SLOSH model
18 and the SLOSH model variant that's embedded within
19 HURRTRAK. And --

20 Q. Okay. Let me stop you just one second --

21 A. Sure.

22 Q. -- just so we don't have to go into another
23 hour explaining the differences between the two.

24 A. Sure.

25 Q. Let's make sure we can all agree. I want to

1 calculation as to storm surge as it comes inland
2 from the ocean. But what happens is, is that it
3 bases its calculations as if the earth were flat
4 and there was no topography, no terrain, no other
5 bodies of water to slow it down or speed it up;
6 isn't that right?

7 A. No. It does use terrain, but it uses a --
8 it's limited by the resolution of the model.

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. In other words, it's a very pixilated
11 depiction of the topography.

12 Q. Okay. And so what you're saying is the
13 numbers that you put here with regard to time
14 frames are not exactly extrapolated from the
15 ADCIRC models, but you use those in coming up with
16 your figures, right?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Okay. So how do you get from the figures
19 that are on the ADCIRC model to what you put in
20 your report?

21 A. What I do is I take the ADCIRC curve, and I
22 alter it to account for the fact that the
23 acceleration of the surge depth occurred more
24 rapidly than what's depicted in the ADCIRC model.
25 The ADCIRC model gently and gradually increases

1 winds to be brought down to the surface. None of
2 those were captured by the dropsondes.

3 Q. Okay. So that was going to be my question.
4 It's your opinion -- I guess my question is, is it
5 your opinion that if that same exact dropsonde had
6 have been released from the aircraft at the exact
7 same place perhaps 10 or 15 minutes earlier, you
8 would have gotten a very different reading from
9 the dropsonde?

10 A. It's very likely that we would have seen
11 stronger winds at the surface.

12 Q. Closer to the ground?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. But you don't have any objective evidence to
15 support that theory, correct?

16 A. No.

17 Q. Let me just do a few housekeeping and a few
18 follow-up questions, and I think we're going to be
19 done. I just want to make sure that I clarify for
20 my purposes that, again, that you didn't do any
21 independent site specific evaluation of the
22 Echezabal property in particular, did you?

23 A. No.

24 Q. And so you don't know from your own
25 observation, you don't know if there was anything

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION

BARBARA A. CANDIOTTO,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Civil Action No.: 1:06CV518

STATE FARM FIRE &
CASUALTY COMPANY,

Defendant.

The deposition of RICHARD G. HENNING was taken by the attorney for Defendant, pursuant to Notice before Tracy A. Lefebvre, Court Reporter and Notary Public, State of Florida, on Monday, July 2nd, 2007, commencing at 3:30 p.m., at the offices of Destin Reporting & Technology Group, 910 Airport Road, Suite 3A, Destin, Florida.

1 papers that have been published by meteorologists
2 that have studied Katrina, research papers. And
3 none of those have changed the findings that I had
4 in the report, though. Generally, what this new
5 material has done is served to further illustrate
6 some of the points that I make in the reports.

7 Q. Okay. Have you produced those additional
8 reports in any of this litigation?

9 A. Yes. It's been part of the disk for each of
10 the updated reports. If I'm asked about an
11 updated report in a deposition, the disk will
12 include all of the new papers. If it's an older
13 report where I have obviously had an opportunity
14 to look at new material since then and the report
15 itself has not been updated and I refer to any of
16 the new material, I do provide any of the new
17 papers that I've looked at since then on disk.
18 I've done that routinely in several depositions
19 recently.

20 Q. Okay. But the report for the Candiotto
21 residence, which is located at 426 North Central
22 Avenue in Waveland, Mississippi, this is not a
23 report which you have any plans of updating; is
24 that correct?

25 A. At this point, no. I have not been asked to

update this report.

2 MR. WEATHERLY: Jeff, let me say this.

3 Let me interject something, that it may
4 well be that we'll get you a supplemental
5 report that includes this additional
6 information. I don't believe it's going
7 to change his ultimate opinions.

8 MR. PIERCE: Okay.

9 MR. WEATHERLY: But if we do send it to
10 you, obviously, you have a right to reopen
11 the deposition and question him about
12 whatever these supplemental materials
13 might bring out.

14 MR. PIERCE: Okay.

15 MR. WEATHERLY: I would suggest we
16 handle it that way, that I anticipate you
17 will get a supplemental report.
18 Obviously, you don't have the most recent
19 version of what's going out now, and we
20 would not object to you re-deposing
21 Colonel Henning in the event you wanted to
22 on those supplemental matters.

