As promised, more on the pro se plaintiff v anticoncurrent causation (Lexington/AIG) starting with Lexington’s position.
Lexington has a right under the insurance policy to deny payments for damage that was caused by (a) flood water (as defined by the policy) or (b) a combination of flood and wind…In other words, it matters not whether the egg or chicken came first…
The water exclusion and the anti-concurrent clause provisions are valid and enforceable under Mississippi law. See e.g., Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 507 F. 3d 346 (5th Cir. 2007); Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2007).
Consequently, the anti-concurrent cause clause bars any claim, or parts of a claim, that Plaintiff may make regarding wind damage that preceded flood damage or for damage caused by flood or a combination of flood and wind.
Even if the wind first damaged a portion of the home which portion was thereafter flooded, there is still no coverage under the Lexington policy for the flood damaged portion of the home.
Oops, Lexington did not mention the Rooster’s decision!
[A]n anti-concurrent cause provision has no application in a situation (such as Hurricane Katrina) where two distinct forces (wind and water) act separately and sequentially to cause different damage to insured property.
Each force may cause damage to different parts or items of the insured property, as occurred in the Leonard case, or the two forces may cause damage to the same item of insured property at different points in time. But the two forces, i.e. wind and water, remain separate and not concurrent causes of this damage...
[T]he anti-concurrent cause provision is not applicable and does not come into play because each force causes its own separate damage independent of the damage caused by the other even when the same item of property is damaged by both forces acting separately and sequentially. Wind and water are separate and not concurrent causes of the damage to the insured property. In either case, the damage caused by wind is covered under the policy while the damage caused by water is not.
It does matter whether the chicken or the egg came first if you count your eggs before they hatch as Lexington did in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in Pro Se Plaintiff v Lexington.
Lexington’s failure to consider Dickinson in the adjustment of the pro se plaintiff”s claim is established in the Motion and serves as evidence of the bad faith the Company denies.