23 MR. PIERCE: Great. Thank you.

24 MR. WEATHERLY: Okay.

25 BY MR. PIERCE:

Q. What additional information is out there?

2 What additional reports are out there?

3 A. There have been several papers written
4 recently.

5 Q. Do you know specifically what they are?

6 A. Yes. There's a very important paper that
7 was published in the April 2007 bulletin of the
8 American Meteorological Society by Mark Powell and
9 Tim Reinhold that discussed the overall
10 destructive potential of Katrina expressed as,
11 what they refer to as integrated kinetic energy.
12 It takes into account the size of the storm, the
13 fact that Katrina was an abnormally large
14 hurricane in terms of aerial coverage. And that's
15 a very important factor to consider above and
16 beyond the Saffir-Simpson scale, Category One
17 through Five.

18 And I consider that to be a good piece of
19 substantiating data that helps to support some of
20 my -- some of the assertions in my earlier
21 reports. So all of the reports that I write now
22 include references to the Powell paper.

23 The same is true for a couple of papers
24 written recently by Dr. Keith Blackwell at the
25 University of South Alabama Coastal Studies

1 also make -- it's obvious to me that you
2 haven't had the benefit of these in
3 advance so, you know, if you wanted to
4 question him about them, you should have
5 the right to look them over in advance so
6 you can be prepared to question him. And
7 I would suggest that if you feel like you
8 need to go back over these additional
9 materials, that you just let us know, and
10 we'll set the deposition -- you know,
11 re-notice the deposition.

12 MR. PIERCE: Yeah. We might have to do
13 that. You know, I don't know --

14 MR. WEATHERLY: You may find out after
15 you review them and get the supplemental
16 report from us, you may choose not to
17 re-depose him, but that will be your call.

18 MR. PIERCE: Okay. Are there any plans
19 right now to do a supplemental report?

20 MR. WEATHERLY: I think so probably.

21 BY MR. PIERCE:

22 Q. Have you been asked to do one?

23 MR. WEATHERLY: We typically do that in
24 these cases. We just haven't got around
25 to it in Candiotto.

1 A. That's exactly right. Their office -- both
2 their offices in Gulfport and Bay St. Louis have
3 been asking me to do a lot of updates to reports
4 recently. And part of the problem for me is I've
5 been doing a lot of depositions lately and doing a
6 lot of traveling.

7 Q. And you can't be two places at once --

8 A. I can't be --

9 Q. -- and doing two things at once?

10 A. Exactly. So it's basically come down to a
11 matter of time management. I'm getting to them as
12 fast as I can. For example, I just found out
13 about the Candiotto deposition last week, that we
14 would be having it today so I did not have enough
15 time to prepare an update.

16 One thing that I can offer is that all of
17 the papers that I've just mentioned from Dr.
18 Blackwell and the paper by Dr. Powell have been
19 discussed extensively in recent depositions --

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. -- taken by State Farm attorneys.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. So they are available in transcripts of
24 other depositions, a discussion of these
25 materials.

1 Q. And how you're relying on them in
2 supplementing certain reports that you've already
3 supplemented?

4 A. Yes, sir.

5 Q. All right. And is there anything that you
6 can think of right now, and I know that you
7 haven't really put pen to paper to supplement this
8 report, but how is it that you would use this
9 information to supplement a report just generally
10 speaking?

11 A. What I've been doing is I've been inserting
12 new paragraphs into an old report with this new
13 information. Some of the verbiage in the existing
14 paragraphs has been altered to some degree, but
15 primarily it's a matter of just pasting in new
16 paragraphs that deal with these new papers and
17 this new information.

18 In this case, nor in any of the other cases
19 recently, in this case I don't see where any of
20 the new information would change my findings as
21 far as wind and surge. And generally they
22 haven't.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. They haven't changed my estimations for
25 maximum sustained winds or maximum gusts or when

1 those gusts occurred or the magnitude of the surge
2 and the timing of the surge. It's, again,
3 primarily been a matter of the new material being
4 added to the reports to help substantiate some of
5 my findings as further evidence.

6 Q. All right. Now, other than the three
7 additional sources that you've listed today -- and
8 that's Dr. Powell's article, Dr. Keith Blackwell's
9 written extensive double eyewall study and then
10 Dr. Blackwell's Power Point presentation, is there
11 any additional information that you've got which I
12 would not have today in the Candiotto matter?

13 A. Yes. And, again, none of this is
14 incorporated into any new Candiotto report yet,
15 but it's material that has been incorporated into
16 new reports. And that is papers written by
17 members of the laboratory at Texas Tech
18 University.

19 Several individuals from Texas Tech set up
20 towers at Stennis Space Center and at Slidell.
21 And I have written about the results of those
22 towers that were set up and referenced at least
23 two of their papers. I have -- again, I have both
24 of those, I believe. Let me find the exact
25 copy -- or the exact title. It will take me a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
SOUTHERN DIVISION

LYNN H. LOTT and CAMILLE W. LOTT,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CASE NO. 1:06cv315LTS-JR

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY

COMPANY and HANCOCK BANK,

Defendants.

The Deposition of RICHARD HENNING, taken by the attorney for the Defendants, commencing at 1:30 p.m., on the 10th day of May 2007, at 348 Miracle Strip Parkway, Suite 11, Ft. Walton Beach, Florida, before Patricia C. Stephens, Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of California and Florida Notary Public.

1 Hunters, along with any surviving wind anemometer
2 readings that may be present along the coast, buoy data,
3 satellite data, radar imagery, and then computer models,
4 and they then come up with these values manually. They
5 use their experience and create the advisories by hand.

6 Q So they take the different data sources and
7 evaluate them basically on a case-by-case basis to arrive
8 at the values that they put into the system to arrive at
9 the wind speed at a particular point?

10 MR. MYERS: Wait a minute. Are you talking
11 about the federal agency, or are you talking
12 about Hurrtrak employees?

13 MR. CORLEW: The federal agency.

14 MR. MYERS: Okay.

15 BY MR. CORLEW:

16 Q That's who creates the advisories?

17 A Yes, the federal -- yes, the specialists at
18 the National Hurricane Center in Miami create the
19 advisories based on all those different types of
20 information. Again, they generate a package of products
21 as a storm is making landfall, and the Hurrtrak program
22 ingests those products and then creates a wind field
23 based on those products.

24 Q Is there a method -- this may or may not be
25 an appropriate question. But with respect to the

1 Hurricane Center in Miami, is there a method they use to
2 convert, for example, a dropsond reading to a
3 ground-level wind speed, or do they even attempt to do
4 that?

5 A They attempt to do that. They use both
6 dropsond data and our flight level data, which is -- for
7 Hurricane Katrina, that morning and then the morning I
8 was flying, is anywhere between 10,000 feet above the
9 surface and 8,000 feet above the surface, depending on
10 where you are in the storm. We actually descend in
11 relation to the water going through the eye.

12 So they, again, use both flight level and
13 dropsond data. And again, it's a case-by-case basis how
14 each forecaster interprets the data. They use -- they do
15 use reduction factors, but it depends on how they're
16 interpreting the strength of the convection as to what
17 kind of reduction factor to use.

18 Q What about with respect to some of the
19 data -- to some of the data gathered at individual sites?
20 For example, you referred to the Emergency Operations
21 Center in Pascagoula.

22 A Yes.

23 Q How do they evaluate a particular reading
24 from a site like that; do they have height or information
25 that's that detailed?

1 A Normally, those kind of reports are used
2 later to reconstruct the wind field. They tend to be
3 sketchy at the time of landfall. And they may or may not
4 get those kinds of reports that are referred to as
5 unofficial reports, because there are only a handful of
6 official national weather service or military reporting
7 sites along the Mississippi coast, and they all were
8 rendered offline at some point during the landfall of the
9 storm.

10 So they rely on these to get these reports,
11 sometimes by ham radio, sometimes by telephone line,
12 however they get the information, and incorporate them
13 into the advisories. You see that a lot of times in the
14 verbiage of a landfalling storm, where they'll refer to
15 reports of winds from the police or emergency management
16 officials or some other kind of unofficial anemometer.

17 Q How do they confirm that, or is an attempt
18 made to validate those results, for lack of a better
19 word?

20 A In real time, there isn't much opportunity
21 to corroborate their accuracy. They look at it to see if
22 it's in context with the storm, with the -- what part of
23 the storm the reports are coming from, to make sure that
24 it isn't something that's totally nonsensical, either too
25 strong or too weak of a value, and -- but again, they

1 look at it and do their best to take the information
2 that's coming in and make an estimate of the wind field.
3 They don't rely a lot on those kinds of reports in their
4 advisories.

5 Q And the advisories -- I probably should
6 have asked you this earlier -- does the Hurrtrak rely on
7 advisories that are generated during the storm, or is
8 there some attempt to go back and look at the advisories
9 to see if the data that they're getting is consistent
10 with other data they may be receiving?

11 A This is the advisories that were issued
12 during the landfall of the storm. This Hurrtrak used
13 advisory number 27. That was issued the morning of the
14 29th of August.

15 Q What time was it issued?

16 A That was at ten o'clock a.m.

17 Q Okay. And then it's extrapolated. We
18 talked about this a little bit early on about the
19 Hurrtrak, but they take that data and extrapolate it
20 across the coast; is that accurate?

21 A Well, extrapolate and interpolate.
22 Probably interpolate is a more accurate word, because
23 what interpolation does is it seeks to assign a value in
24 between a couple of points rather than take a value and
25 speculate on its -- take a point and speculate on its

1 this: Did -- y'all didn't generate it, though,
2 Rob.

3 MR. MYERS: I don't have to generate it for
4 it to be work product.

5 MR. CORLEW: I just wanted to make sure I
6 understood the objection.

7 BY MR. CORLEW:

8 Q Do you have any notes that you have done
9 that aren't reflected in the reports?

10 A No.

11 Q What about data that you have generated
12 that is not in the report, or that you relied on that's
13 not in the report?

14 A No, I haven't -- that report specifically
15 on the Lott property was completed on April 30th, and
16 I've had the benefit of using all of the information that
17 I have up until this point in that report. There are
18 things in that report that aren't contained in earlier
19 reports that I've done, because I've had the benefit of
20 time, and so it's very comprehensive.

21 Q Other than meeting with Mr. Myers, did you
22 do anything to prepare for your deposition today?

23 A I read over the report last night and the
24 timeline, familiarized myself with some of the exhibits.

25 Q Are you familiar -- I know we discussed

1 them to some extent -- with formulas or equations used --
2 and it may be just a factor, but used to convert wind
3 speed readings at elevated levels, say, 1,300 feet to
4 ground level?

5 A Yes.

6 Q And what are those equations?

7 A They're not necessarily -- they're not
8 equations. They're really just percentage reduction
9 factors. And again, they are used at the discretion of
10 hurricane specialists in creating their advisory
11 products, and then by researchers later on in doing
12 reconstruction of the wind field. And again, sometimes
13 they use 90 percent; sometimes they use 80 percent;
14 sometimes they use 70 percent.

15 It -- I have found in writing 170-plus of
16 these reports that -- and I have expressed this opinion
17 in conferences, and I have done this with personal
18 communication with a lot of these people -- that the more
19 work I do in this, the more it shows me that applying a
20 broad-brush reduction factor like that is inappropriate;
21 that it's an oversimplification of the wind field, and
22 that it's important to look at the convection that's
23 occurring at a particular location at a particular time
24 to determine how much of the winds aloft are translated
25 down to the surface.

1 Q Are there -- you've told me basically three
2 reduction factors, but is there scientifically accepted
3 methods of using the reduction factors as opposed to, one
4 researcher would use 90 percent?

5 A Well, it has to do with the stability of
6 the boundary layer. The more unstable the air mass is
7 below the eyewall of a storm or below feeder bands of a
8 storm, the higher the percentage of winds aloft that are
9 translated to the surface. I would agree with that
10 premise. What I would not do, though, is apply a simple
11 number. Like, I would agree that the number would be
12 higher, but that number may be close to 100 percent in
13 some cases. It may be 80 percent in other cases.

14 In a very stable, what we refer to as,
15 laminar flow, with very stable air under the eyewall in a
16 decaying storm, that number may be somewhere near 50 or
17 60 percent. It all depends on the stability of the air
18 mass and the amount of convection that's occurring.

19 MR. CORLEW: Take a break for a second.

20 (Brief break.)

21 MR. CORLEW: I don't have any additional
22 questions.

23

24

CROSS-EXAMINATION

25

BY MR. MYERS:

1 Q Mr. Henning, I do want to ask you some
2 questions following up on Mr. Corlew's questions. In
3 particular, I want to focus on the methodology and the
4 principles you utilized in formulating your opinions in
5 this case, and in Katrina in general.

6 Have you applied any novel theories,
7 approaches or methodologies? And by that, by novel, I
8 mean that are not generally accepted in your field of
9 expertise.

10 A No.

11 Q And as part of your job duties and
12 responsibilities in working for the United States
13 Government, do you not forecast the weather conditions
14 that are -- that may approach the military base or
15 installation, and that have approached the military base
16 and installation in a hindcast-type analysis?

17 A Yes, we're -- yes, we're -- we have gone
18 back, and in particular, Hurricanes Ivan and Dennis, how
19 they impacted the Eglin Air Force Base. It's 724 square
20 miles of property, and we've received a considerable
21 amount of damage. So we went back and looked at what
22 happened in particular parts of the base, similar to the
23 kind of work that I've done here for this case and other
24 cases where I've worked as a private consultant.

25 Q In the type of forecasting that you're

